



PHILOSOPHY OF SHAH WALIULLAH

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1. **Intensité du signal**
2. **Temps de réponse**
3. **Précision**
4. **Stabilité**
5. **Facilité d'installation**
6. **Coût**
7. **Fiabilité**
8. **Compatibilité**
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اسی قسم کے ایک اور ایسے ڈاکٹر تھے جنہوں نے *The Personality* اور *Black Metaphor* کے عنوان سے اپنی کتابیں لکھی تھیں۔ میرے اعلیٰ درجے کی تعلیم کے دوران میں ڈاکٹر صاحب موصول پر میرے شعبے کے نصاب کے لئے ۱۹۶۹ میں دہلی کی یونیورسٹی کے شعبہ تعلیمات اسلامی میں ایک محکمہ کے طور پر قائم ہوئے۔ اس وقت میں اسی شعبہ میں کے شعبہ میں جا کر رہا تھا۔

ایک دن باکرہ خدائی حسین کے ساتھ مسجد اقصیٰ میں گئے ایک فوجی
 ان کی طرف سے ان کے کئی دشمنوں اور انہیں ہلاک کیا۔ یہاں تک کہ وہ
 اپنے ہاتھوں میں ہلاک ہو گئے۔ یہاں تک کہ وہ اپنے ہاتھوں میں
 ہلاک ہو گئے۔ یہاں تک کہ وہ اپنے ہاتھوں میں ہلاک ہو گئے۔

انسانی جیسے سب سے زیادہ اعلیٰ مخلوق ہے، اس کے لیے اللہ تعالیٰ نے جو احکام دیے ہیں، ان کو اپنی زندگی میں عمل کرنے کی ضرورت ہے۔ اگر وہ ان احکام کو نہ مانے، تو ان کی زندگی برباد ہو جائے گی۔

تھا۔ یہودی تعلیمی صاحب کی تعلیم سے فائدہ حاصل کی ایک تہذیب، فلسفہ المسیحی، ایک
 مذہب کا نام قبول حاصل ہوا۔ اس تہذیب پر فائدہ حاصل کے اس وقت ہے، فائدہ
 حاصل کا اعتبار ایک پہلے نام بھی اس لحاظ سے ضروری ہے کہ

جہاں طغیانی صاحب کو اس پر ہوا خود پر فخر ہے کہ اس کے پاس خدا کی آواز کے
 پہنچنے میں کچھ حائل پہنچنے کی مشابہت۔ قرآن مطلقاً کہتا ہے کہ خدا کو سہرا ہے۔
 میرے کہ کاہنوں پرست سے یہ خدا کی طرف سے آواز آتی ہے جس میں صاحب طغیانی نے کہا کہ
 صاحب کے لئے کہ کاہنوں کی طرف سے آواز آئے۔ جہاں طغیانی صاحب کا یہ دعویٰ ہے کہ خدا
 کی آواز اس کے منہ سے آتی ہے اس کتاب کو چھپانے کی پہلے پہل پر ہے کہ اس کتاب کے
 صاحب سے بہت سی ایسی باتیں خدا خود پر آتی ہیں کہ خدا کی آواز کے منہ سے آتی ہے کہ
 آواز ہے۔ جہاں طغیانی صاحب کا کہنا ہے کہ خدا صاحب سادگی کی بات کے قابل ہے
 کہ تمام کا صاحب کا کہ تمام کہنے کے قابل ہے۔ خدا کی آواز کے لئے کہے کے لئے
 انہیں نے فرمایا کہ اس کتاب کا لکھنا سادگی کے لئے ہے چاہا کہ اس لئے اس لئے
 کہ لکھنا سادگی میں ہی حقیقت ہے۔

صاحبِ دین، مسعود خاں، طرزی لکھنے والی کتاب خلافت کی جدت، اللہ علیہ اعزہ
اس کے ساتھ ساتھ یہ مطالعہ کروں گا۔ یہاں میں اللہ کو شاکر کہتا ہوں کہ اس کا ایک
پہلو ملے گا۔

[illegible]

میرے اہل گھر نے میری فکر کے بارے میں ، مصنفین کی فطرت اور حصول
تعلیمت میں مصروفیت کے حوالہ پر ایک نئی افلا میپیا بنوا دی۔ اس حوالے پر فطرت
پر اعلیٰ صاحبہ نے لکھ کر ایک صفحہ ، ڈاکٹر قابلہ عثمانی ، بدھ لکھ کر بھیجا ،
کہ کہ صاحبہ صاحبہ کے لئے ، اہل گھر کے لئے ، اور میرے لئے ، اور میرے لئے ،

The thought at hand tries to present a comprehensive philosophy of Shih Muliushih. In it we have dealt with his epistemology, metaphysics and ethics consisting of the following heads :

- CHAPTER I Life and works
 CHAPTER II Epistemology
 CHAPTER III Metaphysics
 CHAPTER IV Education of Jolly
 CHAPTER V Ethics



In his life and works we have discussed his predecessors and their scholarship. Alongwith it we have also pointed out the conditions which Shih Muliushih inherited from them. It has also been brought in light that throughout his life Shih Muliushih had been inquisitive for the search of knowledge and that abstained from all possible sources of his time. To satisfy his urge he learnt a good deal from his father and other teachers in Jolly and thereafter went in twice to prosecute his knowledge. After getting the permission at the age of 14 he began to teach jurisprudence and tradition in the school founded by his father and continued it till the end of his life. Throughout his

life he studied and wrote, and as a consequence to this, made great contribution in the realm of philosophy, legislation and jurisprudence.

In his epistemology, we have pointed out that the philosophers he created, consider the reason and the sense experiences as the two sources of knowledge. Shah Waliullah neither challenges the authority of the reason nor does he deny the validity of reason as the sources of knowledge but he does establish a hierarchy. To him the lowest kind of knowledge is imparted by the senses. The reason gives a higher kind of knowledge, apart from these sources he also considers the heart, the soul and the hidden power (sirr) as the sources of knowledge, and one yields higher knowledge than the others. Shah Waliullah being a sufi gives much emphasis to the soul (nakh) and considers it to be the highest source of knowledge. Besides, he lays much emphasis on the forms of intuitive knowledge, meditation (tafakkur), inspiration (ilham), contemplation (muraqaba), revelation (wahy) and hidden (sirr) all of them are the forms of intuitive knowledge.

According to him the dispositions bring out a discipline in the life of a sufi meaning thereby that it

almost as indispensable for the pursuit of self-interest.
 That Malikish is of the view that the ignorance of the
 dispositions prevents his progress and whatever he keeps
 on practicing lacks experience. That Malikish, therefore,
 speaks of the advantages of their knowledge and also
 informs of the nature of their ignorance. The advantages
 of the knowledge of dispositions that he speaks of are :
 (1) The soul knows the right way to remember God,
 (2) he becomes aware of the fact that the knowledge of
 the things falling out of the span of reason can be obtained
 by the dispositions. Describing the nature of their
 ignorance that Malikish says that (1) in case of the
 ignorance from dispositions the what reason cannot be
 made strong. As a matter of fact he is unable to know
 as to which of these dispositions is weak and how to get
 it made strong. It is indeed essential for him as any
 such ignorance would hamper his progress. Moreover, he
 should be aware, which of the dispositions should dominate
 the others so that he might control the stronger powers in
 him, (2) the other part consists in the fact that the soul
 passing through the alternate stages of assimilation and
 aversion finds himself in a complete equilibrium and
 stability. In fact a loss is experienced as to what is

going on with him and where he is at a particular stage. Still another form of the ignorance of these disquisitions lies in the fact that the gaff is unable to understand the stage of his predecessor and considers it as the highest as his final one.

Shah Waliullah proceeds to the discussion and gives us an analytical approach by describing the meanings of different terms used by the gaffs. He is of the view that the meanings should necessarily be determined so that the context may be clear and there should be no difficulty in understanding and comprehending the underlying thought. Discussing the problem, he takes up the term 'nafy' which is sometimes used as the nature of man and sometimes as his inner soul and as covers up the heart. In each case it will have different implications, defects and qualities. In the same way the heart is also used in very different things. Sometimes it is used to mean a bit of flesh in the body, and at others the power that controls the motions.

Shah Waliullah also discusses in his epistemology the limitations of the sources of knowledge. It stands as a fact that each one of them imparts the knowledge but in his limited span. He takes them to discuss so that people may not rely on any one of them as every one of them has

The man area of perception and cannot be considered as sufficient for the knowledge of everything. Thus the subject present in the world is the actualisation of the forms present in the world of forms. The reason perceives their difference and the relation as well. It also comprehends the difference of the attributes and the substances and along with this also sees through their relation. Highest thus the reason is the system of Shah Islahiah there to yet another source of knowledge known as the hidden power or the 'Girr'. It is a form of intuitive knowledge. After being the hidden power in man makes him realise the secret of truth which is the highest type of knowledge. But it should be kept in view that even this hidden power (Girr) is not prior to revelation. He again and again emphasises on the need of the prophet and considers the institution of prophethood as the source of human welfare.

Having spoken of the limitations of the senses and the importance of the hidden power (Girr), Shah Islahiah comes to discuss the distinction between reason and 'Karr'. Here again he emphasises on the identity of the terms and by doing so removes the confusion that arises otherwise. Both reason and Kurr impart to us the knowledge of the objects. Yet they are not one and the same and are distinguished

on the basis of their domain. The reason concerns the
 qualities of objects and thus is the power through which
 the existing object with its contradictory qualities is
 comprehended. Heggen fails to understand the contradiction
 of the qualities existing in the objects. As a matter of
 fact it is the error of the senses which apparently
 creates the contradiction of qualities. Otherwise, it
 certainly, there exists no such contradiction. He argues
 that no two individuals are alike and yet they are not
 different from each other. It is obvious that they are
 not alike due to the individual qualities and not different
 from each other due to formal and essential qualities.
 Looking through the difference in the individuals he comes
 to conclude that the world exhibits qualities meaning
 thereby that every object is present in abstracts and it
 is its form. It is evident that they are neither alike
 nor different from each other. Even after being separate
 they are related with one another and this relation is
 established in the form of universalization by the universal
 soul which is devoid of all qualities. Considering the
 foregoing as material object he asserts that they are of a
 kind to understand the relation between the external world
 and the human beings and the universal soul.

Shah Waliullah being a practicing self mystic such as the soul. He is of the view that the meaning of man and other things is the soul though it differs in category. Keeping it in view he describes different categories of soul namely the animal soul (Nafs-e-Ahwal), the rational soul (Nafs-e-Natiqa), Universal soul (Nafs-e-Kulliyah), divine soul (Nafs-e-Azali), angelic soul (Nafs-e-Malakiah), world soul (Nafs-e-Duniavi), heavenly soul (Nafs-e-Jaliliyyah), and perfect soul (Nafs-e-Kamilah). Apart from these there are some other categories like the mineral soul (Nafs-e-Masadatiyah), Vegetative soul (Nafs-e-Hayatiyah). Each of them relates to the nature related to its capacity and to the being of the object. We have discussed these categories in his epistemology, for it relates to the sphere of knowledge.

Discussing the categories of soul Shah Waliullah also describes the nature of every one of them and in accordance with their nature they have their own functions to perform. To begin with every one of them is divine but the element of divinity is in accordance with their grades. The animal soul is created out of the impurities and controls the necessity. The rational soul is confined to man and controls him as a man. Man possessing both

The animal and rational tendencies also have both the soul via. the animal and the rational and each of them controls the tendencies related to them. As a matter of fact the former is the element of the latter. The universal soul is more divine in nature and manifests itself in different parts of existence. The mineral, the vegetation, the animal and the rational souls are its manifestation and it manifests itself in accordance with the universal expediency (ma'likat-e-shaili).

Discussing the divine soul Shah Waliullah speaks of a point known as 'hajra bahar' and it is the essence of the divine soul and is realized by a wali who reaches the stage of pure consciousness (fahm-e-bahar). Having realized the point he goes through many other secrets which as far stretched extend to him. On the basis of the discussion regarding 'hajra bahar' it is the concept of the highest type of intuitive knowledge.

It is obvious that the point mentioned above can be the source of knowledge in the few steps. Once again it depends on the stage reached by the wali. As we know the divine soul is a succession of (1) mineral soul, (2) the world soul and (3) the hajra bahar. One of the three dominates the others and the stage of the wali is

determined on the basis of the destination which has been discussed in his epistemology. At present it will suffice to say that the soul in any of these stages understands the fact that it is the universal soul which manifests itself in different grades. Criticizing the followers of Bahá'u'lláh Majid Sháh Bahá'íah points out that they could not comprehend this fact and considered the existence to be the manifestation of the One beyond our reach. Besides, he also criticizes the followers for not having perceived the relation between the attributes and the substance. Although, as he thinks, there is a unity underlying the diversity, yet it is not of the kind which merges into One. To him the unity is hidden in the attributes. The reason and explanation of it by seeing the mediatory qualities of the objects which are latent in their being. The qualities of one are shared by others. It is because that all of them are manifestations of universal soul and being its manifestation there is a resemblance with each other, and on the basis of these similarities they are bound up in a unity. And on the basis of this unity they are related with each other. Thus it is neither the relationship, as understood by the followers of Bahá'u'lláh Majid nor is it the one grasped by the people of Bahá'u'lláh Sháh. Here

Shah Waliullah partly supports the notion by understanding the objects to be the manifestation through out of God out of the universal soul (qala-a-kulliya) and he differs from the school by asserting that the complete knowledge of God is a matter of impossibility. We only have a part of the truth.

Shah Waliullah is of the view that any of these disciplines can be perverted and the perversion of each of them would influence the others. Besides, the perversion of one would result into the creation of a particular will, explaining it he holds that if the soul is perverted, man would lead a sensual life; if the heart is perverted, he will be guided by his emotions and the perverted reason would not let him discern the right and wrong. The purified and trained disciplines would help man inculcate all the natural virtues namely piety (taqwa), attention to God (Khawf), attachment (mahabbat) and Justice (Adalat). On the basis of this discussion we may conclude that the common knowledge depends on the right sources and if they are unrestrained and unperfected they cannot lead us to true knowledge. In the case of man being able to get that true knowledge it will be difficult for man to lead a good and virtuous life.

There has been a controversy regarding the Shariah and 'ta'rifat'. Some of the ulema are of the view that 'ta'rifat' is more important than the 'Shariah'. It will be worthwhile to mention here, as Shah Waliullah has himself disclaimed, that the mathematician in particular laid emphasis on it and did not give due importance to Shariah. But as Shah Waliullah thinks that Khwaja Naqshband indeed did not care it, his followers, rather misunderstood him and misinterpreted his thought. It was, therefore, that Shah Waliullah took up to explain the importance of Shariah but it should be borne in mind that he still persists to follow his notion of synthesis and consequently affirming the importance of Shariah does not, however, deny the relevance of 'ta'rifat'. But it stands as a fact that the Shariah being the spirit of Islam is more important.

To him, Shariah is only the way to purify and train these dispositions. Dissenting it he holds that there are two aspects of Shariah namely the internal and the external one. The external aspect purifies the five senses (Jawarih). It keeps one refrain from the sins and establishes a system of values. The internal aspect of Shariah purifies man's soul and makes him understand the meaning of vice and virtue. The external and the internal

aspects purify different dispositions and in accordance with the purification of the dispositions the stage of the soul is determined. For example one whose heart is purified and trained is truthful (siddiq), one whose animality is trained is a man of patience (sabr), one whose reason is purified is a learned man (faylasufin), one who whose dispositions and senses are not trained but he avoids a life of excess, is righteous (muhibul yamin).

The chief importance of the Shar'iah lies in the fact that there are two necessities in man, namely the actual or natural inclination and the belief or mental inclination. The former inclines man to the life of sin and profanity and the latter helps man to the life of piety and virtue. Shar'iah being a discipline helps subdue the lower inclination and due to their sublimation man becomes pure and pious. Thus it may be concluded that Shar'iah enjoys a priority in the inclination of virtue in the life of man. Moreover, it helps man impart the knowledge. Being the complete discipline it informs man about the right and the wrong.

Shah Waliullah also emphasises on the habitual discipline in God. How must they feel not because that He has commanded for it but because we feel an urge of

shallowness.

Having explained the sources of knowledge that Valikhin takes up the dangers of getting false knowledge. The first one of these lies in the misunderstanding. That Valikhin is of the view that many of his wife are not capable of understanding the stages of evolution and rebirth and it is therefore that the scholars of Shaikh have not explained them. But that Valikhin considering it an unfortunate taken up to explain them because the wife of his time were rather confused about these stages and he saw in it a possibility of misinterpretation and abuse.

That Valikhin is convinced of the fact that every event has its cause. It should however not be mistaken that he believes in the atomistic theory of causation. Every danger rooted in its sources of knowledge can be mediated by analyzing its cause and, as a matter of fact, as inferred on the basis of his views, the best possible way of its mitigation lies in the rectification of the disposition.

Speaking of the dangers that Valikhin also asserts that the wife should be able to know the divine will. Dismissing it he asserts that the urge is needed

in the world of forms by the universal intellect (*noûs*) and is brought to the individuals by the higher souls in the world of forms. The soul must have the capacity of uniting it. He, however, is informed of the divine nature in different ways.

At the outset of metaphysics of Shah Waliullah we have taken the premise of synthesis which may rightly be considered as his main contribution to the realm of metaphysics and *uṣūl*. One of them was the controversy between the two schools of *uṣūl*, namely *shāhīdī* and *ḥādīdī* school. He took up to resolve the controversy neither by rejecting any of them nor by promulgating any other school but by seeking a reconciliation between the two. And, as history witnesses, he was successful in his efforts. His philosophical writings could earn for him a good deal of fame and reputation. Besides, he was known as a fervent traditionalist and an ardent scholar of jurisprudence.

Shah Waliullah did not stop only at finding out similarities between the above mentioned schools of *uṣūl* but he also tried to resolve the controversies in different *ḥādīdī*, namely *shāhīdī* and *ḥādīdī* and various schools of jurisprudence (*fiqh*). We have mentioned it

to prove that for Shah Waliullah synthesis was a method and he applied it in his various writings on different subjects. This work only demonstrates the synthesis of the described subjects. Shah Waliullah goes forward convincing arguments to point out that mujtahid and shahidiat are the two stages and as the shahidiat has been propounded in a later period of history, it is a higher stage. It should be borne in mind that mujtahid Ali Qari also holds the same opinion but his followers reject one and proposed the other. But Shah Waliullah does not take himself to say such thing. Contrary to this, he explains that they, being the stages should not be rejected. Shah Waliullah is of the view that the place of a thought in the history should be determined and having determined it we should try to understand the development of knowledge. He holds that every age has its own span of knowledge and whatever is written in it is undoubtedly in accordance with the comprehension made possible on the basis of the development. Putting it more explicitly he asserts that the people belonging to different ages have their own domain of perception which categorically depends on the standard of the knowledge developed in that age. In brief, the time to conclude that Shah Waliullah does not reject the

thought of any of his sides.

Dismissing the similarities between the two schools Shih Hsiieh-shih proceeds on saying that Tzu-tu is one and on next that it cannot be claimed to have achieved its fully. as a matter of fact the tenth year after being one to an man in itself and the next, temple of his all efforts, gets only a drop and is contented with it. Explaining it he presents the traditional analogy of the birds taking water from the spring drop by drop with their beaks and a traditional example of birds not having felt the parts of the tree. Each of them considered its part as whole. By presenting these examples Shih Hsiieh-shih aims at asserting that in the first case the truth stands beyond our reach and in the second place it has been adequately observed. The analogy shows the vastness of the truth and the example gives us a clue of the misrepresentation of the seekers. In the first case it undoubtedly stands as convincing and in the second, as Shih Hsiieh-shih himself asserts, a eye of good vision may correct the mistake.

Explaining the similarities between unjed and ch'ung Shih Hsiieh-shih brings to light a very important discussion. as begins it by asserting that the existence

and concept are separable and are different on the basis of the qualities. The existence in concept is an abstract existence and the existence perceived is characterized by some qualities and the most important of them are the objectivity and the existence itself. Shah Waliullah has made a contribution by pointing out the qualities in the objects. Thus it is suggestive of the fact that the objects possess two types of qualities namely (1) the common and essential qualities and (2) the individual qualities and both passing through the objects make it what it is perceived. The existence is a common and essential quality of the objects. It runs through all the beings and thus it unites them all. It is on this basis that the unityism or monism is supported by Shah Waliullah. Writing about the Shuhudiyat, Shah Waliullah agrees with the Mujaddid on the point of the existence of the appearance but he does not agree with him when he asserts that the world is not the manifestation but the reflection of the attributes. To Shah Waliullah the difference between the two statements is the difference of interpretations. Shah Waliullah again points out that the Mujaddid is right to assert that the appeared and the appearing, i.e. reflected and the reflecting are different. It is on the will of

the reflecting to reflect as long as it desires. That is to say that the image formed after reflection exists in the body reflecting and it remains in the mirror as long as body is present before it. In spite of its being the image of the same body it cannot however be asserted that the two are identical. Once again, as Shah Waliullah thinks, perceived this identity in the state of unity in which the distinction between the two nearly God and the world is not clear but in the very possessing of the mysterious condition of the nafi.

Writing about nafi Shah Waliullah points out the importance of nafi practices. He philosophically explains the two aspects of Islam namely the external and the internal, the Shariah and Haqq (sanctification). Each one of them is formed by different types of people i.e., (i) the reformers, mujtahids etc., and (ii) by nafi. Differing from those, whom he does not name, he reforms with the will of God and gives points out his different stages.

Having described it Shah Waliullah comes to discuss different attributes which are required by a nafi with the help of his repetitive efforts. He presents a brief of what we shall give only their names :

1) attribute of piety : It is indeed necessary for a sufi in particular and for the people in general. Cleanliness has been adopted by almost all the religions.

2) Attribute called (Mikhat-e-Ishiq) : The secret of this attribute lies in the purification and stilling of the heart. It can be obtained in three phases : (1) by remembrance of God, (2) by induction of mercy (Mumal-e-rahmat) and (3) by the illumination of the light of the divine aspect.

3) Thereafter he discusses the Divine attribute which is acquired by seeking the proximity with the angels or the soul mates.

Discussing the attribute of amory Shah Waliullah points out a very important thing. He holds that the knowledge of the object is gained with the help of the language.

Shah Waliullah understanding its nature begins his ethics with the definition of virtue. He is of the opinion that every object whether animate or inanimate possesses some attributes (Kuslat). Discussing them he holds that there are two types of attributes (Kuslat) namely the natural or the innate ones and the acquired ones. In the case of inanimate which it was evidently

be inferred that there arises no question of any acquired attributes. They must possess only the innate or the natural ones. It is in the case of man and some other higher animals that some attributes are acquired. The property of innate attributes is essential in all the species though it is evident that there would be a difference in accordance with the nature of the things. Even after that there are some qualities (Katalekt) which are common in the species. Such qualities must stay examples of those common and essential qualities in different species, and in them we speak of the common and essential qualities identified by different species. Some of them are shared by man and inanimate objects, some of them are common to man and plants, and others are shared by man and animals. These common and essential qualities shared by different species cannot be counted as their virtues for they are in their very being as in other words innate. Their possession cannot be considered as something specific which can separate them as their basis as virtues or actions. These qualities can be regarded as virtues in the case of species amongst which their existence is a matter of impossibility.

Having spoken of the common and essential qualities

Shah Waliullah discusses the attributes particularly possessed by man alone. Some of them are, for example the high morals, courage and good effects. To Shah Waliullah they are partial virtues, for many of them are possessed by higher animals. Courage is one of the examples. There comes then the question as to what the virtue is. The answer to this question as Shah Waliullah thinks, is that virtue is one controlled by soul and desired by reason.

It is not indispensable that the virtue be actualised in the action, and every action cannot, however, be regarded as virtuous. It is obvious and requires no study. Shah Waliullah, admitting the fact, speaks of two types of actions namely one related to the world and the other related to divinity. Both the types of action are potential in man and he realises to perform them when the time demands. Courage, for example is shown at the time of danger, otherwise it lies hidden as potentiality and does not come forth unless demanded. Similar is the case with other actions related to the world. Shah Waliullah is of the opinion that these actions are virtuous but not in the real sense. And it is also evident that all of them cannot be regarded as virtues (Fazail) for

many of them belong to the actual tendencies which in no way do any good is questioned. The second type of actions, as that nihilistic holds, are also potential in man, and when they are concerned with divinity and man the qualities of man alone are held as virtues in the real sense.

It also stands as a fact that for being a man actually he sublimated, and it is, therefore, that the philosophers have suggested different ways for his suppression. The Ishwariya, for example, as that nihilistic himself reasons, preferred to destroy it completely. But it is rather difficult for a man to do it and as that nihilistic profess another way which in our opinion, is more psychological and suitable to the human nature. He holds that the complete destruction of sexuality is a matter of impossibility but it is true that it can be sublimated as a great art and when it will be suppressed it is evident that the soul is no rational inclination which we may call its divinity would dominate and its domination would result into the cultivation of the virtues in the real sense (that is) belonging to the second category of actions. Now that nihilistic shares many views philosophers which he does not notice. However,

the way which he suggests is more practicable even for the common man is take his virtues and it is, indeed helpful in the realization of Santa, the virtue in the real sense.

The second type of actions lead to the creation of fellowship virtues, which must necessarily be possessed by a virtuous man. Such fellowship comes then as (1) purity (ichhat), (2) humility (ija), (3) detachment (samhat), and (4) justice (nirhat). All of these virtues are cultivated voluntarily and when man becomes habitual of them, he feels themselves in their absence.

Such fellowship considers the above described virtues as the cardinal ones, but along with it he also professes other virtues which are either to be taken as virtues or as sins. In his ethics he first takes up the actions held as virtues.

The first one of them is the belief in the unity of God. He considers it as one of the essential virtues to be possessed by man or he would not be taken to be a Muslim. Describing it he speaks of the stages, namely the belief in the unity of God (1) as the only existence, (2) as the only creator, (3) as the only designer of the universe and (4) as the only one to be worshipped.

The second of these virtuous actions is the belief in the attributes of God. Shah Waliullah considers the attributes to be the qualities which should carefully be unfolded. Due to the difficulties to agree with the Islamic view that the common man should not contemplate over them. Besides, he also describes three categories namely (1) the attributes allowed to be thought over by Shariah, (2) the attributes disallowed to be thought over by Shariah, and (3) the attributes to be thought over as per necessity. For instance, laughing (sahak), happiness (farhat) etc., belong to the first category, sobbing and lamenting are included in the second category and the attributes like that of knowledge such as seeing, hearing etc., come under the purview of the third category. By giving these categories Shah Waliullah means to point out that belief in the attributes is necessary but the ponderance on them may mislead the people.

Shah Waliullah is of the opinion that the fasting is greatest of all virtues. In order to support his contention he cites certain traditions which we have mentioned in his ethics. Besides, he also speaks of its five stages namely (1) the stage of fast, (2) the stage of hunger, (3) stage of *shar'a* creation of good his personality,

(4) stage of the fusion of the soul into the intellect and
 (5) it is the stage when the events happening in the world
 of matter are recorded in the world of heaven. From the
 discussion of these stages it is clear that Shah Waliullah
 professes a staunch belief in destiny and associates it
 with the same force and firmness. The stages categorically
 suggest that Shah Waliullah does not believe in complete
 freedom of will but it should also be taken into account
 that he neither denies the freedom of man. He is of the
 view that in spite of the determinism man has been given
 the power of choice and this implies that he is responsible
 for his right and wrong deeds. Shah Waliullah, like
 Ash'arites, advocates and demonstrates the determined
 destiny.

In the discussion of virtues, Shah Waliullah also
 talks of worship. He regards it as one of the greatest
 virtues man should cultivate in his life to benefit him
 and satisfies his nature. Shah Waliullah repeatedly
 emphasises on the importance of worship. He regards it
 essential for the training of man and it has also
 brought to light his ignorance. He regards the pagans as
 polytheists. He thinks that to be the man who worship
 the planets, and Shah actually draws our attention to Shah

he also considers deviations on polytheists. Shah Waliullah also classifies the vice of the major and the minor ones.

Apart from it, he speaks of other virtuous actions like prayer (salat), fasting (sawm), holy war (jihad), pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), holy war (jihad), abstinence (nasa), begging (dawa). In addition to this he also describes the secrets lying behind these virtues.

Shah Waliullah has given a complete system of ethics. He has not discussed the virtues alone but has also described the vices. At the onset of the discussion of the vices he takes up polytheism.

Shah Waliullah is of the view that the worship should be performed by will and not by habit. Here he explains the meaning of will. The power of will like is the power of choice. He explains it by criticising the philosophers that the will implies being and not doing of an action, and before it is done or not done it does not mean anything, meaning thereby that the action is prior to will, its performance depends on it. Thus he requires that the action is prior to will. It is created by God, first in world of forms and then in the world of objects and man chooses its doing or not doing. And worship being one of the virtuous actions should be chosen by man

by his own will. The same controversy he resolves by pointing out that there are two types of actions namely (1) (a) voluntary, (b) involuntary and (2) laws. They are also of two types, (1) necessary and (2) probable. Establishing it he gives the example of a statement of a person declaring that the police know-grilly knows death. The other denies the statement and challenges its necessity. To him a person taking police say service. This is the case if it is necessary, and is the other if it is probable.

In addition to the other pervasiveness brought about by the sin, it affects the outward behavior of man. As he lives in the society he must behave in a way which does not affect the institution, and if he does not do so, not only the society but he too will be affected and the development of both, man and society will be hampered. Thus the education in the outward behavior is a must.

The second name connects in the blessing and curse of the highest spirit is 'khatirah qala'. Their blessing is reward and their curse is punishment. Such utilization signifies it saying that finally God blesses the virtuous and punishes the vicious. Man having the power of choice makes any one of that his blessing.

Rationalising it, he holds that every creature feels contented and relieved if it does its accordance with its nature and if it acts otherwise it feels dissatisfaction and torture. The same is true in the case of man. He possesses the divine disposition (latifah secara) which is the basis of his nature, consequently, he must perform the actions satisfying this disposition. If his actions correspond to his nature, he feels satisfaction, and if the case is otherwise, he feels torture and pain.

Shah Waliullah presents a complete system of ethics. Regarding virtue he is of the view that it will be recognised in accordance with the species. The virtue in the case of other species of animals will be the (sacra) attributes (kamilat-e-shai) and in case of man it will be determined on the basis of acquiring those qualities helping the tendencies of divinity present in the soul man of man. Regarding destiny it has been ascertained that he advocates semi-determinism. Shah Waliullah does not reject the principle of reward and punishment, instead of it he holds that God being the knower of all things also knows the destiny of man which he will choose for himself in his future. Shah Waliullah is also of the view that blessing and curse of God depends on his will. Like

Asbathia he never likes to limit the powers of God in any sphere. In our opinion Ghosh Sainuliah, by considering man to be good by nature, presents an ideal of man who is perfect in all respects and that man is Prophet Muhammad (Innuul-Kamil).

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This is to certify that the thesis
entitled "PHILOSOPHY OF SHAI KHAN" is
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award of Ph.D. degree in Philosophy.

(Signature)

(Dr. Mohd. Hossain)
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CHAPTER - I

LIFE AND WORK

The assessment of ability, intellectual capacity or any other realted quality may be made only after assessment of the personality of the person in view. Without if the glimpses are vague and implicit and we feel hesitant disaffiliated in the account of the contribution of anyone whom we uphold as worth describing and study.

Keeping this in view, we are bound to present a short account of the life of Shri Mallikarjuna, who has been an eminent scholar and prominent figure of his day. He rises to the view at the time of decline of imperial empire. The decline was not affecting from the point of view of regional life, as if there is a principle that the decay of a region results in to the decline of a set of values and eventually morality in the society. We need not substantiate the argument with a talk of ambivalence, it will suffice to say that history witnesses such changes in the socially structured a particular region has come to decline. Malabar was the condition of the society in India when Shri Mallikarjuna took up as his challenge to restore the old but unattained values

of Islam. The Muslim in partitioned at that time had forgotten what they received from their predecessors in inheritance. Describing it more explicitly, the knowledge of tradition was completely swept to oblivion. The Muslims were indulged in rival rages and little was thought of religion. Before him, it was Ghos Ghalib Naqvi believed to conserve the knowledge of tradition in India. His efforts did not result in to any special success. After him the able and sagely father of Ghos Mullaish, Ghos Abdul Fathim began to teach the tradition in his school. He also could not achieve any greater success in the revival of the knowledge of tradition, but his descendant Ghos Mullaish is noted for his contribution in the teaching of the tradition to the Muslims of India. He is notable not in the realm of tradition alone but also in the field of philosophy. We shall discuss his contribution to philosophy after giving a short account of his biography. In the discussion of his biography, we consider it is an indispensable to make the mention of those who contributed to Ghos Ghos Mullaish, what he is. In other words, we shall deal with those who have influenced him and whose opinions are heard in his works and teachings.

Ghos Mullaish is a descendant of Ghos Muhammad.

He is believed to have come from Arabia at the time when Islam was spreading over the southeast of Asia. However, nothing can be said with certainty about the date of his arrival in India, but it is a matter of certainty that after his arrival he settled in 'Satala' (a town in Punjab). He was a staunch devotee of Islam and made all his attempts to spread it within the reach of his voice. On most occasions it has been that from Sheikh Ghumadidin to Shah Abdul Aziz, the son of Shah Waliullah, all of them were the devoted Muslims and fought for the cause of Islam. On most cases it is said that Shah Waliullah was brought up in an environment where devotion to Islam stood as the characteristic feature of the family.¹

The first great name in the generation of Ghumadidin was Sheikh Kamaluddin. He was a devoted scholar of Islam and the religious leader of the day. He was honoured by his son Sheikh Ghumadidin about whom not much is known. However, his scholarship and devotion are unchallenged. The next important figure that emerged in the family of Sheikh Ghumadidin was Shah Waliullah, the son of Ghumadidin. He was a man of ability. He received his basic education from the scholars of his own family. Thereafter, he began

to learn the tradition and soon became accomplished in it. His ability and scholarship made him extra ordinarily popular among muslims. After his death, his son entered the qadi (qadi position). He was not as learned as his fore-fathers. He had three sons namely Qadir, Shakh Mullah and Shakh Yusuf. Qadir became the successor of his father. He was succeeded by Shakh Yusuf and after his demise Qadir, the eldest son of Shakh Yusuf became the Qadi (Judge). Qadir had a brother who equalled him in scholarship and ability. Qadi Qadir had two more sons Shakh Ahmad and Shakh Adas and his brother Shakh Kamaluddin had only one son named as Shakh Huseinulla. Shakh Huseinulla being the eldest of all succeeded his father but later on renounced the honor of qadi and led a soft life. He was a spiritual man and had the divine gift of ability. After him, the renowned scholar of this generation was Shakh Ahmad, the son of Shakh Huseinulla. He used his scholarship to Shakh Abdul Ghani (had Shakh Abdul Ghani, the son of Shakh Ahmad) and scholar of his time. The concept of Shakh Abdul Ghani, Shakh Yusuf was as great a scholar, as his predecessors were. He had six sons, Shakh Muzaffer and Shakh Mubarak. Shakh Muzaffer had four sons namely Shakh Muzaffer,

Shahid Khan, Shahid Khan, Shahid Khan and Shahid Khan. Among them, Shahid Khan was a notable figure. He had three sons, Shahid Jahanbakhsh, Shahid Farid and Shahid Najibullah. From Shahid Najibullah descended Shah Abdul Hakim, who had two more brothers, Shah Abdul Hakim, and Shahid Abdul Hakim. Shah Abdul Hakim was the son of Shahid Abdul Hakim.¹

We have given a short account of the predecessors of Shah Abdul Hakim. We shall now present a brief sketch of the life of his father Shahid Abdul Hakim. The account of his life is rather essential for our purpose because it will help us to understand the disposition of Shah Abdul Hakim which he got in his childhood.

Shahid Abdul Hakim the father of Shah Abdul Hakim was born in 1824 A.D. He was born in a family having a mystic disposition. It is evident that he must have been influenced by the family environment. He received his education from Shahid Abdul Hakim, his brother, Shahid Khan and Shah Abdul Hakim. Shahid Abdul Hakim was a mystic person. From his childhood, he had a taste for knowledge in order to satisfy the stars. He studied the tradition (Hadith) and Muslim jurisprudence (Fiqh). He was an ardent scholar of his time. Having been accomplished in the knowledge of tradition, Hadith and Fiqh, he established a

arrived in Delhi and began to teach there. He belonged to a well established and prosperous family and as a consequence in this he hardly had to think of his subsistence. Moreover, he had a reputation in the royal court because his father Sheikh Najmuddin held an important post in the city of Delhi. He was desirous to preach Islam and taught the tradition, Shariah and jurisprudence to a great number of students. Thus Sheikh Abdul Rahim legitimated the Muslim intelligentsia by his scholarship and ability.³

In spite of being prosperous, he led a simple life and since he was a sufi, he wore traditional sufi dress. He was a pious man and used to honour the people like him. Throughout his life, the teaching of Islam remained his objective and it was due to his efforts that revival of the teaching of tradition took place and the muslims of India had the opportunity to learn tradition, Shariah and jurisprudence. It is really a worthwhile contribution of Sheikh Abdul Rahim, but it was further excellently made by Shah Waliullah (his son).

Sheikh Abdul Rahim died on 12th of safar 1131 Hijrah in the month of February. At the time of his death he was seventy seven.⁴

Before we begin the account of the life of Shah Waliullah, it will be apt to speak a few words about the characteristics of his family. On this upon ourselves to describe it shortly with its help we shall have a key to probe in his personality and eventually understand him with more clarity and better comprehension.

From Shah Waliullah to Shah Abdul Rahim we can in his family a line of scholars each of them gained popularity and fame for his condition and ability. On the basis of their scholarship and ability, they had gained the favour of the court and were given high honours. Many of them were given the responsibility of the post of Qadhi (Judge) and many of them, although had no such post, yet they were greatly honoured in the court for their learning and ability. Most of his forefathers were divinely inspired and had a sufi disposition. His father Shah Wali Rahim was influenced by a sufi, Khwaja Hashim, belonging to the sect of Naqshbandiyya. On this basis it is concluded that the Shah, if did not belong, was at least in proximity with this sect. Thus it is evident that Shah Waliullah descended from a family of scholars having sufi disposition and aptitude. It is more than material that he must have got sufi potentialities, love of wisdom and devotion to Allah and

in inheritance. The parent of his family brings us to understand these significant stimulus to his character. In this sense, it will be facile for us to understand his personality.

Now that we have described his family background, it is time for us to present a resume of his biography.

Shah Waliullah was born on 4th Shawal 1114 Hijrah (1703 A.D.). He was brought up with a special care and kind patronage of his father. Since his father was a saint and in addition to this some other saints had prophesied about Shah Waliullah that he would be a great saint and a great scholar of his age it was his family would always feel a pride. The prophesies included a sheer truth which is manifest in his life. At the time of his birth, the British was not leading a prosperous life. He received no subsidy from the East government, however, he was a self reliant man and was able to bring up his posterity in a proper way.⁵

Shah Waliullah had a great ability, capacity and aptitude of learning and his father had realized it. Keeping this in view Shah Waliullah began to impart knowledge to his child even since he was only five years old. In the beginning he brought him up in his child patronage. His

guidance and his a child different from others of his age. Shih Wai-shieh started learning Farsi when he was seven years old and due to the devotion to knowledge he soon achieved an accomplishment. Thereafter, at the age of ten years, he was well versed in grammar and composition. His father also taught him logic and very soon he was a scholar in it. When he was fourteen years old, his father invited the renowned scholars and scholars and before them put the 'crown' on his head, signifying that he was allowed to teach the tradition and make his scholars. In the fourteenth year of his life before this auspicious occasion, he took the oath of allegiance before his father and became the disciple. His father commanded him to follow the path of Naqshbandiyya in action. In the same year, he was married. His marriage followed many unhappy events and due to them he was greatly perturbed. However, his devotion to knowledge was never anticipated and despite of the misadventure he continued to go through the books of tradition and Fiqh. His father died when he was seventeen years old. His death gave him a great shock and he took up some time to reconcile with the existing situation.⁴

His father made him his successor in his life time. He had completed his education by that time and his father aptly considered him to be able to teach the tradition, Sharih and Fiqh. After his father's death, it was now his responsibility to preach Islam and teach theology. His father had founded a school in which education of theology was given to the disciples. After him, his son Shah Muhammad took up as himself to perform his great duty. Indeed, he had the ability to do the task. Soon he gained a tremendous popularity among the Muslims of India. A number of disciples came to learn tradition and Fiqh from him. He was regarded to be an excellent scholar and speaker. Due to his efforts the revival of the learning of tradition took place and the Muslims from far-off places started coming to him to learn the tradition and Fiqh.⁷

After Shahid Abdul Haq Muhammad Subhani and Sheikh Abdul Rahim, Shah Muhammad was the next, who was actually successful in the revival of the learning of tradition and Fiqh. The number of disciples that he taught was greater than ever. The Muslim in India developed an attitude for theology and a great number of them came to him for the attainment of its knowledge.⁸

Just thirteen after the death of his master imparted the education of theology to the nation for twelve years. As a teacher, he was held high and his disciples paid a great respect. He loved his disciples and always made a kind treatment with them. To many of them, who had the talents and arave for knowledge, he offered a financial support.⁹

Having taught for twelve years, he felt an impulsive urge to continue to learn the religious sciences from better scholars. Although he himself was a great scholar and had many disciples yet he felt to develop his knowledge in it. With this view he made up his mind to go to Arabia for the attainment of religious learning.¹⁰

Having reached Arabia and after performing Hajj, Shih Waliullah presented himself before Shaikh Nuh, Waliullah gave Shaikh Nuh, his mada, his precious atmosphere as a disciple. The Shaikh was pleased to receive him and at his request included him in his disciples. For some time he taught him and thereafter allowed him to teach the tradition. From him he took 'Amata Yahya Isha Yahya'. Being accomplished from his school, he went to Shaikh Abu Yahya Nuh, bin Ibrahim Kili, where he learnt 'nahl hukmah' and sufism. Shaikh Abu Yahya was himself a great wali and Shih Waliullah

obtained goods under his guidance. On the completion of spiritual discipline the Shaikh bestowed upon Shah Waliullah the well known (Khirqah). He also learnt tradition from Shaikh Tajuddin Qasbi Hamauli, who also certified his ability to teach tradition and granted him the permission to teach it, after satisfying himself with the mastery of the accomplished student in imitation Shah Waliullah returned to India.¹¹

He was not only a scholar of the scientific sciences but also a learned Sufi. He shall mention the names of those who influenced him in the realm of tradition and Sufism. All of them were great scholars and Sufis of the day. They are Shaikh Ahmad Chagvali, Shaikh Ahmad Qasbi, Syed Akbar Ismaeeli, Ghawadhi Sahab, his uncle Sahab, Shaikh Jee Jee Bahadur, Shaikh Ibrahim Kirai, Shaikh Hasan Ajeeli, Shaikh Ahmad Ali and Shaikh Abdullah bin Salim Alhasani Samarkandi. In case of Sufi he used the knowledge of Sufism. He had studied them with the help of his teachers in Arabia and in case he used the knowledge of tradition. It seems that the tradition came to him from them as a source. Apart from it, Shah Waliullah was influenced with his uncle Shaikh Abu Raza Sahab, who along with his brother Shaikh Abdul Rahim shared the company of Shamsa Rawdillah Almasrudi and Ghawadhi Sahab

Kutubi. Khwaja Khwaj had shared the discussion with the disciples namely Imam Ashiqah, Shakh Ahmad Ashiqah, Imam al-Majidi al-Farsi, Shakh Aliabad Ashiqah, Khwaja Mirza al-Farsi, Shakh al-Farsi, Shakh al-Farsi al-Farsi and Khwaja al-Farsi al-Farsi, who was a learned scholar of Ashiqah al-Farsi. Imam al-Farsi established the school of Ashiqah al-Farsi. Shakh al-Farsi and his mother were benefited by the scholarship of Imam al-Farsi. Not even after that they were more inclined towards Ashiqah al-Farsi. Shakh al-Farsi mentions it in his work 'Ashiqah al-Farsi'.¹²

After returning from Arabia Shakh al-Farsi resumed his duty of imparting the knowledge of Ashiqah to others. and he was satisfied with his accomplishment and hence he spent all his life in teaching the Ashiqah and writing the books. Going to the Ashiqah of Shakh al-Farsi and Shakh al-Farsi, al-Farsi, he became a greater scholar and a real Ashiqah scholar. His popularity became on the peak and he became an important figure of the day in Ashiqah. He continued the teaching of Ashiqah until he died at an age of sixty years in 1174 Hijrah.¹³

Throughout his life, Shakh al-Farsi stood for the cause of Islam. The main objective of his life was to obtain knowledge and impart it to others. He spent his life in

writing books which reveal his genius and importance as a scholar. He was an eminent scholar of theology as you know and a great skill as the other. We should not consider him as a traditional theologian. Even after being a scholar of theology, he was a man of contemplation. He had a philosophy of life and he expressed it in his writings. He was an eminent philosopher of the day and was aware of science. He had studied logic and philosophy. He went through the school of materialist school and materialist school. He has attempted to bridge the affinity between the two schools. We shall deal with it in coming chapters. Before we conclude this chapter we deem it apt to make a mention of his great works.¹⁴

1. Fatahul Fatah Fi Tarjuman Ah-Juran
2. Fatahul Kahir Sharh Fatahul Kahir
3. Fatahul Kahir
4. Mas'ul Sharh Hala
5. Sharh Sharh Hala
6. Hujjatul-Ishlahiyah
7. Jawab-Fi-mayar Sahabul Ihtilaf
8. Hujjatul Shafiah Shilahatul Mujaahid
9. Qurratul Ain Fi Tufailul Mujaahid
10. Qurratul Ain

11. Feryusul Hamidah
12. Alfarazi Numan-Pili-mahachakrata Nadi Karim
13. Tawilul Ma'arif
14. Alfarazi Arifin
15. Shafariz Subuliyatun
16. Rizki
17. Dzakiah-Fi-salsali Nila Alim
18. Ghafar Nadi.

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CHAPTER - II

JOHN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

There are many sources of knowledge and the philosophers are divided regarding the authority of these sources. Some are of the view that the reason is the only criterion of the source of knowledge, and others believe in the authority of sense experience as a source of knowledge. To begin with the discussion, we should refer to the Rationalist philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz who believed in the authority of reason, but contrary to them are the Empiricists establishing the authority of the sense experience. Empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are the proponents of this school. It was not an oddity in the west. The philosophers in the East and particularly the Muslim philosophers have also pondered over the problem. Thus too the epistemology begins with the authority of reason. To support our contention, we fall back upon Mutazilites. The Mutazilites, as we know, are rationalists, but we should not confuse them with the rationalists of the west, for they believed in the authority of reason as the source of knowledge.

whereas the Rationalists attempted to follow the direction of reason as well as revelation. But it is a fact that Rationalists gave primary importance to reason and secondary importance to revelation. The Asharites, on the contrary, emphasized on revelation. They gave primary importance to revelation and secondary importance to reason. Putting it in brief, the priority of reason and revelation over each other was the point of contention between Rationalists and Asharites. Revelation has not been challenged by any school of Islamic philosophy, yet the place of reason has, of course, been overemphasized by the Rationalists.

The perception is also a source of knowledge. Indian philosophers, particularly the Charvatas, have emphasized much on its importance. Similar is the case with empiricists who testify in the necessity of sense experiences. As we are aware, the five senses give us the different types of perception and each of them imparts a particular type of knowledge of particular things. In other words, we can say that each of the senses has its own area and it cannot give us the knowledge falling out of its area or into the area of another sense. Going ahead with it, we can say that all

the sources have a specific area of knowledge and beyond it they cannot probe in.

In this respect, as we have pointed out earlier, that individual has defined well. His epistemology is mainly a *sofi* epistemology. He has tried to explain the dispositions (*aklat*). He is of the view that all the sources of knowledge help us in acquiring the knowledge, and it is therefore that he does not challenge the authority of any of the sources, but, together with this, he also holds that everyone of them has its own limitations. All that we know is a part of the truth and not the whole. He, however, emphasises on intuitive knowledge, and it is for the reason that that individual is a practical *sofi* man, being a *sofi*, intuition is held by him as the most important source of knowledge. He shall discuss it later on; at present it will suffice to say that that individual believes in the presence of different dispositions in one which impart him the knowledge on different levels. The highest power (*al-ir*), a type of intuitive knowledge, is the highest source of knowledge and is used at the highest stages reached by a *sofi*. It is, therefore, that he emphasises on the knowledge of dispositions (*aklat*).

Knowledge of Dispositions :

At the start of the discussion, let us point out that according to Shih Hsiangshih there are six dispositions in man, namely (1) Janshih, a disposition which controls the five senses, (2) Hsueh (talk), a disposition which controls the emotions, (3) Hsueh (act), a disposition controlling the heart, (4) Hsueh Hsueh (will) a disposition controlling the reason, (5) lower mind or lower soul (Hsin), a disposition controlling sensibility, and (6) soul (Shen), a disposition to impart the divine knowledge. He is of the view that, for a man, knowledge of these dispositions is a merit. He explains his assertion by giving the example of an old woman who, without knowing the characteristics of the medicine, prescribes it for others on the basis of her past experience. Thus the self-ignorance of the knowledge of these dispositions (shih) is very much like that old woman. Contrary to this is a man having the knowledge of these dispositions. He can be compared with a physician being fully aware of the diagnosis, nature of the disease, its causes and its remedies. The latter is certainly better than the former.¹

Apart from it, the knowledge of these dispositions helps

the suff in the remembrance of God. Shah Waliullah, on this occasion, speaks of the two methods of remembrance (Zikr).² The first consists in the fact that one will learn little from his elders. He remembers God but does not proceed to a higher stage. The second method of remembrance is more beneficial, for it consists in the fact that the suff has the knowledge of some dispositions (aitaf) and remembers God with all comprehension of what goes about the knowledge of the things falling out of the span of the senses. As it is an established fact that the senses fail to impart this knowledge, what could be, then, the cause for this. To many of the philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza, it is intuition and to others like Shah Waliullah it is the dispositions (aitaf). Some of these going to the heart, some to the liver and others to the head. We should not fail to mention here that the Shah does not deny the authority of testimony. He does believe in the authority of the holy Quran and the tradition, and considers them as the repository of knowledge. Finally, he speaks of the three kinds of knowledge, and for the attainment of each there is a source, way and method.³

At the onset of the discussion, it should be made clear that Shah Waliullah, in his epistemology, takes into

consider the discipline of sutra (śāstra). Earlier, as we have, Jhaṇḍi has spoken of the path and discipline of sutra. We have then a great contribution in this direction, but as history witnesses, the particularly so in India, there was a decline of sutra (śāstra) in the 18th century. We call this a decline because people, in general, hardly know what it is, but did follow just as fashion of the day. That Jhaṇḍi prescribes the knowledge of the disciplines as essential for the pursuit of the self, enough for it teaches the discipline and morality.

Having discussed the importance of the knowledge of the disciplines, the next comes to describe the sources of knowledge possessed by soul. Again the Indian have been recognised as the source of knowledge by some philosophers in the East and West, not that Indian philosophy knows (jñāna) alone as the source of knowledge. It appears to him that there are four sources of knowledge, namely (1) the soul (ātma), (2) the heart (hṛd), (3) the reason (buddhi) and (4) the higher power (śakti). He first takes up to explain the soul. As he says, the soul is something which, when leaves the body, enters it lifetimes. There are three kinds of soul : (1) animal soul (śūdra or śūdra-jīva), (2) rational soul (manu-jīva), the (3) spirit soul (ātma-jīva).

we shall discuss them later on.⁴

With this in mind, let us see the harm contained by a self in the case of ignorance of these dispositions. The first one lies in the fact that such a person cannot be strong. It sometimes so happens that one is the owner of a disposition (lakṣaṇa) and a self is strong and with its help he is able to pursue the course of action (tattva), but the next disposition hampers his way. The second harm of their ignorance is mentioned in the fact that in the course of his journey (samsāra), a self passes the stages of acquisition (lābha) and subsistence (bhoga) perpetually, but as he does not have the knowledge of the dispositions (lakṣaṇa), he is unable to understand anything and keeps himself in the state of these constitution and complete equilibrium. There is yet another harm of the ignorance of these dispositions (lakṣaṇa) that the self fails to understand the stages of the previous selfs or his predecessors, and confuses their stage on the last on the stage one as the goal of action.⁵

It is thus evident that the knowledge of the dispositions (lakṣaṇa) is indispensable for every person. It is necessary for the training of the soul. It also helps the self in his progression (bhoga). Not only this

but, as the Shah says, the passions (irshad) cannot be affecting without the knowledge of the dispositions.

There are three stages of these dispositions. Firstly, they are controlled by the senses (jam'ah). At this stage they obey the senses and follow all their habits. Consequently, they are at the animal stage (habialiyat). The second stage is that they are controlled by heart and mind with all the attributes of morality. At this stage there can be alternatives, viz. (1) the senses will either be accomplished with the virtues, and in such case the animal soul and the lower senses will have no contravention, or (2) the soul will not be virtuous. In such a case the animal soul will control them. In both the cases it will be the human soul. In the third stage both the animal soul and the lower soul will be annihilated and thereby the soul will be angelic in character. The soul must be aware of all these stages and should attempt at reaching the highest one which is divine in its nature. It cannot be achieved unless he obtains the knowledge of these dispositions.

The Four Dispositions :

Having discussed the knowledge of the dispositions, we shall take up the senses (jam'ah), heart (qalb),

reason (aqil) and soul (ruh). As Ghaz Mullaigh does not emphasize on the five senses (awrah), we shall discuss the stated dispositions in detail. However, it is indispensable for a wali to purify the senses which will be mentioned afterwards.

Before traversing the way of the purification of these dispositions, Ghaz Mullaigh points out the difficulties arising out of the use of the terminology. He asserts that the meaning of the terms used should be clearly understood, but many of the awlia, as he thinks, do not understand these proper meaning and connotation. It should, therefore, be pointed out as to what actually these terms like *qalbi* (heart), *heart* (qalb), *reason* (aqil), *soul* (ruh), *hidden power* (sirr) mean, as we use them to mean different things. It should, therefore, be pointed out as to what we specifically mean by them. He explains his contention by giving different meaning of some of these terms. *Qalbi*, for example, is used to mean different things. Sometimes we use it to mean the source of life and thereby it becomes equivalent to the soul; sometimes we mean by it the nature of man desiring good and shunning evil; sometimes we mean by it the animality; and sometimes we use it to mean the will. As we know, the nature of man overrules his heart and mind and if it is perverted the

will is born. It is this will born to save. Similarly, the heart has also different implications. Sometimes we mean by it a bit of flesh in the body. Sometimes it is used to mean the power of comprehension (*gnana-samartha*); and sometimes we take it to mean the disposition (*gunas*) of our soul as anger, pride, etc. In the same way, by reason we mean the power of knowing, but sometimes it is used to mean the soul and then becomes a "jagat" (substance); somewhere else it is "adibhuta". The causal, however, is the power controlling the nature and heart of man. Thus, all these dispositions run throughout the body, but each of them has its seat in different parts. The heart, for example, has its seat in a bit of flesh, the lower soul (*kaia*) in the liver and reason (*logh*) in the mind. Similarly, the soul runs through the whole body, but actually the soul unites the divine soul (*subramahat*) which was created many thousand years before its entrance in the body. In the same way, hidden power (*aiya*) means the concealed. As the soul enjoys priority in the body, the hidden power, in the same way, is superior to reason. Its function lies in the fact that it would save the reason of the intelligence in the worldly affairs and submit it to the divine powers. Thus, the soul often

confuse in the use of the terminology, and by using one they often mean the other, and also speak of its externality (bahir). Explaining it he gives the example of the love the internalities of which are described by them as affection (shifah), attachment (vow) which, as a matter of fact, are the attributes of the soul. In the same way, the belief (yaqin) which is actually concerned with heart is interpreted in many ways. and only this too they also speak of its stages as ilmal-yaqin, Naqsi-yaqin, and qabul-yaqin. Shih Waliullah asserts that the errors are not avoided in the use of terminology, and it is therefore that the disciples are often confused and do not understand the current and esoteric implications of the terms. He, therefore, emphasises on the clarity of the terminology and also states the principle to understand the real meaning of the terms used.⁶

The other three dispositions - the heart (qalb), the reason (aql), and the soul (ruh) - are internal dispositions. Shih Waliullah proves the existence of the three on the basis of traditions. In support of the existence of heart he cites the traditions proclaiming that (i) there is a bit of flesh in the body; when it is good, the whole body is good, and when it is bad, the whole body is bad. and this bit of flesh is heart.

(2) The heart in the body is like a leaf in the forest which is tossed by the wind at the will of the slightest. To prove the existence he quotes the tradition saying that (3) the soul desires not the way either fulfill or negate it. Regarding the reason the tradition says that (4) one possessing no reason has no religious action. The soul possesses three kinds of tendencies, namely (a) natural tendencies (qawa-e-tabiyya), (b) animal (hysterical) (qawa-e-haywaniya), and (c) rational tendencies (qawa-e-'ilahiyya). The roots of the natural tendencies is the liver, the dwelling of the animal or animal tendencies is the heart, and the seat of the rational tendencies is mind. The functions of these dispositions are different. The soul fulfills the needs of the body. It desires all that is good for the body and secures it from what is needed for it. All the natural desires, biological in nature, belong to the lower soul and in order to obtain it from the desires an intense prayer is needed. The function of the heart is related to the emotions and feelings like that of love, anger, hatred, generosity and misery, etc. Everyone of us is aware of the fact that when someone is angry, his heart is affected and it is seen through his facial expression. Gladness in the condition of the

aspect, when a man finds himself in the state of *faan*. The function of reason is to consider the present and make efforts of the future.⁷

All these three dispositions are one in man sense and different to another. When Valbailah first talks to the difference. In explaining it he describes the position of the soul. He holds that it is enfolded in the matter, having different senses and sensations. The soul controls them. It sometimes fails to control the strong sensations are strong, man is unable to understand anything. His heart and mind (soul) cannot helpless. Such a man is guided by his natural inclination and can be compared with vegetation and plants having no reason. Contrary to him is the man who is guided by his heart alone. He remains in the state of feeling and emotions like that of anger, fear, shamefulness, brevity, etc. Such a man can be compared with animals. Superior to all is the man guided by his reason. He utilizes the capacity of recollection and remembrance and makes efforts for the future. He can be compared with the lower animals (insects, reptiles). The study of man supports the conclusion. We find man in different stages described above. Thus it is evident that there is a difference, as the dispositions (soul) are concerned.⁸

Having described the difference, he takes up the clarity between these three dispositions. They are one in the sense that all of them belong to the soul and that, for a full coordination, they obey each other. Explaining it, he says that the soul obeys the heart, for without its help there cannot be any sensation. The heart obeys the reason, for it warns the heart about the forthcoming dangers and helps create the feelings of love, abhorrence, fear, anger, etc. The reason obeys the heart because the senses belonging to the heart confirm the beliefs of the reason and unless they are certified by them, they cannot be taken as true. The heart and the reason obey the soul, for it is supreme in the body and commands and controls all the tendencies and desires. Thus, these three internal dispositions, even after being independent of each other, work in coordination.

Shah wilayah points out that all these dispositions are separate entities but always exists a coordination between them. In other words, in spite of there being separate they are united. Explained it he asserts that the heart and the soul are separate from one another, yet they are united. Speaking of their relation, he gives the example of a hot metal of iron and wood. Each of them has its own qualities: the iron, for instance, melts when it is set on fire. Its melting

also affects the wood and it becomes crooked. The coldness affects the wood and it is contracted. Its acceleration also affects the beam. Thus, it is evident that the beam and the wood in the boat, in spite of having different textures, are affected by each other. In the same way, the heart and the soul being separate are related with each other, and are influenced by each other in the manner described in the example. By giving this example, great Chinkish wants to suggest that the attributes of one should not confusingly be ascribed to the other, and the sages particularly should be careful in this regard. It is also explained by another example of mercury which is a compound of water and silver. It gets the fluidity nature to the water and hardness to the silver. Thinking it as a compound of the two, it someone puts a silver coin into water and desires to get the same result, he can't do it. It is because of the fact that, in mercury, the water and silver are united in a way that it becomes a new thing and acquires different qualities having them both the two. That, in the same way, is a composite of different elements. Each of those elements works in integrity with the others, and there is no difference in the deeds of men, as all of them are the unity of the same elements. It is, therefore, that man by his nature is one and possesses similar kinds of deeds, and there

is, in this respect, no difference between a wolf and a sheep etc. But, as we saw, there are, in other respects, some differences between the two which will be taken up later.⁵

Limitations of the Dispositions :

Having discussed the dispositions of one, Bushmiller also points out that there are certain limitations of these. For example, the animal senses have a particular domain of perception - vision and audibility, etc; the only perceptive colours, shapes, quantities, and sounds, etc. Thus, each of these animal senses (senses) have their own limits of perception, and none of them can perceive anything beyond these limits. Explaining it, he gives the example that if we want to perceive what is happening with the help of our eyes, we will conclude that if at all they exist they are situated with some colour such as red, green, etc., or when they do not exist. He undoubtedly seems to point out that the sense of sight cannot perceive those things like sugar or height because they fall out of the domain of its perception. Here lies the error of perceiving something from the sense not related to its perception as suitable for its perception. Any such effort would either lead the

perceive to deny the existence of such things or to prove the opposite existence. In either case he is wrong, for he has made a wrong effort. Thus, he philosophically concludes that no external senses can perceive beyond the domain of its perception. In the same way, the internal senses like imagination (ihsayah), fancy (wahm) and willing (mutasarrifa) have also their own domains of perception, and like the external senses they also cannot perceive beyond their domain, and any such attempt of perceiving anything from an internal sense, not including its domain will again tend to naught. For example, if the abstract (majarrad) is perceived from the internal senses, it would mean that it does not exist for it, for if it does, it must exist in respect of the seven directions with, or as him, does not fall in any of them. The wise people are aware that in such a case the nonexistent (ghaib) is taken to be existent (hazir) which is an error. In the case of external senses, the error is committed by perceiving the existent (mawjūd) as nonexistent (ghaib).¹⁰

Similarly, Ash'ariyah speaks of the reason (aql). According to him, it also has its own limitations and cannot comprehend anything that lies beyond its domain. He presents the rule as common against a mistake by attempting

in comprehending with its help which does not lie in its
 service. It is therefore that they are puzzled, and to
 solve the problem they try to understand that lying beyond
 its domain by way of simile with the man's lying in its
 domain of interpretation. But such an attempt leads them to
 nothing but complications, and if at all they are convinced
 of something to be similar with another, they contradict
 their own faith when they contend about its existence and
 similarly with some material object (manq) for the reason
 that the other contradicts their arguments and they again find
 themselves in the midst of darkness, and once again they try
 to find out its similarity with some other material thing
 which contradicts their previous faith or often rejects it.
 In either of the cases darkness there is their fate. Thus,
 as is of the view that reason, is the interpreter of the
 divine will. It can only understand what exists between the
 earlier and the now. Regarding the absolute, Shah Waliullah
 has a good opinion and confidence that to the last extent by will-
 ing than words than dogs. There is, of course, no doubt
 that it is a highly subjective view, but whenever he says
 about the limitations of reason (aql) is something thought
 preventing and we are reminded of many of the eastern and western

philosophers who doubt the reliability of reason regarding the matters concerning with the transcendental world. Chantal, Rami and Iqbal, in their philosophy, say so vehemently in particular. They, as we know, do not believe in the priority of reason over revelation. Chantal emphasizes on revelation and ha'adai. For the knowledge of the non-material world. Rami and Iqbal believe in the priority of intuition and inspiration of Isaq (Ives) for its comprehension. In the Western philosophers Kant, Hegel and others also take reason as incapable of understanding the reality in itself. We have mentioned them to prove that high "gliliah is one of them who give reason its due place.³⁰ (4)

Having described the incapability of reason, that intuition also speaks of its domain. Being the interpretation of the divine soul the reason must comprehend that present in the nature of the soul. Explaining it he asserts that the soul is related more transcendent (ma'aruf) over material (dharfi). It is related to matter, for it is embodied in it. It is related to the abstract, for it comes from it. The reason is capable of comprehending the qualities of the material objects. It also has the capacity to understand the diversity by seeing the different individuals, and the unity as well again by seeing them. With the help of perceiving

the difference of voice and complexion the reason perceives diversely and by taking them all as individuals it sees the unity. By perceiving the form of the individual it can also perceive the form of man living in the world of forms. It can also understand the other creatures like animals and vegetation by finding out some similarities and differences between them and the human beings. By perceiving the different forms it can also distinguish one from the other. Both of them forms perceived in the material world has its opposite in the world of forms. We call them opposites as one is material and the other is abstract. The reason perceives the opposites and many of these opposites abstract forms have not revealed themselves in the matter. They are not mingling but the attributes (gun) and the qualities (guna) are related with one another. The reason perceives that relation. It also perceives the relation of reality with the attributes and the matter. In these opposites some of them are difficult to understand but the reason includes some of them in the domain of its perception. The time or continuity is one of them which exists as long as its opposite exists meaning thereby the existence of the form of time in the world of forms. The reason can understand it as it is perceived

in the existent (existentia). The other one of them is imperceptible. The reason should comprehend its form and become the source of obedience to the true constant (eterna veritas). In the form of imperceptible and its true commands there is quite a contradiction which lies in the fact that which is imperceptible cannot be perceived, but the reason conceives its rational form. The wisdom lies in the fact that the reason should understand that it has determined its form which otherwise is indetermined. Explaining it is given the example of a man wearing green glasses. Although he sees everything as green, yet he does not tell himself as he thinks that the greenness perceived in the object is not its quality but he perceives it due to his glasses. In the same way say the reason should comprehend that the imperceptible determinate is not the one lying as indeterminate. It with a case the reason will never be satisfied. The image of the form of imperceptible which represents the real imperceptible should not actually be taken as its true representation. Thus the reason is that power which perceives the existent (existentia) lying between the object and the spirit. It is the power which comprehends the reality of things in general but reality of some of them is extended from it. In the comprehension

of things it takes it up from the perfect understanding

(material) and willing (metascientific). The essence of reason is divine power (sirr). It takes its help when it is united with divine light (tajalliy-e-asam) or the world of higher angels (malak-e-asal), for without the help of sirr, the reason cannot comprehend things, and when the comprehension of unity is made sirr becomes the eye, the ear and the soul, uniting thereby that all the organs of a man are united with the divine light (tajalliy-e-asam) and the world of higher angels (malak-e-asal) and he himself becomes divine.³⁰ (b)

Distinction between Isrâ' and Fana

In the above passage we have already referred to sirr, however, before discussing sirr in detail, we shall take up the confusion between isql (sensed) and sirr which has been clarified by their definition.

According to the text, those who use sense to seek the essence (isql) are wrong as both of the terms are different by their meanings. It is clear from what we should and be read for the sphere. He defines isql as a power which perceives the object in the presence. The existing objects are the part of the reality and being the part they come from the whole (ajza-e-kull). Having perceived the qualities of the existent (hastir) we try to find that act in the non-existent (ghair) but the like is not seen in it, now comes sirr for

our help which it cannot in every instance as an image of the qualities and is perceived as these attributes. The reason perceives all these attributes separately and comprehends the difference of their meanings. Some of these qualities are contradictory, and here the reason fails, for it cannot resolve the contradiction. When Walikish considers it to be an error of reason (sagl), for to him it is in the domain of perception of sense. The apparent contradiction comes from the senses (hassa), thus it should be taken as the error of the senses. Explaining if he gives an example of a spirit-eyed person who sees one thing as two, and being aware of his defect he takes the two as one. The reason is also responsible for this difficulty, for it should perceive all the attributes (sagl) as separate entities.

Having spoken of the error of seeing the difference of the two with Walikish takes up as criticism the view of Fakhr-al-wajid. The followers of Fakhr al-wajid pronounce 'hassa saf' and when after pronouncing it they try to understand the difference between man and God and that too on the basis of qualities. This leads them to doubt and they are left in bewilderment. Some Walikish points out their mistake. On one hand they are unable to understand the relation between the human beings and the external objects, and on the other

they fail to understand the relation between the external objects and the pure (God). In reference to the first he insists that manifestation is a relation between the appearing (satvik) and the appeared (manas). This relation is different from other relations. Penetrating into the nature of the relation he concludes that the appearing and the appeared are not alike. For example, man and the form of man are not alike. Had they been alike, all the individuals would have been the man, and they are neither different from one another because if they had been different, no two individuals would have been alike. As there is resemblance between man and animal, between animal and plant, between plant and inanimate beings, as there is resemblance between man and man. Thus, for man vaishnav, all of them are related with each other and share the quality of one another, and all of them are subject to change. Thus, there is a hierarchy ending on the universal soul. It is suggestive of the fact that the universal soul is related to the world and this relation is the nature of manifestation. The reason fails to understand the specific qualities possessed by the objects. It is unable to understand that if all the objects are related to one, there should, that, be no opposition.

And if opposites exist in the determinate, one cannot be their existence. To understand, he points out that we shall have to ascend the hierarchy of existence to the undifferentiated. In the first case, that is to say, considering the objects a new total of opposites we shall infer an unity, and if, in the second case, we deny the unity we shall fail to understand the source of their existence. Supporting the argument she asserts that the less wise people try to find similarities in the relation of the whole of nature and essential qualities. But when they perceive the opposites they are taken aback and are losing the previous belief from another. Even when one is shattered when they are confronted with the opposites. He explains it by separating what apart from the similarity (admiral) and difference (ghalayat) there is yet another relation which is established in relation to these two and stands on par. Supporting it he argues that the particular qualities of something do not make a thing what it is. In support of his argument he gives the example of short staturedness, stammering and blackness of the skin. All these qualities do make it an individual not that they do not go to make him a man, for without them he still may even exist. Thus the source of human existence, universal soul, is devoid of all such qualities which are taken as common and

essential qualities of man. He again puts forward a forceful argument saying that the applying (ilham) and the applied (malesya) cannot be one and the same as, for example, the face of man is not man, the part is not the whole, and the world in existence is not the universal soul, although it is true the face of man is present in man, the whole is present in part, and the universal soul is present in the world. In this way, in order to understand the phenomena of apostles we shall have to consider the universal soul as beyond of them. It undoubtedly possesses the capacity of manifestation in the objects of the world. It is thus essential that the applying (nafs-e-halikh) must possess what is applied (Kawwad).¹²

Form of Intuitive Knowledge :

We have discussed the place of reason in Shah Waliullah's epistemology but, as we are aware that he is a practicing Sufi he, therefore, emphasises on the importance of intuitive knowledge which has the forms namely meditation (Tahsil), contemplation (Ikkam), ecstasy, genius (marifat) and revelation (wah). It will be worthwhile to mention here that the Sufis in general have a faith in intuitive knowledge. It does not mean that they defy the authority of science and reason as the sources of knowledge. It only means that they give priority to intuition over reason and he stands over the

courses. Each Malikiyah believes in all these forms and holds that each one of them is related to a particular stage achieved by a traveller (salik) in the mill course (suluk). But, revelation in particular is meant for the prophets only. Along with these forms, each 'Malikiyah believes in the hidden power (sirr) which is also a form of intuitive knowledge. But, as each Malikiyah describes, it belongs to the higher ranks of the soul. It is, therefore, inadvisable for us to discuss the soul so that we may explain it in a proper way.

Classification of Soul :

Each Malikiyah speaks of different categories of soul which we shall discuss in the following passages. We shall first of all take up animal, rational, and angelic souls.

1. The animal soul (nafs or ruh-hayawani) is created out of the temperature of the elements. It controls the digestion (ghiza), helps growth (nuzul) and understanding (fikr).

2. After the animal soul, each Malikiyah speaks of the rational or human soul (nafs-nasutiya). Defining it he says that it is the one which collects different elements from outside and gives them a new form of discipline. Explaining it he gives the example of a seed which, when sown, leaves

its entity by manifesting itself in a form. Thus, it goes through the whole of it, though it exists outside in the tree in its original form. The same is true regarding the presence of creation in all species. The soul which collects the different elements through five senses to give them a systematic form is the human soul. Its chief characteristic, as it has been described, is to collect, compare and combine the different elements, and it combines them in a way that even after death they live together for a long time and not only this but they also keep on possessing the acquired skills, habits and morality and other habits related to the senses and mind such as hearing, thinking, willing, etc.

3. The third kind of soul is angelic soul (mal-ee-salini). Defining it, that scholar says that the universal soul which all the lower souls are about to come into existence in future and these forms of the universal soul are embodied in the human beings. And since it long before it is done, putting it in brief, we can say that angelic soul (mal-ee-salini) is seen in the form of universal soul. It is embodied in man and, with its help, man lives in 'thatland-ah-gah' where he sees either in the form of a black point or that of a white point, namely either in 'nijjar'

or 'lilyin'. Like other elements the angels soul also has its characteristics. Its chief characteristic is that in 'shadibah-ul-qalb' it converses with the divine soul and possesses the capacity of discerning with angels in the world of angels (malakut). Every angelic soul has its own status and attributes and, in accordance with them, it converses with the angels of his status. However, with the attainment of discernment it deals in the realm of animal soul (nabwah) and becomes one with it. Explaining this unity, the Philo gives the example of mercury which contains united and silver as elements and they cannot be separated from each other. Each of the elements helps in shaping its character. The silver, for example, gives it glazing, and its malleability is because of the elements of mercury. To put it brief, he means that all the elements of the soul are united and in accordance with them, each one possesses certain characteristics which originally belong to nature of them. The human soul possesses the quality of receiving the knowledge from the angels and by assimilating himself into the universal soul (nafsa-kulliyah) it gets the attributes of the world. The universal and the human souls have created the five senses and other sources of knowledge like heart, reason and intellect.

The liver is the centre of sex, the heart is the power which possesses sexual and other capacities, the mind is the vessel which has the capacity of reaching into the things. The senses correspond to all six levels, the reason corresponds to rational soul (*nafsa-rational*) and the heart corresponds to the divine soul (*nafsa-e-saniya*). Thus are senses, the reason, and the heart are the powers of the human soul. The most important of them is heart, and it is therefore that the arif calls it as the human disposition (*istifa-e-insani*). It is the power of the human soul and the reason is its tongue. When the traveller (*sâlik*) disengages himself from the senses, his heart becomes his soul and his reason becomes his mysticized power (*qaww*) (*qirr*). Thus the soul is a composite of the senses, reason and divinity. Pointing out the difference between the reason (*aq*) and the mysticized power (*qirr*), the arif holds that reason is the power of the soul, it dwells in the mind and admits the influence and the other two higher elements of the soul, namely the rational soul (*nafsa-rational*) and the heavenly soul (*nafsa-e-saniya*). The mysticized power (*qirr*) belongs to the higher elements of the soul, and it is therefore that the reason is higher than the heart and the hidden power (*qirr*) than the reason (*aq*). In this way, in

the hierarchy, the mysterious power (sirr) is on the top. In accordance with their place these powers have different capacities. The heart is capable of receiving the ecstasy, the soul has the capacity of love, the reason is endowed with the capacity of belief and the imagination is gifted with the capacity of destruction. Thus, there is a difference in the status of each of them. The traveller (salik) having annihilated himself loses the sensual soul is either attracted strongly toward of angels, and therefore subsists again with a new spiritual life or he is annihilated in his own self (istayyah-e-halwa) and then subsists again, finds himself in the universal self (vafayyah-e-halwa) or he is annihilated in both his individual self and universal self. There is, of course, the difference of the stages. When Bahá'í considers himself in the last described stage, in this way he describes the different sources of knowledge possessed by the individual.¹²

Secret Dispositions :

Having described the internal dispositions and the categorization of soul, we shall now discuss the secret dispositions (irshad-e-Muflah) which, as he thinks, are realized and comprehended by some only. He holds and categorically declares that the utility of the secret dispositions is for

those who have trained and purified their material and
 subtler senses. To begin with, the text explains the divine
 soul (*nafs-e-na'iyi*) as one of the secret dispositions. To
 make it explicit he takes up to define it saying that the
 divine soul is the unity of the souls species, the rational
 soul (*nafs-e-naqiyyah*) and anyone of the other souls such as
 the mineral soul (*nafs-e-madaniyyah*), vegetative soul (*nafs-e-
 shakhsiyyah*), animal soul, stellar soul, or devilish soul -
 all of them are abstracted from the universal soul (*nafs-e-
 kulliyah*). And, that the divine soul, is described as the
 secret dispositions, also comes from the universal soul.
 The Shah speaks of the activation of souls and considers the
 heavenly soul (*nafs-e-malakiyyah*) as the first abstracted from
 the universal soul, and the perfect soul (*nafs-e-saniyyah*) as
 the last activated soul, and also states that both of them,
 the first and the last, are equally in proximity with the
 universal soul, though they are distant from each other.
 The divine soul, however, is a circumlocution of the the mentioned
 souls. The universal soul collects itself in every soul
 and each one of them is more developed than the other. Thus
 he speaks of the evolution of the soul. He begins to
 describe it by defining the vegetative soul.¹⁴

When the souls have come into existence, the material

world (kainetee-jadyee) presented from it. To him it was the result of the disposition of the elements in a totality. Due to the unity of these elements there came into being a grass (kain) with particular strength and essential qualities. The common ones were the elements of the existence of the separate entities and essential ones ran through all of them and this essential (tuhun) in the primary form is the vegetative soul. Thus, the first life spread over the world and thereafter the universal soul (unip-e-huiling) once again manifested itself and the new manifestation resulted into another existence, namely the higher kind of vegetative soul which ran through the entire expanding vegetation. After the animal life, heading to view the universal existence (kashihake-huili), the universal soul again manifested itself into yet another form and that was the animal soul. The highest of all is the hierarchy of animals. The manifestation resulted into the existence of lower soul (kain), reason (kain), and heart (kain). Thereafter, the universal soul set up another path and manifested itself into human soul which in its essential features resembles the universal soul, and it is due to this fact that the human soul is capable of obtaining knowledge and passing through different stages. The matter here which the human soul experienced

Itself is one but its manifestations divided into grades and each of them becomes an species by itself. Thus, man being one of the manifestations is one of the species by itself. But, higher than man in general is the perfect man who by himself is a distinguished species simply on the basis of the essence, distinguishing man from the animal. Thus, even in the creation of man, both Valmikiak makes a category of the perfect man whose soul is in proximity with the universal soul. Alongwith this the perfect man also shares the divine apt (samatyash-hood) and in this way the soul of the perfect man is the element of the universal soul, i.e. samatya-patrya, and the universal soul (samatya-kulitya) being divine in its essence makes the soul of the perfect man also divine.¹³

Having described the first, that Valmikiak verse 10 describes the second one and that is the world soul (samatya-tamari). It also comes from the universal soul (samatya-kulitya) and runs through all the objects of the world. The existence of this soul follows the existence of the world and the first one of them (i.e. the world of forms (samatya-saital)) where the forms of the objects rest. All of them are born created long before the vibration of the objects. Considering the importance of the forms, he argues that man, the universe, is not totally as man as his creation in the world equate

him in the matter of face composition, and he is distinguished because of the form of every man present in the world of forms. And man is seen in totality because everyone shares the same which runs through all. All these forms of man are attracted towards the divine light present in the universal soul, and the human soul being in proximity with the universal soul shares this light and is thereby attracted towards it. Thus, the divine soul is a unity of the two, namely the human soul and the world soul. The human soul is its matter and the world soul is its form. As a matter of fact, both the souls, viz. the human and the world souls are forms and none of them is matter, but the first one becomes the matter because the latter brings it into existence. Explaining it, he gives the example of a painter, who has an idea or form in his mind and that idea creates the other forms seen in the world of objects. Thus the lower form is matter for the one manifesting itself in it. Now, Shah Waliullah postulates that his thought might suggest that the question is either subjective (ma'nu'i) or objective (mu'arifi), but he declares any of these possibilities. It is neither of the two. But, to him, the existence of the world is seen to have come into being due to the universal spirituality, and it demands every part of which it is only a part. Explaining it, he again comes to the

analogy of the painter who, with the help of his lines in his mind, gives it different forms and brings into the shape he desires which becomes the reflection of the same in his mind. In the same way, too, the absolute, changed the latent soul into many stages and finally created the one called the human soul. It is therefore that the form is closer to the body (*harika*). Here, the man seems to echo Aristotle who, inspite of admitting the inseparability of form and matter for substances, conceived form to be prior to matter, and also presents the different categories of soul. The form, according to Pash Mishra, being divine in essence, possesses the divine sight, and the person who attains goods to therefore first attracted towards the divine sight and later on is induced to the absolute eye (*manishya-darshana*).¹⁶

Proceeding on with the discussion of the divine soul, the Shik takes that the soul possesses the one spirit in the form of a point great as 'haji-sukhal'. The soul is its only. It seems that the essence of the soul is that point. Explaining its nature, the Shik asserts that the point is pure to itself. The pure manifests its essence in it but does not lose its purity. The one who attains goods realises to him the existence of that point and to determine his stage.

That individual have access to the possibility of three stages. He will either be successful, intoxicated, or pure consciousness (three-a-lahai). In case of his being successful the point will be aligned with his soul in the way as the notes and signs are lined in the melody. In the case of his being intoxicated, the point will be different from the quest tribute and all his actions will be lost in it. In case of his being pure consciousness, none of his senses will tolerate the other. It notes that each of his senses will each independently but in coordination with each other. It also suggests that none of these senses will function against others, and others, as intended by that individual, is good.¹⁷

Having described its nature and the stages of growth attained with its help, that individual takes up to criticize the Christians. In his opinion, the Christ presented in the bible the view of the 'unity in trinity' by visualizing the different stages of that point. The first of them was told by him as 'ah' (the father) which is the essence of his (three-a-lah). He called the second as 'ah' (the son) which is the universal soul (three-a-lahai), and the third he names as the holy ghost (three-a-lahai) which is the great divine light (three-a-lahai) meeting in 'three-a-lahai'. As the that which, his people mistook his teachings and

understand him wrongly. As a consequence to this, they believed him to be the son of God. Shah Waliullah, however, does not argue much on this subject and leaves it rather unattended. He proceeds by saying that the Quran cleared off these mis-conceptions and thus proves the importance of the holy book. In this way, Shah Waliullah is of the view that the reality is composed of three things, i.e. the pure essence, the universal soul, and the divine light (haqiqat-e-saniyya).¹⁰

The contents (eterna) to his sacred verses are based on these three parts of the reality. The one who attains gnosis begins his journey from 'silasat-e-sughra', as explained by Sheikh Ismail. During the course of his journey he either follows the heavenly soul (nafs-e-samavi) and due to its weakness he is attracted to watch the divine light. Here, the point mentioned as 'hajr-e-sakhat' is united with the pure and then the 'arif' transcends the complainable and indecomposable elements, for if it is called the observation it is not so, and if perception it also stands apart. At the fifth pole, it is like the vision of which the seat is fully aware but cannot interpret. In the second stage, the 'arif' sheds the material soul (nafs-e-natiqa). It is the soul of the individual is lost in the whole and becomes individual meaning thereby that there remains no distinction of the part

and the divine. We can call it the stage of complete
 assimilation not, why, the self is divine and it is here
 that he lived the reality with the help of the cognition.
 Here again, he comes across two stages, namely (1) on the
 basis of the knowledge, he understands the distinction between
 him and the divine and understands the objective existence
 with his internal and external position and (2) in the second
 stage, his knowledge leads him to realize that only the
 absolute exists and the existence other than he follows from
 him. Here again, he comes across two stages, namely (3) he
 either makes no distinction between the absolute ego
 (satvitat-samitiya) and his own ego (satvitat-s-mat).
 Contrary to this, he takes his own ego as the absolute ego.
 (2) He recognizes the absolute ego as separate from his own
 self. In the self terminology, such a realization is known
 as the realization of his own self (satvitat-s-mat). In case
 of the 'self', the universal soul (satvitat-s-mat) is the
 goal and from here he rises to the pure and knows the secrets
 of the divinity. This stage is known as 'satvitat-s-mat'.¹⁹

He is either 'satvitat-s-mat' or 'satvitat-s-mat',
 the fact remains as that the living soul (satvitat-s-mat)
 dominates all the three, namely the lowest soul, the middle
 soul, and the 'satvitat-s-mat'. The last of all, as developed

by the divine soul, remains concealed, and its essence and purity remain always revealed. Explaining it, he gives the example of a cloth wrapped with cotton. In such a case the simplicity of the cloth will be concealed, and so is the case with 'haja-e-bahar', but as there exists difference between the two one cloth cannot justify itself but the latter can, and as it sometimes reveals itself from the veil that covers it. Such an arif, whichever of the two paths he might have chosen to travel, has the knowledge from two sources, namely (1) the great divinelight (tahalliy-e-majid), and (2) from the universal soul (nafs-e-kulliyah). Both of them lie outside his body and he attains knowledge with their help. In such a state, all other senses are dominated by 'haja-e-bahar' and the self explicitly understands the difference between the knowledge gained by its afterworld course. In the high state of knowledge, the objects are seen in multiplicity. It is here that all the senses are united and distinguished. As the divine soul consists of the two, namely the rational soul (nafs-e-natighah) and the heavenly soul (nafs-e-samavi), in case the heavenly soul dominates the divine soul and the 'haja-e-bahar' remains unveiled, it is called the 'hak-ul-akhir', and if the rational soul dominates the divine soul and 'haja-e-bahar' remains concealed it is

called the 'secret disposition' (*latifa-e-Mufla*). Thus, we see that the 'secret disposition' emerges out of his thought as a mystic concept with the dimension of mystery. There is yet another possibility that the 'haji-e-qubut' may denote the diving soul and this is called '*ahf*', the hidden. In this way, there are three stages, namely 'the emergence' (*alvin* light), '*latifa-e-Mufla*' (the secret disposition), and the '*ahf*' (the hidden).²⁰

The journey of the soul does not end here. It continues, but only the few reach the stage described above.

Having described it, Shah 'Abdullah takes up to discuss the stabilization of the spiritual existence (*fata-e-majidi-mahvi*) and the subsistence in world of '*qubut*'. To him, the descending of either the diving light (*qurani-nur*), the secret disposition or the hidden power causes stabilization in the spiritual existence or the subsistence in the world of '*qubut*'. Here, Shah 'Abdullah points out that whereas the soul is, the phenomenal and the reality stand apart. He finds here an echo of '*shamsiyyat*' which we have discussed in detail in his *Ma'ayinat*. From the point of view of epistemology it should be borne in mind that Shah 'Abdullah underpinned this world and whatever the soul visualizes is

information, and the inferrer still remains at bay. It means that the horizon of knowledge (دانش) is not within the reach of any human being, however great well or well he may be.

Going ahead with the discussion, the high asserts that apart from the form of man there are many other forms, and the qualities of man are shared by other objects as well. To him, it has been so designed that man's reason should be able to see the opposition. and it is the universal soul which manifests itself in different garbs. The function of the reason is to see the objects with the help of the opposition.²¹

Putting it in brief, it is the universal soul ^{روح عالمی و کلی} seen everywhere. Nothing other than this exists, though it does not manifest itself into new things and new conditions yet it has the capacity. The reason may not be able to understand it but the soul with a greater do understand that all is the universal soul, all is from it, and it is in all. That is reason comprehends it and realizes the reality.

Pleading the criticism, the high holds that the philosophers have not thought of a reality lying between the substance and the accidents. Contrary to this, they thought of it as non-existent, for their reason could not understand it. To him, it stands as fact that there is one reality which adds

expresses itself in the prototype and at others in the attributes. Thus, it is this reality which establishes a relation between the two. Yet it is neither of them. The source of substance is in the world of forms, and attributes of substance in the mind (minds). The idea of a thing in mind is true because it is applied to the things in the material world. The application is caused by a relation between the source (minds) and the substance (minds) but that relation is not true. It is because of this fact that the philosophers rejected any such relation as it is neither true in itself nor with the help of other things, meaning thereby it is neither self-sufficient nor proved otherwise. But their mistake is of the view that such a relation does exist, but it is neither in itself nor is it proved with the help of other nor is it a thing which could be understood in relation of before and after. It is the source and exists by itself *other is not proof or evidence.*²³

The source envelops the substance and when the wise people see it enveloped, they are astonished and try to do away with their astonishment with the tip of their noses. They try to understand with the help of the things they have formed in their mind. Sometimes they consider it as an attribute and at others they take it as an evidence, but the

reason fails to grasp it and their confusion remains as it was. Shah Waliullah, as regard to the meaning of the source (lila), says that it is substance nor attribute, nor manifestation. It transcends all of them. Those who advocated 'substantial-cause' or creation could perceive only the universal soul and see it moving through or immanent in the multitudes, and thus reduced the diversity into unity by considering it as the configuration of the unity. Yet they were wrong to consider the universal soul as the source of existence. It, as a matter of fact, transcends the universal soul (hafez-kulliya) as well, and it is the source where lies the unity; but the fallacious of creation could not reach it. Apart from them, there was another group of sufi who, with the help of their meditation, realized the *qawm* (qawm), but in the interpretation and explanation they blended the facts with each other in a way that union is which could not be discerned. This blending and confusion, as Shah Waliullah points out, has been the weakness of sufi. ¹⁰

The blending and confusion have already been discussed in reference to soul (nab) and hidden power (sirr). Shah Waliullah also does not except it here. Proceeding with the other group of the sufi mentioned above, he pointed out that with the help of ecstasy (wajdan) they attempted to

comprehending the reality of things. Having reached the pure (sat-ekikat) they inferred that there is only one existence viewed with different names. When we see it reflected in the thing we name it existence (sat-¹ekikat) (taj-ek-ekikat) and when it is there on reflecting it is there as pure (sat-ekikat). Those who had the gems through the path of divine light (taj-ek-ekikat) differed from them. That individual, in the conclusion of the discussion speaks of his own view. He is of the opinion that the reflection or observation seen through the divine light (taj-ek-ekikat) is one aspect of the reality not the entirety of Quran and those of logic cannot interpret the reality any more. It seems that the reality remains uninterpreted and unexplained. Whatever has been said of it, is the part of the Truth.²⁴

Virtues and Vices :

Having described the soul and its categories we shall now take up virtues and vices which depend on the purification and perversion of these dispositions. If purified, man leads a virtuous life and all the four important virtues - namely (1) purity (taharat), (2) attraction to God (ibadah), (3) attachment (muqamat), and (4) justice (adalat) - are acquired; and if perverted, man leads a vicious life. It is therefore, indispensable to purify these dispositions. It

become more essential for virtuous life is the nature of sin. But, before discussing the purification we deem it necessary to discuss the virtues and vices as up to emphasize on the necessity of the purification of the dispositions.²⁰

These dispositions teach us morality. They create in us many appetites, and if any of them is perverted, we become immoral. If the soul becomes perverted and the reason and the heart stay fit, man takes delight in the pleasure of flesh and being. The perverted soul is called the sensual or the animal soul. If the heart becomes perverted, and the reason and the soul stay fit man does the emotional deeds. He, for example, is tempted to murder the soul helps him by giving power. Likewise, he does other deeds, immoral in character, and the soul encourages him to do them. The perverted heart is called the profane soul (self-loved). Inspiring it, flesh selfishness gives the aspects of a man in love with a woman. The heart intensifies his love, the soul induces him to have sexual relations with her, and her reason pleases him by remembering her beauty and charm. Similar is the case with other pleasures. This is all in the case of perversion. The reason in this state becomes helpless. It is unable to direct or instruct the soul and the heart. A man in the state of anger, for example, forgets everything.

He is not then guided by his reason. Thus, in order to be virtuous and moral, it is essential to know the state of perversion of these dispositions - the heart, the soul, and the reason. The natural tendencies belong to the lives and are controlled by the soul. The perverted state of soul, the animal or the animal soul, like the good one, runs through the whole body; the perverted heart called as the profane soul also runs through the whole body. In the same way, the contented soul [saffa-e-mutmainna] also runs through the whole body. Contented soul is now guiding the soul via the heart. Its roots are in the mind. The roots of the animal soul lie in the soul, and that of profane soul in the heart. Thus, it seems that the man should be aware of the perverted states of these dispositions, and in the age of ignorance he becomes the victim of inevitable diseases which often haunt the human beings and make them immoral. The worst of them is the pleasure of the flesh which attracts man to the extent that he loses everything to the oblivion. His reason fails to guide him, even in the old age, when he loses all his faculties, he is tempted towards them. It is thus, again, made explicit that these dispositions should be trained in proper way, that is, man should be aware of the perversion and should not allow them to enter the dispositions.

Classification of the dispositions :
Importance of Shariat

Now comes the question as to how the perversion can be stopped. The answer to this question is simple. The Shah holds that man has been endowed with two kinds of tendencies, namely the animal or sensual tendencies (qaww-i-hawaiyya) and the angelic or divine tendencies (qaww-i-malakiyya). It is evident that all these three dispositions should obey the angelic tendencies and suppress the sensual ones. It is the only way to train them. The Shah here points out that all these dispositions are different, having different souls (nafsa). It is, therefore, evident that their training should also be different. The traveller (saliik) must be aware of them, to each of them he is to be considered and contemplated. Having discussed it, Shah Waliullah takes up to explain the training of the five senses (jismiyah) and that of the dispositions (aklaf).²⁶

It comes to train the five senses (jismiyah) and that of other dispositions (aklaf), one must follow a discipline and that discipline is Shariat. Explaining the Shariat, Shah Waliullah asserts that there was a time when man was the slave of lower god (nafs-i-mawna). His servility to this god led him into the clutches of the devil and he was completely deviated from the path of righteousness and virtue.

God, by His mercy, called him to show the right path and thus formulated a complete plan (tashir-e-kull) and from it came into being the part of the plan (tashir-e-jawri), that part of the plan was a person from amongst the devoted men. God selected him to be the prophet to teach his fellow beings the discipline of righteousness and virtue (shar'ih). The last of all was the prophet Muhammad, and the discipline that he taught his people is complete and fixed. Thus, it is necessary for human beings to follow the discipline to keep a check on the five senses (jawari) and the dispositions (aitaf), so that they should not be perverted and guided by the devil and thereby save themselves from the horrors of greed, stupidity and tyranny. Thus the Shar'ih covers not only is the actual discipline above.²⁷

Since the Shar'ih is the cure for the diseased soul, it is essential for the believers to know its importance, and if they fail to realize it, that means that they have not understood the nature of the teachings of the prophet. Realizing the importance (mahabat) of the Shar'ih, Imam 'Alladillah gives two examples.

First, he gives the example of man-eating an apple the effects of the use as its growth without having any knowledge about it. Similar is the case with the soul, it also has no

themselves about its influence on the growth of the fruit. And, then, the Shah gives another example for the clarity of thought in connection with his inclination that the cold breeze helps a man suffering from heat by comforting him and both are unaware of either attempting or being affected. In the very same way, the universal soul influences the individual souls by giving them perfection (kamal) to reach a certain stage, but none of them, that is, neither the influencing one nor the influenced, is aware of one another's work. Putting it in brief, Shah Valiullah asserts that man should know this very fact that he possesses the two types of tendencies, namely, the natural or animal tendency and the angelic or divine tendency, and that the angelic tendency must dominate the animal one. Like other places, here too he stresses silence and does not change from one's seat.²⁸

Shah Valiullah goes on to say that we, without thinking of reaching any stage of perfection, must cultivate the following four attributes, namely (1) piety (taqat), (2) affection to God (mahab), (3) attachment (muhabbat), and (4) justice (adalat). We have discussed them in detail in his ethics. Here it will suffice to say that these attributes help man being in proximity with God, for with their help he acquires the position of higher ranks. It is because

of this fact that the Sharīah has emphasized in their
 legislation. All the persons are not only to acquire these
 qualities. The Sharīah, therefore, divides the people into
 three kinds, and the Quran also refers to these categories
 in the following verse :

مَنْ يُؤْتَ الْحَقَّ بِالْحَقِّ وَالْحَقَّ بِالْحَقِّ وَالْحَقَّ بِالْحَقِّ
 وَالْحَقَّ بِالْحَقِّ وَالْحَقَّ بِالْحَقِّ وَالْحَقَّ بِالْحَقِّ

[He has been over this that (to the people of Muhammad -
 (Muhammad-siddiqs)) who is the best of all the people
 (Quran)].

Among the people of Muhammad (Muhammad-siddiqs) some
 followed it thoroughly, others partly, and still others only
 nominally. Thus the Sharīah or the Islamic law makes a lot
 of effort and they are compelled in its aspects seeing
 thereby that there are two aspects of Sharīah, namely the
 external aspect and the internal aspect. Sharīah, in its
 external aspect, makes an effort to reform man by giving him
 instructions to refrain from the evil and by obligating him
 to do good deeds. Along with this, it also establishes the
 foundation of sociology (science of values) to improve the
 human conduct. The internal aspect of Sharīah, as what
 Mulla Ali Qari writes, is Ibadat. The Sharīah, in its internal aspect,
 makes an effort to purify man's soul by commanding him to
 save himself of the evil with a complete understanding of
 the meaning. It is for that he should know the evil brought

shown by a sin. The people of and people will be judged in accordance with the category they belong to. Explaining it, he refers to three stages, namely (1) and dominance of sensuality (nashiviyat) over divinity (mal'utiyat), (2) suppression of sensuality by the divinity, and (3) dominance of divinity over the sensuality. The ^{one} having a dominant sensuality is categorised as sinful (faasiq) or hypocrite (munafiq). He is 'faasiq' if his deeds are bad and even harmful; he is 'munafiq' whose actions or deeds are the worst. The one whose sensuality is suppressed by and divinity that is not completely controlled by it, is 'ta'atibul-qulub' (righteous). His divinity fails to control his sensuality either because the rational tendencies (aql) present in his nature are not strong and he is unable to nullify the influence of his divinity, or because the bad ~~deeds~~ stops him in the way that he fails to remove them. The one whose divinity overrules over the sensuality is victorious and in proximity with God. In it lies the secret of and training of and characterisation and growth (aklat-wa-jawad). For such a man it is essential that these two tendencies - namely, and sensuality and the divinity - should be present in his nature in a proper proportion and, along with this, he should have been doing good deeds for all his life for being able to do so his

reason (aql) should be controlled by his faith (imān). His heart should be controlled by his will power and his efforts (mujahada) (qaswat-e-aqliya) should be suppressed. Thus, in order to achieve the purpose, the training of the reason is indispensable. Not only this, but it is also necessary that there should be some laws to control these three powers, namely the reason, the will power, and the senses. The Shariah provides us with these laws and we must follow them for their proper training and guidance.²⁹

The internal aspect of Shariah aimed at false is mainly concerned with the training of the senses (jawarikh). Shah Waliullah includes the reason, the heart and the soul in the senses (jawarikh) and calls all of them as 'ta'atifa-Jawarikh' (the senses controlling the senses). Recounting his father he narrates that a angel approaching death was sent to him to explain this. It had lost all its powers and was about to die but was walking along with other angels just because it still had the strength to walk, and as near as it felt that power, its soul left the fetters of its body. And, in this way, he was given to understand that the life of the senses is mortal. He also points out that he included the reason, the heart and the soul in the senses (jawarikh). For the senses translate their decisions into actions meaning

Meaning that they are the instruments of these three, namely the heart, the hand and the soul. Thus the intended aspect of the Shar'iah explication on the teaching of this verse controlling the senses (lithafu-s-jawarih). It is therefore that the Shar'iah checks the selfish (fasiq) so that he say, either this way or the other, he must refrain from his evil deeds. Explaining it, he refers to the comments of the Shar'iah arranged in an evolutionary manner. For example, for women, for example, is imposed to keep the humanity away from evil. Thereafter the adultery has been prohibited. Similarly, the selling and purchasing of the liquor is forbidden to keep our away from it and that the penalty for drinking is described. Thus, all these commands are revealed to control the senses and thereby shape the man into a pious and good one.²⁰

Those who do not follow the Shar'iah are the hypocrites. Imam Wahidullah describes their categories. The first one is of those who believe in the Shar'iah but do not follow it due to some insignificant pretence. They feel the danger of disobedience but conceal themselves with that very pretence. The second category is of those who do not feel the danger of disobedience and conceal themselves thoroughly with their pretence. Such a hypocrite becomes the slave of his senses;

his reason, heart and soul do not guide him. He knows that what his senses demand, in brief, he leads a life of sensual pleasure and develops the tendency of revenge and hatred. Not only this, he also desires to get all the things of luxury. He develops a feeling of intolerance towards his equals. Having the tendency of revenge he attempts to kill those he takes pleasure in being obeyed; he takes up to serve his friends against the Shariah he takes hold in their service. Failing in his brief, he does all that is against the Shariah and the Quran (aqd).³⁴

The hypocrite whose understanding (qawwam-e-darrahi) is dirty, fails to comprehend the significance of Shariah. He does possess the right reason but fails in the shades of doubt about God and His commands. His weakness, though superficial is the result of worldly knowledge, he not as sharp he penetrate into the Shariah and comprehends its importance and he, therefore, doubts the attributes of God and tries to understand them in the help of sciences. Thus in short, the cure for the hypocrisy lies in the fact that the hypocrite should be guided by his reason, his sensuality (qawwam-e-shahi) and reason should be controlled by his Quran. His soul with all its capacities must guide his reason and this will be achieved only with the help of the Shariah, and, as

It is not so easy a task, the Shariah prescribes prayers like (salaat) and fasting (roza) etc. It is the duty of a man to consider the illegal as illegal and necessary. He should not pursue the path of the pleasure of the senses but leave those enjoyments for himself in the hereafter. Thus, the Shariah helps in the training of the human.²⁸

Individuals belonging to any category to possess the individual differences. Some of them are quite in accordance with their nature and others deviate from it. The Shariah teaches man to behave in accordance with his nature, and, as it depends, the sensuality should be controlled by the reason (aql) and the animality (hawa) should follow the divinity. That will be a combination desired by the Shariah. Explaining it, he gives the example of a man going for hunting, finding on a horse with a tiger riding on the man's back biting him. It will be against the nature, for according to it man must have ridden the tiger to follow the prey. Thus, the Shariah guides man to the right path and those deviated from it must be cured not only this cures is their cure. Having been trained, the reason will properly guide the animality (hawa) and the sensuality would last after the animality (hawa). Each one will function in accordance with its nature and man to totally will work according to his own.²⁹

The Shariah has prescribed laws for the separation of the animality (hablulhayt) from the humanity and for the control of sensuality (shahwat) by the reason (aql). In order to suppress the animality (hablul-hayt), fasting (sawm) and patience (sabr) have been prescribed, and in order to control the sensuality (shahwat), worship and remembrance have been made compulsory. Acting in accordance with these laws, one can purify his mind and enter heaven. The purified persons are also different. One whose heart is purified and trained is 'siddiq' (sadiq); one whose animality is trained is a man of patience (sabr) and one whose reason is purified is a learned man (rushd-ul-ilm); and one whose disposition and words (lata'if-ul-jawahir) are not trained but he does not indulge himself in the life of nature is righteous ('adil-ul-qayamat). Thus, according to Shayh Salis^{iq}, it is the Shariah that makes man purified and trained. In support of his argument he refers to the tradition and Qur'an. Both of them, as he holds, emphasize an ascetic life, and it is therefore that continuous fasting, leaving of 'nazar' (morning meal for fasting during the day) and avoiding too much of the Jazat at the time of 'nazar' have not been recommended, so that the asceticism in all points of life may be kept in view; but it is in accordance with the nature of

But not is the only possible cure for his diseased
Play-millions (itself).³⁴

Having explained the importance of Shari'ah in the
training of the ascetic, Shah Waliullah takes up to describe
the role of 'Sariqat' (inner law) in the purification and
training of the ascetic. It was founded by Sheikh Jamal
Baghdadi and Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani and thereafter
followed by his disciples. Tracing its history the Shah
holds that in the days of the companions (sahabah) and
companions of the companions (khawassah), there were some
people who criticised over the Shari'ah and did not find
it not to cure all the diseases. Having pondered over the
problem they came to conclude that the world is Duniya and the
soul should completely detach itself from its pleasures. As
a consequence to this, they began to lead a life of complete
renunciation. Having discarded all the pleasures of the world,
they started living in the forests and spent their days and
nights in the worship of God. They put themselves in all
possible bodily tortures and ate only that much which could
sustain them alive. The first man to practice such a life was
Khalid Wasitimi. Many others followed him; their main goal
was the proximity with God which, in their thought, could
be achieved by renunciation of desires to a life of detachment.³⁵

Among them there were certain people who tried to improve the qualities of the lower angula (mahala-gatiliya). Some of them achieved perfection to the extent that with the help of dream and meditation (yogya) they had inspiration (ilham) to interfere with the deeds of people. Others had no inspiration, but by the virtue of their practice they were able to float near the water and fly to the sky. Sheikh Junaid was the first who took up to reform this way of life. He gave the position to the Muslim and Tanika. In the book Dawabih-us-Salam, he later on, expounded its doctrines. In his exposition he presented before the world an explanation of the law, namely the course of Mahasibi and that of Sheikh Junaid. Sheikh Junaid, in his course of reform, emphasizes on the training of the dispositions (ihsan). He describes the way for the training of each disposition, namely the spirit (nafs), heart (qalb), reason ('aql), soul (ruh), and hidden power (sirr). He also points out the dwelling place of each of these dispositions in the body. The purification or training of the spirit (nafs), heart (qalb) and reason ('aql), as Sheikh Junaid declares, is tariqa and the training of the rest of the dispositions, namely soul (ruh) and hidden power (sirr) is ma'ala (haqiqah). Thus the course prescribed by Sheikh Junaid is the path of inner

Love (karuni) and goods (samiti).²⁶

Arguing the importance of worship Bhak Vallabha asserts that in order to reach a stage, the purification of the three inner dispositions is essential. and this cannot be attained without worship for it is on the basis of worship that man knows his nature. For instance, the heart should control the five senses and the action of the senses should indeed reflect the heart and therefore the stage of truth is attained, but if the sense is defective its achievement is a matter of impossibility. Explaining it, he gives two examples. The first is connected with the man who pretends to have idea of the truth but fails to acquire the reverence for his good attributes and relinquish good habits like selfishly and offering sacrifices etc. that man is supposed that his nature is defective and he has not properly cultivated the love of truth in his heart. Such a man cannot attain the stage of truth. The second example is of a man who pretends to be pious. His heart remains full of worries and doubts. His happiness is aroused even by a petty affair and he very quickly arrives in the state of fury and vexation. It is sure that definitely that such a man cannot reach the stage of piety. In order to meet the nature, worship is thus necessary. Now after the worship if someone does not state

a stage, there is nothing wrong about him. Sheikh Raynald
 entitled such a man as "malta-mal-mal". It means that
 man's first duty is to scrub and remember God and wait
 for his blessings for a stage in the soul journey. And, if
 all he achieves now is to not a matter of worry, he has
 directed his efforts towards the situation of why it was
 but it depends on God.²⁰

Having purified and ignored the nature, the heart and
 the reason the soul contends to purification of soul (yah)
 and hidden power (salar). Now again he starts into the
 realm of the lower soul (nafs) for, as that "evilish
 nature, there is a diligence in its previous or present
 training. Differentiating the two, he discusses the nature
 of lower soul (nafs). He asserts that it makes two types of
 mischief : (1) the lower soul, in accordance with its
 inclination, is inclined towards the animality (basar) and
 in order to refrain from its inclination it should be
 controlled by the heart and the heart should be controlled
 by the reason. (2) The lower soul sometimes is not inclined
 towards anything. It becomes absolutely inactive. In such
 a state it pollutes the soul (nafs) and the hidden power (salar).

The ordinary man is unable to understand the cause of
 profanity. And a goodie (arif) house is not struggling

equalled the lower end. 20



Before discussing the grading of the soul, Shah Waliullah describes its attributes. To him the soul possesses two attributes. With the help of one it is attracted towards the divine light (tajalliy-e-meen) existing in *shakhsat-e-quds* and with the help of the other it is induced in the right and higher angels. The intellect affects it and the effect is represented either in discipline (*taqwa*) which is associated with naturally *siyasat* or to the soul which takes place with the help of the heart. Due to the profusion of the nature of man the soul becomes lax and the impurity refrains it from pursuing its desired course. Otherwise, as it is in the very nature of the soul, it is attracted either towards the divine light (*tajalliy-e-meen*) or to the purified soul (*arwah-e-talikhah*) and the higher angels (*malak-e-ali*). The attraction takes place due to the love of the soul to reach the call *subhat-e-shaban*. After this idea, he also speaks of love of faith. Explaining it, he says that it is the belief of the reason into the reality; it also includes the distance of the reason upon the heart to make it work properly. Describing it, he points out that *'subhat-e-shaban'* is the love which attracts the thing towards its source (*ma'ad*). Explaining it, he gives

the example of deed and mind which always returns to their source. This inherent is expressed in the movement to the case of aspiration, and in the form of unity, it results into satisfaction and comfort. This type of love helps the soul in being attracted towards the divine light and otherwise. Thus the soul and the divine light become related. Their relation is of the type existing between the land and the ocean.²⁸

In the same way the hidden power (clair) also possesses two attributes. With the help of one it observes the divine light and with the help of the other it sees the prophetic souls and the higher souls which are in proximity with the divine light.

Like soul the hidden power can also be profane, and the profanity detains it from carrying its path. To save it is purified, the desires in the heart cleanse it. When the reason helps the will meditates, and when the heart helps the sleeping. Here that relation jumps to describe the difference between the faith (yagis) and the observation of the hidden power (mashahide-e-clair). To him observation it is the appearance and faith is the belief in something without seeing it. Both of them, as he is of the vision, are rooted in the 'taq'. Here again, he points out the confusion made

by the people. It is in between the observation and the
 inspired form (amrah-e-quran). Explaining it, he asserts
 that the power of imagination (qurrah-e-quran) helps the dreamer
 by finding out the explanation and interpretation of faith
 and the inspired form confirms it. But in this confrontation,
 he takes it as observation, enough, as a matter of fact,
 it is the inspired form which dominates over the heart in the
 state of ecstasy. Clarifying it, Shah Waliullah asserts that
 it is not that the observation is spontaneity (amrah) and the
 inspired form is deliberation (amrah), we shall be wrong to
 propose it as because the deliberation due to the realization
 of a problem becomes spontaneity and spontaneity in its
 initial stage is nothing but deliberation. If we say that
 the imagination has the tendency of pervasion but the
 divine light (tajalliy-e-quran) does not have it, however
 be the pervaded one, but it is not inclined towards it. We
 are not justified in asserting any such thing as there
 would be similarity of tendency to the imagination and the
 divine light. With the help of his constitution he proves
 that the words do not really distinguish between the observa-
 tion and the inspired form. Considering the difference of
 tendency of the imagination and the divine light they make
 the combined effort to serve abstraction. Proceeding with

the diagram. Such criticism argues that if the imagined form is taken to be embodied in imagination and the observation is understood to be lying outside, it will again be wrong to say our work thing is in this case the imagined form will be embodied, and the observation disembodied. It seems that the embodied will displace the disembodied which, at this, is a matter of impossibility. Thus, he concludes that it is a delicate and acute problem and cannot be solved by ordinary logic. He, however, gives no solution of the problem but only poses it for the people to contemplate over. It is, however, explicit that he acknowledges the distinction between the two, but the only points he has and does not elaborate as to what should be thought of these two and how should they be represented as separate entities.⁴⁰

Having discussed it, he asserts that if the imagined form is similar to mere abstraction, it loses the hidden power to its proper place, and if the soul and the hidden power are at their respective places and the lower soul (self) detaches from sensory activities, the unity with the divine light is then possible. And, due to the union, the self will reach a stage called as the state of constant union

(Hayato-wijimaye itikae)), alongside this, he describes here nine other stages as well. If the soul, reason and heart continue to reside in the state described above and the lower senses (lower) remain controlled the soul reaches a state called as the state of absence of existence (ghost or void state); if the hidden power induces the soul pursuing the right path there comes a state of sticking (solidity). Its relative higher stage is attraction (love); if the soul follow the hidden power pursuing its right path there comes the state called as the state of growth (conclusion). The higher stage is difference (discrepancy). Thereafter comes the stage of contraction (pain) when the lower senses help the soul and the hidden power. The following is the stage of expansion (happiness) and it is achieved when the soul senses fully support the soul and the hidden power. This support must come from it personally. It should interpret and explain them with affection. And if there is a continuity in some of the stages and in others it does not exist, the soul comes to the stage of seeing the descent of the divine light (tajer-iliy-e-ikhlas). And, if the soul sees himself to be united for a while and thereafter the unity disappears, he rises to the stage of thinking and brightness (insight or enlightenment). All these stages are the development of the stages of the heart

and the reason and are created in the soul and the hidden power (ask va nitr). Sometimes this unity is concealed in the veil of physicality and sometimes manifests itself like the discourses (mushafah), event (muafat), dispute (Mushaf), etc. If the heart subduces, the soul comes to a point very much like the state (hal), and the knowledge gained at this stage comes from the heart. By the domination of the reason there comes a stage resembling perception and contemplation (idra' va tafakkur) and the knowledge gained at this stage comes from the reason. If the soul and the hidden power pursue their right path the soul is united with the highest spirits (malakutah).⁴⁵

This unit is often concealed like the discourses, disputes and the events, and sometimes is apparent in diverse forms (divari-e-mahakkiyah). If it becomes sometimes the soul and the hidden power act properly and sometimes one of them pursues its right path. However, with the willance of their function the soul passes on to different stages. Much has been said, as Shih Waliullah ash-Shuhadani, regarding the purification and misadventure (lata-e-mahakkiyah) but, as he thinks, it has not been properly explained. He is of the view that every internal and external tempt (lata' va jashak) has its own discipline (hukm) and when any of the two comes close

to each other and as the other path is created appearing thereby (1) both of them are either united in a way that their discipline (tadr) becomes one. This state gives way in the stages of intoxication (sukr), ecstasy (majd), absorption (mahv), and (2) as both of them even after being united remain distinguished following their own discipline but help the student in the path of progress and this state leads to the stages of sobriety (sahv), dignity (tashin) and stability (istiqamat). According to Ghah Nihiliah, great is he who possesses dignity (tashin) and other internal virtues, even after being united, across their own discipline (tadr).⁴³

Hariri gives his point of view Ghah Nihiliah discusses the first condition of the unity. In case of the triumph of inferior senses with the other, if the rationality, sensuality and the five senses are dominant, and person will be a hypocrite, and if the heart could control the lower senses, reason and soul, the person will experience the stages of dominance (ghalbi), ecstasy (majd) and intoxication (sukr). If the heart is dominant the soul is unable to think of anything else with like the people being in ecstasy. He thinks neither of the world nor of the life hereafter. He only keeps on being things in ecstatic condition. And, if the reason dominates he thinks of everything and is able to

distinguish between one and another. In the first case it is called authentication and in the second submission. The first is submission (ghalib) and the second dignity (tashin). The first is intoxication (sukr) and the second sobriety (sahy). Putting it in brief, the soul dominates the heart, the senses, the reason and nature and the nature power all of them. To conclude, the Shah affirms that for the training of the internal senses worship is a must. The soul can keep on remembering God. Shah Mujtabish prefers the first remembrance (zikir-e-jahr) suggested by the Sufi masters. He also emphasizes on the molding of breath (habs-e-dan) and internal justification. Moreover, he thinks much needed for making the heart active. The Sufistic music, as he thinks, makes the frequent remembrance and remembrance enlightens the hidden power. Thus, in his opinion, the justification of internal and external senses (latail-wa-majail) is necessary and can be made with the help of worship and remembrance.⁴³

It has often been observed that the mortal self demands for the fulfillment of wishes and when the self does not attain it, he experiences internal confrontation, but his constant effort makes him overcome and, having succeeded in mastering the lower self, he sees in him a strange light which affirms the capability of the lower self. Now Shah Mujtabish refers

to think Ibrahim Adham to have been telling that he had compared the lower will voice and making the mention of two stories told by him but gives no details. Therefore, he describes as to how he could know that the internal senses have been purified. The will, as he thinks, would know if it be truly delighted and brighten. He still requires it by using his steps. If he is at the stage of ecstasy and rapture (wajd wa shawq) his heart dominates. One who has the shakhsia faith is a man of reason. a man of piety, ihsanic or istislahi is a man of soul. Apart from it, the reform of the internal senses will be rewarded by the saying that a will comes correct. Having purified all the senses one of them which corresponds to his nature dominates the others. The man of heart will always be in the stage of ecstasy and rapture, the man of reason would observe the divine light, the man of soul would enjoy the illumination of the soul, and the man of hidden power would gladly follow the conviction of God (ishq). Thus, the dominant internal senses would play an important role in his will path.

Shah Waliullah also says that if a will is seen to be doing something against the shariat, he should not be doubted unless we have the following points in mind that sometimes

It so happens that a particular sense with an intensity is

lower senses dominated in a wali. Now in order to purify the lower senses it has to be controlled. But even after its being controlled it may express itself in a mild and delicate way. And, thus, a wali having such a nature may perform something against shariah. Moreover, in the beginning of the advent of Islam such emphasis was given on the purification of the external senses and the internal ones were hardly attended to. Thus, their internal nature were not reformed in accordance with the shariah. In this way, that foolish gives such emphasis on lower self but, along with this, he also go on business of his nature so that the internal and the external senses may be purified.⁴⁴

Stages in the Wali's Journey :

Having described the importance of shariah, "taqwa" and worship in the purification of the senses, reason, heart, soul, and the higher power, we now take up to discuss the different stages in walien. We shall begin our discussion of these stages by pointing out the difference between wali and common man. On one ground, as described earlier, there is no difference between the two, but on the other it does exist which will be described hereafter.

That Sufialish here asserts that this difference is created by the status and dignity reached by man due to his

doms. To explain it, Manu himself describes that passion (kashaya) and emotionality constitute the nature of the animal soul (nafs-e-ghaliya). Man's object lies in the attainment of light and purity and they cannot be achieved unless he controls and pacifies the soul and the animal soul (nafs-e-ghaliya or nafs-e-ashbiya). Thus, by controlling them he will be different from the stone man and will thereby reach a stage as it is achieved by him, it will be called his own creation. This stage in this way is man's creation. When he reaches a particular stage he sees himself in a particular state which can be understood as its consequence. He, however, has to depend for it as far as he is and outcome of the state. It is not to reach a stage some work must be performed. Repentance (tauba) and prayer are necessary to soothe the passionate and the animal soul. The passionate soul must be controlled by the animal man, and the animal soul should be dominated by reason (qaswat-e-fa'rahiya). In this coordination, only, repentance and prayer are possible. The result of repentance lies in the shock.

One who shocks himself is called 'sajda'. He is classified into a particular category in accordance with the nature of the shock he imposes on himself, and when the controllers are divided into many kinds. The first is the

who controls himself properly. He is either taken to shock himself due to advice of a preacher or of a wife or is induced to shock himself due to the company of the pious people. The second one is that who shocks himself due to the master (wajd) felt in the depth of his heart, and in this state he feels either disgusted or repulsive. The ecstasy transcends the heart and it is separated from the senses (hawash). The third one is that who controls his senses. The shock on the senses causes his consciousness and the consciousness means its control over the heart. All this is achieved with the help of experience (karam).

Having described the experiences, Shah Faizullah describes the position (mawd). It is important for the training of the soul. In order to position it, one must refrain himself from consciousness, and the mind not heavily control his heart and senses. Not only this, he should also avoid his indulgence in the affairs concerning all his time. Apart from it, he should himself account for his deeds he has done till then (mashawad). With the help of self-accounting the heart is controlled and the mind is purified. Position, however, depends on the experiences and thus, ultimately, it is the experiences which helps man in the training of his mind, his heart and the senses.⁴⁵

There are many stages of patience but they are not often distinguished because the deeds at those stages are similar and the reason, due to the similarity, acknowledges no difference though, as a matter of fact, they are distinct from one another. That Taimishah describes some of these given below.

(1) Patience and dependence (sabr), (2) truthfulness and honesty (sidq wa 'adl), (3) wisdom and piety (hikmah wa taqwa), (4) love of the paths of God (muhabbat-e-shi'kh-e-illah).

Some of them are result of the reformation of the soul and others of the heart and nature. Patience and dependence are the result of the reformation of soul; truthfulness and honesty follow from the purification of the heart; devotion and love become the quality of the soul when purified.

The training and reformation lies in the fact that it should, on the one hand, penetrate into the nature of the belief which comes from the world or faith (akrat-e-a'ali). It, however, should not question the elements of the afore-said belief, rather take it for granted and proceed to act in accordance with it. On the other hand, it should be aware of the becoming. It means that it should be guided by meditation, 'muhasibah' in the well terminology and 'fawa'

in the sense of epistemology. (Here the Vedāntika describes the distinction of terms by giving the equivalents, but they are different in accordance with the fields they are used in. Thus, when the saman is trained, it becomes aware of the becoming either with the help of dharma or meditation. Knowing something about what to come, is not really comprehensible because if it related to self potentialization and cannot be experienced unless they are developed.

The training of the saman also means that the research should understand the teaching (śikṣā) and the dharma (dharma). It should also be able to give right interpretation to the divine book. Alongside this, it should be in a position to penetrate into the nature of Brahman. All this can be achieved when the saman is trained and purified. The purpose of the training lies in the civilization of the saman. Civilization of the saman would mean their proper functioning which would be in accordance with their nature. The sūtra sūtra in connection with the achievement of the purpose. Some of them are of the view that each of the saman (śikṣā) should separately be trained, and having purified them one should work, the sūtra. It seems that the training of the saman comes first in their spiritual saman and worldly thereafter. Others are of the opinion that

worship is the pre-requisite and cannot be ignored in any case. As a matter of fact, the purification of the senses depends on knowing his meaning. Worship without it may evened be abused and perverted. Thus the latter emphasises on the worship more than the training, and Shah Waliullah also supports them. It is on the basis of the training that they are categorised. Explaining it he gives the examples. One who acquires love and faith before the training of the soul is 'majmuh', one who is dominated by his state (hal). And one who worships and worships before coming to the stage of love and faith is traveller (sallik). The training of the soul (tafs) has a three-fold effect. On one hand, it affects the five senses and helps them in proper coordination. On the other hand, it affects the heart and reason. It helps the heart by arousing in it the feeling of love of God and directs the reason to revive faith in his being. In this regard, Shah waliullah prefers the teachings of Khwaja Naqshband, for he is of the view that the training of internals (batin) is not enough, the externals (qahir) should also be purified. Khwaja Naqshband asserts that the traveller (sallik) should connect himself with the 'majmuh' and his essence should not be divided. The worship being 'majmuh' should compulsorily be performed. The veracity lies in the fact that remembrance

(*śānta*) and *śāntasamādh* (*śānta*) are essential for the purification of the dignification. Putting it in brief, with *śāntasamādh* holds that the worship is matter (*śāntasamādh*) and the stage (*śānta*) is form. From without within *śānta* be inspired. He gives the example that the eye is necessary and only then the form can be given to it. It means that no stage can be reached without worship. It is him the *śānta* (*śānta*) of the purification of the *śānta*.⁴⁶

Having described the importance of worship (*śānta-samādh*), the *śānta* comes to define different stages. He first takes up the stage of truth. Defining it he asserts that it is not the truth of assertions (*śānta*) but the truth of states (*śānta*). Explaining it he describes that the heart possesses a power to liberate the five *śānta* (*śānta*) itself and thus controls them and makes them as what it feels virtuous. When the heart acquires this attribute with the help of worship and *śānta* stages the stage, namely the stage of truth which him in between the two, namely the inspired attribute of the heart and worship. Having reached this stage the *śānta* (*śānta*) comes to retreat, and whenever he finds the name of God written on a paper or hears it from someone, he at once shows respect by bowing his head and pronouncing assertions like

Having defined the stage of *taqwa* he comes to explain the stage of *ecstasy* (*majd*). To him *ecstasy* means the absorption or complete engrossment in a particular state or affair such as the joys of society (*hays*), ignorance of the world, regret and shamefulness, etc. In this absorption the five senses should also be lost, meaning thereby they should be in complete subjection of the heart. The traveller reaches this stage with the help of worship. The *ecstasy* depends on the ability of the soul. It seems that the soul omits the possibility of being lost in a particular state or affair and the heart is absorbed. Ghosailah also speaks of the ways leading to *ecstasy*. Worship is one of them and lawful music also leads to it. He has pointed out a mistake of many of the Sufis who understand the stage of *ecstasy* as the last one and consider the one saying it is as a saint without knowing whether the heart contains the *ra'ya* or not, meaning thereby that, in the end, *ecstasy* will be a stage when the heart facilitates the *ra'ya*. Without it, that is to say, if otherwise is the case, it is very much like animally which makes it difficult to distinguish between man and animal. To him, a stage without having *ra'ya* is not a stage in the soul's career and, in the case of otherwise, he would not recognize it as a

the stage. On the same principle, he explains patience (sabr).

According to him, it also lies in the gravity of the nature of the heart and depends on worthiness. Like other stages, it is also achieved with the help of worship. Explaining it further, he says that at this stage as well the reason should dominate the heart. Here he also speaks of the kinds of patience or dependence (tawakkul). He describes its two kinds, broadly (i) trust in God, and (ii) trusty (tawqar). The first is attained by the reason with the help of meditation and inspiration (kashf wa ilham) and, on the basis of it, the reason loses confidence in everything but God. Shuh'aniyah here points out a mistake made by the people in general. Most of them confuse it with carelessness and idleness and call them as dependence (tawakkul) and thus justify their unorderly deeds and idleness life. He rightly asserts that carelessness and idleness cannot be understood as patience and dependence (sabr wa tawakkul). The second, trusty (tawqar) means to be in the limits of Shariah. The importance of Shariah has earlier been discussed. Here it will suffice to say that one must keep himself within the bounds of Shariah. Asserting it, he points out towards the people who thought themselves free from it and believed in the 'barzakh' stage. Other than this,

the party includes the love of God's command, taking in the
 picture the Holy Church, the Kasha and the prophet. Not only
 this, it also includes the love of coffee and it is this which
 is called an assimilation in the prophet (fate fi al asatid)
 or in the faith (fate fi al faith). The essence lies in
 the fact that the heart (qalb) should not be swayed in the
 direction of lower and (dafa).⁴⁷

For his achievement he is of the view that the
 esophagians have found a better way (hal) and it is the
 attention paid to the disciple. Explaining it, the shah
 says that everyone possesses the capacity of doubtless
 (ghalib) and resolution (am) and when he attempts to compare
 he considers his opponent as inferior and dominates him.
 In the case of common men, this capacity is used to gain
 power and status. The coffee utilizes it, and particularly
 the esophagians, to reform and purify the nature of the
 disciple. The master was in fact aware of this capacity of,
 at least, he is unable to distinguish it from the other. The
 will, with the help of worship learns, to differentiate the
 attributes and capacities from one another. Thus he becomes
 aware of this capacity as well, and when he wants to attend
 someone he attends to it and his status affects the disciple
 to the extent that he is lost in them. Explaining the

difference of the two, namely the one who has realized this capacity and the other who is unaware of it. Both willishah gives two examples. The one is of the state producing fire when struck upon by an iron rod. But, in case of this example, the flame is not necessary and if at all it blazes, nothing can be said of its direction. The other example is of a man who has realized fire and is capable of heating anything whether wet or dry. It seems that in case of correct use the effect of the state is not a matter of rarity, but in case of a man who has realized this capacity the effect of the state is essential, meaning thereby that his attention can direct the disciple in the way he likes.⁴⁹

Having described the methods of saqabandiya, Shah Willishah comes to a second problem which completes it, the absorption. In connection with this, he is of the view that a man must remember God from the core of his being, and with its help he realizes the powers of understanding (qawwat-e-madraki) and power of imagination (qawwat-e-wahmi). Having realized these powers lying in him in potentiality, he should draw for himself an imaginative picture and, with the help of his faith, he should explain and interpret it. This imaginative picture will be relational in nature. This means that it would be related to someone and that some one

will be God.

would be God. Explaining it he asserts that, as the devoted
 falcon remains attached to its nest, in the same way the
 imaginative picture in his mind is related to the one it
 belongs to. Hence he emphasizes on the objectified picture
 but he is also of the view that it could be observed as well
 in such case it will surely be a form and so he calls it
 reflection of the form (*vaajilaa-a-saati*) which could appear
 either in the style of appearing as sleep.⁴⁹

After describing the faith, the next comes to the
 importance of inspiration (*haash*). It depends on the capacity
 of the person and as he handles himself, all his other
 capabilities and *pranah* are recruited and enlightened to reach
 this stage, concentration of attention and attention to the
 lower organs are essential. It has already been described
 that full participation in the world leaves no time for being
 absorbed in worship and remembrance of God.

Shri Chaitanya here again tries to remove a confusion
 caused by the simile in verse 1. And it is said "I believe the
 religious (faithful) and the sepioid agreed. He defines
 'faithful' saying that it is that when a *vyakta* (*vaki*) receives
 speaks up hearing a tradition or a voice of truth without the
 basis of any rational argument (*vaajilaa-a-saati*). Defining
 the rational argument, he asserts that it is the argument

established on the basis of the explanation (libarot-s-masa),
 clues (libarot-s-masa) and intuition. It seems that with
 their help man reaches to the exact meaning of the word.
 The reliance (aitibur) is one way of understanding the
 meaning of the words. Shm Kalishnik is of the view that
 the dangers are known by this process either in the state of
 awareness or in sleep. Explaining it, he asserts that a
 musician sings a particular song but it interprets the hazard
 to his ear. At a matter of fact the musician's song has to
 coincide with that of the hazard but the likeness of the
 contents compels him of his own and he feels himself is harm
 led in it. Thus, 'aitibur' is the transcription of mind
 without the establishment of any argument. The 'araz', the
 tradition and the teachings of great sages should be studied
 and comprehended with the help of this process of knowledge.
 Shm Kalishnik, thus, simply explains that reliance (aitibur)
 is not a kind of seeking; it is the process in which the exact
 meanings are understood through contemplation.¹⁰

Process of Awakening :

The tradition and the purification of the senses
 constitutes two types of knowledge, namely 'a'har' and 'nag'.
 By 'a'har' he means that the knowledge of the multiplicity
 of the objects is obtained by the senses and work of them is
 as regulated by a system. The knowledge later on, the

manas and the 'arid' becomes aware of the objects (iridhat). The matter of intervention is completely subjective. As he prefers an explanation to this subjective experience it lacks convincing possibility. Knowledge of the world comes from the absolute apt (maniyat-a-matlap) and the individual receives it with the help of his senses. The senses possessed by man are by way of which related to different elements, angalis, atisat, and other sense bodies. The knowledge in the sense may actually concerned with the absolute apt is related to the individual apt (maniyat-a-matlap). The 'arid' can obtain the true knowledge only when he sees God in the world and the world is also. Each of them have their own position and the 'arid' becomes aware of that. Supporting his contention, he argues that had there been only the unity (kash-a-matlap); the diversity could not be perceived, and if there existed only the diversity the unity could not be visualized. It is therefore that to proceed to see the unity is diversity and otherwise for the attainment of true knowledge. Thus, unity and diversity both are indispensable for obtaining the knowledge.³¹

It is the knowledge that categorizes one and differentiates one from the other. That spiritual dimension is in the preceding passage.

First of all he presents the qualities of a perfect man (irmak-e-kamil). It is he who sees the unity. Having known the unity he is not in need of knowing the diversity, for it is hidden in the unity itself.

Explaining it with mystical metaphors of the divine mirror, it comes from the world of forms and through the divine light (tajalliy-e-manzur) on the universal soul (nafs-e-kulliyah), it is there that the self perceives unity in unity and diversity is diversity. Through these species, namely the divine light and the universal soul, the divine mirror (dair-e-illahi) is revealed on the human soul which with mystical effort compares with the mirror. Speaking of this revelation he holds that it is in accordance with the divine sufficiency (kamalat-e-kulliyah) and the universal plan (amr-e-kull) that the souls bring forth the divine jewel of knowledge to the soul of the self. Such a man who possesses the divine jewel or notion of knowledge is the perfect man and his manner, heart and sphere come accord with the conditions which actually are divine but appear to be natural (tafiid).

Such a man is adorned with the national feelings. Among them, one who trusts the nation is the patriot (vatan) and one who understands the evil or tyranny is the critic (kashf). Note the last aspects of inspiration. The divine

divine aid, being divine, reach a stage suitable to their nature; and some of the individuals work hard to achieve a particular stage. God helps them in the achievement of their object. In support of his argument he quotes the following verse from the Holy Quran :

يَسِّرُ اللَّهُ - (الم)

(God makes easy and He is the disposer of all things. He breaks the veins of the individual and makes up of him what he wants and then helps reach the goal).

It does not depend on the will power. It does not depend even on the Shariah. Contrary to this, the scholars of Shariah had been complaining as from the people, for much of it namely the assimilation and submissiveness of the internal dispositions into the state depends on the individual. The scholars of Shariah did not reveal it also for the reason that some of the individuals may misunderstand. Clarifying the fact he gives the example of the books of scholars which benefited many of the individuals. Yet, for some of them, they proved to be dangerous due to their inability of comprehension and right interpretation. As regard to the assimilation (Fata-i-Isfahani) and submissiveness (Haqi-i-Muhammadi), Shariah can help only to the extent as the story of Ismail-e-Majnun, for instance, helped him in transporting him to his own village. However, the people in general are not helped by Shariah in this regard and as the scholars had said

something it from them. But, as Juh Wiliam thinks, it is the demand of the time that the secrets of the civilization and substance should be brought home. Here he gives a clue to the degenerating conditions of the Sells in his own days, and by way of reform thinks it indispensable to speak of the secrets which had hitherto been concealed. An example is the secret names (*latika-a-muina*), the Juh is of the view that, due to the lack of sagacity and sharpness required in their comprehension the Sells have been unable to understand them. Many of them have attempted it but their efforts led them to doubt and they could not reach any conclusion. To him, it is because of the fact that in the computations they made mistakes. Here he takes up to point out these errors and rectify them as far as possible.

He begins with ii, he takes up to describe its source of danger and is of the view that the heart, reason and the nature of man are the sources, as they are afflicted in which the dangers coming out of them are nine millions. If it is a danger rooted in the heart, he calls it '*akimi-a-tuqut*'. It will express itself in matters of contraction (*qita*) and expansion (*hadi*), fear and hope, and prudence, etc. The danger coming in the reason expresses itself in two matters

of meditation regarding the future. and, the danger rooted in the nature of man expresses itself in the matters of hunger, thirst, and so on. First, it is necessary that in order to save oneself from these dangers which rooted in the heart, reason or nature, have their roots and are created by it in a way as the hunger, thirst, heat and cold become the cause of urge or mental disorder in the cause of irritation, and self-disorder, etc. Reason has the capacity of comprehension and heart possesses the capacity of intention (good) and faith (good). They do not help in the creation of the dangers and the hell must not take them into consideration as long as they are trapped in their own domain of perception. It is actually the devilish temptations (ishta-~~o~~ shaitaniya) which are responsible for the creation of dangers. They should, therefore, be controlled. In case of things being free they create it man feelings like anger, temptation, etc. and destroy the divine discipline, and any discipline other than the divine one should not be followed and stayed.⁵²

If any other discipline is followed, the devilish power dominates the divinely in man and the followers acquire the character of irritation, annoyance and temptation. The evil souls also help the devil to develop these temptations in man. They, however, cannot give anything to man except the hell and

disappointment. Thus, a soul should be aware of these tendencies and guard himself against their domination. He should also know that they could induce him only to the evil dream and devilish discipline. Pak Yik-huijan, therefore, advises the soul to emancipate themselves from such tendencies and seek for the refuge of God. There are some dangers which belong to the world of form (*hain-m-ai-hai*). When the soul qualifies us to what he needs by the voice of Jesus. To him, it is the world of secrets looked after by the highest angels. Explaining it he gives the example of a house with the lamps of different sizes and lighting capacities. All of them are lighted together and give a light collectively. Although each one of them gives the light in accordance with the capacity of emission, is the same way there are many secrets of the soul and many angels, each of them having his own capacity. But, when taken collectively they form a whole. The soul in the state of earthly form can see the reality but perceives its form belonging to the world of form.¹⁴

As it has been said that everything has its form in the world of form, same is the case with the dangers, with the difference that vice and virtue are not distinguished there. The soul, however, before the onset of the danger he

is to him or is about to face, either in the dream or with the help of some other man or animal. Not all but only a group of angels is engaged in this task. Each of the secret souls also help them in the performance of their work. The knowledge of angels and other sciences related to the astrology are noted in this section, meaning thereby that the angels are the actual source of information. These sciences by themselves cannot foretell anything. According to further, he holds that the urges in the heart of man are created by the angels in the world of forms. It is because of the fact that the universal expediency (shaiqsi-e-milli) desires to create some virtue which cannot be expressed unless embodied in the human soul, and for its embodiment in the needs soul it necessarily comes into existence in the world of forms. The universal expediency, in this regard, works the universal ego (shahidi-e-kosmi). According to explicitly the Shah asserts that when the world needs change its first cause is the divine light (ruhiyy-e-qaam) which is understood to be the heart of universal ego. Explaining the doctrine he gives the example of water a part of which is absorbed in the ground. In the same way, what is revealed by the universal ego in accordance with the universal expediency is implemented by the angels and the human souls, for they are the only instruments

an agent to bring it down to the human beings. In this way the sage is revealed. The agents by themselves are nothing. They are like the diamond mirror which need a man to lift a speck which hinders the vision, only when he himself takes away from it. But God possesses the capacity of bringing everything down to the human beings if desired by the universal expediency (mañihai-e-bullii). Speaking of the difference between the capacity of the angels and that of man, the Shah explains it with the example of an astronomer and a common man. An astronomer has the prior knowledge of a solar eclipse while a common man knows about it when he sees the sun. Thus the angels have the capacity of receiving the knowledge of any event to see its happening in the phenomenal world and can know it when it comes across.⁸⁶

In creating the divine active the universal expediency (mañihai-e-bulliya) manifests itself in the individual expediency (mañihai-e-jurriya) but its manifestation comes place only when the total capacity (hikmat-e-bulliya) is expressed in the partial capacity (hikmat-e-jurriya). Thus the sage is created in man. It is first admitted by 'huji-e-bahar' which decides to draw the divine light (iajailiy-e-saad). Explaining it he gives the example of a seal impressed upon

the soul. At the same stage the description of the soul 'hajr-e-mahat', in the same way, gets the impression of the divine active. Thereafter the soul and the 'ajay' admit its age and first there it comes to the intellect and heart and finally it enters the realm of the spiritual senses. It makes all of them and since the external senses are dominated by that stage a new religion, nation or civilization comes into existence. Shah Waliullah takes here for granted that the urge must be divine. He had already asserted that the nature of man is good and divine and that changing occurs only that which is divine.³⁶

God the Almighty imparts the humbly a new knowledge which continues to exist for a long time had from time to time is revived by the reformers (mujaddids). Here Shah Waliullah points out that the Supreme often considers the divine active in his lastness with the divine light. Even Jesus Christ considered it so. All prophet advanced came out against of any such thing. He seems to point out that the urge (daj) and the divine light are different from each other, and those who have taken them as united are mistaken. Speaking of the perfection of man, he holds that it lies in his understanding the dangers hidden in his soul and nature and should also be aware of their nature. His awareness of them will help him

manifests that the danger had he will know the truth.³⁷

Regarding the creation of the divine realm (shah
 'alidish) speaks of many possibilities. He asserts that the
 training of the human souls rests in the world of forms as
 form. Its form emerges out in accordance with the universal
 motive (daiya-e-halliyeh) which manifests in the partial motive
 (daiya-e-jawabyeh), and the angels appointed for it work for
 the individuals in whom it is created. That he trust his
 soul accordingly. Such a man may even lead perfect men like
 'quah', 'majidid', etc. Another possibility lies in the
 fact that the angels appointed for a particular function
 perceive it and the man in whom it is perceived does not
 understand, someone else helps him to understand. It is he
 also includes the birds. It seems rather irrational that the
 birds could also give man the knowledge of particular things.
 However, it is mystical in nature and, hence, cannot be
 questioned.

Third third possibility lies in the fact that the angels
 appointed for the remembrance of God may encircle the soul
 and create in him the divine motive around for him. In such
 a case if the heart admits the effects the soul gets contentment
 and satisfaction and if the reason is influenced, the subject

is purified. There may be yet another possibility that the soul might know the divine nature in his dream. Here he categorizes the dream saying that the one related to the contentment and satisfaction is 'maya' and the one related to the particular deeds is 'anubhava'. The angels, however, give the soul the knowledge of the divine nature of which he is not aware, for all the knowledge either obtained by meditation (kashī) or inspiration (ilham) comes from the angels in the world of forms. Thus, the world of forms is the repository of knowledge and the angels in it are the spirits.⁵⁸

CHAPTER - III

METAPHYSICS - (Section I)

Synthesis, as we know, is the representative of Shah Waliullah's metaphysics. To put it otherwise, we can say that Shah Waliullah's metaphysics is concealed in revealing the similarity between the *wahdatul majid* (the unity of Existence) and the *wahdatul shakhs* (unity in Appearance), the two forms which of union. It seems to understand Shah Waliullah's metaphysical position it becomes indispensable to comprehend the two positions, between them he tries to make a reconciliation. Keeping this in view, we must take upon ourselves to explain and discuss the metaphysics of Iqbal Arshi and Mujibul Afsar, the proponents of the two schools (*wahdatul majid* and *wahdatul shakhs*) respectively. To begin with, we shall take up Iqbal Arshi's doctrine of the 'Unity of Existence'.

At the outset of our discussion of Iqbal Arshi's doctrine of the unity of Existence we should cast a perceptive glance at the meaning of the Existence (*wujud*) itself.

The etymology of existence suggests two different meanings.

Firstly, it means the concept or the idea of 'being' isolated (majid bi nafi al-madarik). Secondly it means that it has no existence (majid bi na wa-mawjūd). Absolute existence (majid al-mawjūd) or universal existence (majid kullī) is the reality in which all existence owes its existence. Thirdly, as affīf points out, even the term existence is both the source.¹

Absolute existence has ideas used by Imam Ḥafīd to corroborate at least four senses, mentioned below :

i) Absolute in the sense that it is limited in no form yet common to all forms (imnāfiyya).

ii) Absolute in the sense of not being in any form but transcending all forms (tashawwūfiyya).

iii) Absolute in the sense of not being the cause of anything, self-subsisting.

iv) Absolute in the sense of the reality of realities (ḥaqīqiyā).²

Sometimes Imam Ḥafīd uses absolute existence in different elucidating metaphors like the witness (al-shāhid), the central point (al-muqāṭaʿ) or the centre of the circle (mawḥūḍ al-dawra). We have reproduced an extract from 'Furūḡ' p. 24, which is suggestive of the different meanings of absolute existence, "There is not in the possession of God

by means of this form, in all existents, the world would have no existence, just as, were it not for the intelligible universal realities (al haqiq al ma'wal al Kalliyah) no predictions (akhsas) for external objects would be possible." Let us now understand the different meanings to which the extract leads us. (i) it may mean the unity of all individuals belong in the past, present and future in man being whether it be the universal substance, primary matter of God (ii) it may mean that the absolute being manifests itself in all forms and situations, (iii) it may mean as the source of all existence that has being (iv) it may mean the universal and the being of any other existent to a particular mode as manifestation.³

being in the modern sense is an adjectival or qualificative which determines or manifests itself in different modes, colors, shapes and space and time etc.⁴

The different meanings of absolute being create a confusion. It begins when Imam Arabi like Suhrawardī's believes that being as existence is separable in the mind from the concept. Let us make it explicit by an example. The universal concept is separable from the existence like the concept of man is mentally separable from the existence of man, but the concept and existence are inseparable in the

external world, as is the case with the being. The concept of being as *Ihwal Ahsal* says is separable in the mind from the existence but it stands inseparable in the world of objects. The existence as a concept and *wujud* (quality) are separable in the mind but identical in the world of objects.⁵

Ihwal Ahsal explains that the absolute reality is the source of all existence. Existence as concept is identical with the existence in the external world. From it follows that all existence owe its existence to *Qus* which is an absolute reality. We only see the limited existence which *Ihwal Ahsal* regards exist on their own and as such have a source of existence which is the absolute existence or absolute reality. The absolute existence and absolute reality refer to one but the same thing. By unity of existence *Ihwal Ahsal* means that the absolute existence is the source and cause of all existence.⁶

There has been a controversy among the Philosophers regarding the essence and existence (*Ma'na & Wujud*). Some believe them to be identical and others separable.

Ihwal Ahsal is lined with the former. He says the absolute existence whose existence, and essence are identical (*ma'wjudun hi majdun kama majdun*) or whose existence is

necessary (wajibi) what is essential) is the source of all being in the sense of a reality. This essence is all realized or realizable with the exception and accidents. With the manifestations of existence and essence, the mind acquires the notion of abstract existence.⁷

With it we come to the problem of the separation of existence in thought. The absolute existence is separable from the absolute existent in thought. The quality of a thing separated in the mind is mere conception. The existence cannot be conceived in any thing other than 'highly' of a thing. According to Ash'ari Ibn Arabi and Ishraq, what separates the existence and concept of a thing would be a logical contradiction by making an existential proposition a predicational proposition. In this way Ibn Arabi goes to assert that the absolute existence is the source of all that exists.⁸

With this we come to the problem of being and not being. According to Ibn Arabi, all that has a being must exist in one form or the other, so this he calls 'wujud' or 'hastih' (Presence or stages). According to him there are four types of being: (1) being in the external world (wujud al-shay' al-mawjud) (things in existence) (2) Intelligible being (wujud al-shay' al-ha) (3) Being of

a thing in spoken words (sachal al shay'ill al-haw) and
 (4) being of a thing in script (sachal al shay'ill rasmi).
 All that exist must manifest itself in one or the other
 of these stages. Existing in none of them is not being.
 If a thing exists in one of these places and does not exist
 in the other is a being in the place in which it exists and
 is not being in the place in which it does not exist. Here
 it seems, as if Ihsan could were to prove that a thing may
 exist conceptually and may not exist as a concrete object.⁹

Regarding God Ihsan Arabi thinks that He has the
 knowledge of things prior to their existence in the external
 world. These things exist in two places : (1) Intelligible
 being (2) Concrete being (being of a thing in the external
 world). To us they must exist in the concrete form in the
 external world. The intelligible being of them is in God.
 As He has His concept of universe and man. He regards
 the universe to be eternal and temporal simultaneously.
 It is eternal because, it is in the knowledge of God and
 temporal because it has a concrete being, that is, it exists
 in the external world.¹⁰

THEORY OF BEING**Being**

Absolute
Divine Essence
Original Being

Relative
Phenomenal
Being

Independent
(Substance)

Dependent
Attributes accidents
special and temporal
relations

Material
(Matter)

Immaterial
(Pure spirit)

Relative 'being' may either be actual external world or potential. To this, he sometimes adds possible being. By not being he means, a thing existing in neither of the planes. A thing existing in one and not existing in the other plane, for instance, a thing may exist as idea in the mind and may not have any existence in the external world is not non-being. Pure non being is not possible, it can only be imagined. we can conceive the opposite, logical contradiction as a reason of the non-existence (4) short of negation is reality).¹¹

There are three types of beings :

(1) Necessary being (2) contingent being (3) impossible

being. Necessary being means the being whose existence is

Itself necessitated or which exists per se. It is God alone. A contingent being is one whose existence is not essential. Its being and not being are equally possible, or impossible being is one whose own existence is derived from some reason.¹²

In the doctrine of Thom's world, there is no place for possible or contingent being except that he calls impossible as possible. In reality, they exist as potentialities which must necessarily be actualized. The categories of contingent being are denied because an existence must either be necessary or be made necessary (majbut majud bil dhayr). In this way Thom's world comes to conclude that there are two types of beings, namely the necessary being and the impossible being.¹³

Thom's world concludes that there is only one reality but it is viewed from two aspects. In the sense of reality we call it "Waq" when we take the essence into consideration; in the sense of appearance we call it "Khalq" manifesting its essence. Both are identical. There is a reality in diversity. "Waq" & "Khalq" are two subjective aspects of the one. The diversity is empirical. When we regard Him through His, He is all essence. When we regard Him through ourselves, He is in things or He is in His manifestation.

The alleged difference between one and many is actually an difference. Multiplicity is due to different points of view, not to an actual division in one essence. [Ayn]. In the metaphysics of Ibnul Arabi, who logically speaking, there is a unity transcending the phenomenal world and a multiplicity of subjectivities finding their explanation in the grounds of essential unity.¹⁴

Ibnul Arabi explains this duality on logical grounds. The objects in the phenomenal world are contingent beings, but it is necessary that they would be self-subsisting and thereby necessary beings. Their eternity is attested on the same ground. Logically speaking the contingent beings must have their existence in a necessary being in the form of possibility or they could not have come in the existence. Let us recall as we have said before, that Ibnul Arabi coherent all into one reality; one stands as a continuum in its essence or a substance in its accidents. The one is logically different from them yet actually one with them. It is due to our finite minds that we make a distinction between one and many and consider that there is plurality of beings. According to Ibnul Arabi, a cyclic can transcend into a super mental state-division and see the underlying reality of many. we multiply the one due to dimes (predication).

The fact regarding the difference of colour, shape and spatio-temporal relations are actually nothing.¹⁵

All that has been written still now brings us to some paradoxes like 'He is I' and 'I am not He'. He is 'He' and 'He' is not He. These paradoxes are seeming paradoxes. In reality there is nothing like that. Something is 'He' and 'He', there is a complete reciprocity and a mutual dependence between me and the other. None of them has a meaning without the other. A verse of Ghazal Arshi would make it explicit :

He kills me and I poison Him,
 and He worships me and I worship Him
 In the place I acknowledge Him
 and in the night I deny Him.
 He knows me and I know Him not,
 and I know Him and behold Him
 You can't be independent,
 when I help Him and assist Him ?
 In my knowing Him, I create Him
 From me are borned in the tradition,
 and in me the object is realized.

Ghazal Arshi's concept of union : In his mystical
 vision, we find a unity of Rumi's doctrine of 'Lahut'

and 'Naqat', inherited view of universal substances and cosmopolitan doctrine of the One. Despite of the complication we cannot accept and claim that Ibrul Arabi's doctrine of union is identical with any one of them. Hallaj's doctrine of form and essence seems to have paved the way for Ibrul Arabi's pantheistic doctrine. More often than not Ibrul Arabi uses the terms 'Lahut' and 'Naqut'. Similarly, he uses the terms 'Tul' and 'Ard' (length and breadth), 'Material' and 'Spiritual' in his metaphysics. Ibrul Arabi's *Almaul Haw*, *Almaul Sharb*, *Almaul Arwah* and *Almaul Nuri* are identical with Hallaj's length 'Tul or Lahut' and his *Almaul Khaliq*, *Almaul Istin*, *Almaul Taw* are identical with Hallaj's breadth (ard, Naqut) but there is a fundamental difference between the two, for Hallaj's Lahut and Naqut (spiritual and the material) are of the different nature but for Ibrul Arabi, they are the two aspects of the one. The form and the essence are different names for the one.¹⁶

Like Hallaj, Ibrul Arabi never admits the theory of incarnation. He neither separation nor form really nor believes in the fusion of reality in one. Summarizing Hallaj, Ibrul Arabi says,

'*Ann almal Faqqal Hal Naqqu ann*'.

The two are always there and there is no sense of saying

that one becomes the other.¹⁷

Isolation between the real and the phenomenal :

Israel Ansel often explains the relation between the real and the phenomenal world metaphorically. Since these metaphors are ambiguous, much care should be taken in interpreting them, since he may be understood contrary to what he is. First, he explains the relation between the real and the phenomenal with the help of the metaphor of the mirror and the image. The one as an object sees its image in many mirrors appearing distant to each of them. The world is a screen on which the shadow falls, whatever is seen on the screen is nothing but real. Secondly he offers the metaphor of permeation. The many permeates the one in the way as the qualities and colors permeate the substance, the one permeates the many as the food permeates the body. Last is, as Israel Ansel himself, the spiritual level for he is not outside and through as he is realized. Thirdly he offers the metaphor of 'vessel'. The many springs from the one not small return to it. The one is like a vessel in the way in which his essence subsists. Fourthly, he explains the relation with the metaphor of number like mathematical one. The one is a discriminial point. The relation between the one and the many is like the relation between one and

other infinite numbers coming from it. Firstly, we come to the analogy of the body and its part. The body is an organic whole. Its parts though possessing an entity of their own, have come to separated from the body. The phenomenal world is like the parts having to act by without the organic whole, the one the parts are important the without then the body cannot be conceived. The phenomenal world thereby even after being the parts is important and necessary like the realisation of the one. In such a situation the unity remains uncompleted. Finally, Ibrail Arail conceives that the super-world state as intuition alone is able to perceive the unity.¹⁶

Ibrail Arail should not be mistaken. He never regards the phenomenal world to be real in the sense the One is. He, of course, calls it Haq, the reality yet never considers it to be Al-Haq, the real. According to him, the one has two aspects namely (i) the aspect of difference (Jihadi Haq) and (ii) essentially oneness with one another, actually, this is one aspect of unity (Jihadi Haq). The former aspect is known as is what Ibrail Arail calls contingency (lakaz), Eternity (Wahidiyyah) and Immortality (Hadeeth). The latter is what he calls necessity (wajab), Lordship (rububiyyah) and eternally existent and so on, and can we

know in what sense the slave is the lord and the answered
in the real and in what sense we should interpret Ibrul
Arabi's paradoxes.¹⁵

It has been clearly explained that the quality of
Hay and Khalq, the lord and the material, is not actually
any quality in Ibrul Arabi. This quality may be compre-
hended as identical to what we call differentiating the
existence. As regard to this, Ibrul Arabi uses two
Arabic terms 'faqrh' and 'mashakh'. It may have to
be noted that these terms have also been used by anthropo-
morphists and corporatists but it may be added to it that
Ibrul Arabi does not mean quite the same as they do by
these terms. A morphologist considers God to be having all
attributes comparable to man, or created beings, as is the
case with a corporatist a 'majma'at' who attributes all
attributes comparable to man or created beings. It does
not however mean that the above mentioned schools did not
believe in transcendence of God. Even after possessing the
attributes comparable to man, God can be transcendent. But
a paradoxist like Ibrul Arabi could not have given any
solution to any such thought. For him, God knows and sees
not because he has eyes or ears, not because he is immortal
and hence God sees in the beings capable of shape attributes.

In this sense, He is immanent. He is transcendent because His essence lies above all beings and despite of being everywhere and in everything He is on par. Thus His essence cannot be individualized and as He is transcendent. In this way he believes the best English and French is more abstractness and idealism (1944). In rejecting the doctrine of anthropomorphism David Arabi asserts, it is true that God has hands and feet as the Quran describes but the truth is not confined in the doctrine of anthropomorphism. But the Quran describes those attributes to Him, it means that He is hands and feet as all things having hands and feet. This limited manifestation of God is French or immanence but to say that He is an anthropomorphic being in the sense of the speakers of anthropomorphism is wrong. The very being of God is beyond all limitations. He is in every thing and yet above all things. On the same contention David Arabi rejects the Christian doctrine of incarnation 'injal'. To him, it is true that God is Christ but He is Christ in the sense in which He is in everything. To state it explicitly we may say that He is Christ and He is other created beings either but to say that Christ is God is identical to David Arabi to say that which according to David Arabi is infinitely. David Arabi envisages that

simple reality can be understood only when it is viewed by taking the transcendence and immanence both into account. No other idealism is the only religion which treats the both aspects of reality at par. In support of it, a quotation is used in here rendered as

"If you assert (pure) transcendence you limit God,
 And if you assert (pure) immanence you define Him.
 But if you assert both things, you follow the right course,
 And you are a leader and master in religion.
 He who asserts duality is a polytheist,
 and he who asserts monism is a unitarian.
 Beware of Jewish if you accept (i.e. God and universe),
 And beware of Jewish if you accept monism.
 You are not He, say, you are He, and you see Him in
 The eyes of things, absolute and limited."

"The Haq ul ulm Immanence is asserted in the same as Kholq ul ulm Immanence is asserted although (logically) the creator is distinguished from the created."

Shah Waliullah shah Waliullah says that God is in everything inside it as a logical proposition not always denies the converse of it that everything is "God". The two aspects transcendence and immanence constitutes reality. Haq constitutes Immanence and Kholq constitutes Immanence. Let us

see all the possibilities by which transcendence can be comprehended and asserted.²⁰

There can be three possibilities. In the first a non-assessive God is to transcendence. His own has his own limitations so that what holds the view that our's description of his (his God) transcendence is limited whatever abstract form our may apply, it will remain limited and God's transcendence is beyond all limitations. The other possibility of achieving via transcendence is created by our intellect. According to David Armstrong our intellect cannot conceive anything beyond the phenomenal world, for its knowledge is based on it. The intellect creates the unity (Yekhid) but as David Armstrong says it is of 'homid' (uniform) and not of God. 'God's' unity in the sense of complete transcendence is not possible to be understood by the intellect which has its own limitations. Another possibility of its comprehension is as such is the unified intellect. David Armstrong's view of transcendence is an echo of Hilary's view. A self can understand the complete unity by ecstatic flights whereas God alone knows the real transcendence. A self understands it with the help of super-sensory intuition. This higher form of transcendence is beyond all-sections. The unity of transcendence by

them and is called "Truth at hand". Transcendence in the real sense is different from that understood by intellect. The one comprehended by it is a typical correlative of Immanence.²¹

As regards to the definition of God, Thomist would say that no complete definition of God can be given for the higher form of transcendence is beyond the reach of our knowledge and the transcendence comprehended by us is one reached by our intellect, the typical correlative of Immanence. In in, therefore, whatever definition of God is given, will be on the basis of the transcendence and Immanence comprehended by us and since human knowledge is incomplete, no real yet complete definition of God can be set forward.²²

Thus there are two forms of transcendence; one belonging to the divine essence and the other belonging to created comprehended by intellect as a typical correlative of Immanence. The attributes of transcendence are predicated of the latter form. These attributes are worked up to a minimum (being) as contrasted with the limitlessness (Infinity). The transcendence ascertained by intellect assumes the following form. It is transcendent in the sense of being absolute as to its transcendence in the sense of necessary being, self-existent and self-caused as contrasted

with contingent being, created being or caused being of the phenomenal world. He may be called transcendent in the sense that He is unknowable and uncommunicable and beyond all proofs. This second kind of transcendence if taken as the whole explanation of immensity is rejected by Ibnul Arabi. According to him reality is constituted of both transcendence and immanence.²⁵

Causality and its place in Ibnul Arabi's system is

Causality has been a problem with all the philosophers of all ages. It may be recalled here that there are two types of theories put forward to explain the doctrine of causality, namely the sequence theory of causality and correspondence theory of causality. There are philosophers like Hume and Russell who refute the latter and uphold the former theory. Ibnul Arabi himself admits the doctrine of causality which is quite different from both the above said theories. It should be borne in mind that Ibnul Arabi hardly admits any causality of causality, for the mysticists believe that the phenomenal world is the self revelation or manifestation of God and reality (Haqq) and Shaiq is the Ihsan Arabi, spiritual sciences that cause and effect are mere terms which, so to say, are nothing but subjective categories. If at all the causality is to be upheld,

Ibnul Arabi says that God is the cause and the phenomenal world is the effect. In this way, he believes in it, but in the other he relates it which we shall see later.²⁴

To begin with, he makes a distinction between the two ways of causality (1) causality applied to the universe as a whole which would mean that the universe is caused by something which is its cause. The question comes, what is it, that has caused it? (2) The causality applied to the parts of the universe namely, thereby the causal connection perceived in the parts of the universe. Ibnul Arabi takes an objection to it, and this kind of causality is impossible and not transparent, its parts & the universe as an organic whole stand in a causal relation, with one continuous (the divine essence). The divine essence controls it, harmonized with. The causal relation noticed in the universe is actually a relation between the divine world and the other belonging to the same continuous. The 'cause' the divine object is the cause and the 'effect' is the effect. He does not deny the reality of other causes for doing so, because it will make him a polytheist.²⁵

This assertion of Ibnul Arabi makes the cause and effect identical. The created individual is at a loss to understand and explain it. As well by verses 5: 64:

Intuition understands the problem in the following manner. Cause and effect both are the aspects of reality. The cause (as called) is as a being both an essence and a form. By virtue of its being essence it is a cause and by virtue of its being a form it is an effect. Finally, the effect (as called) as being is an essence and a form. By virtue of its being an essence it is a cause of some other aspect and by virtue of its being a form it is an effect of some other aspect. In this way cause and effect are identical, that is a cause is a cause and an effect simultaneously. The cause factors are determined by effect factors, in any it is other words, a cause is an effect of its own effect, yet is the cause of being produced but in the sense of being determined. This doctrine can be apprehended if we believe in the impossibility of the co-existence of causes. Considering a cause is to having the self as a cause this leads to the question as to what is the other. If the cause and effect are known to be one, all is then considered as the cause of the cause or the being of the effect. This notion of causality helps to explain 'becoming'. All changes taking place in the world, which would imply either creation, or a form produced. The activity and the causality of the form and essence are

side by side.²⁶

At the outset of it, David asked some question whether between the world and God there is a causal relation or a conditional relation. If God is a cause (illah) or a condition, (Shart), it means whatever is taken as a consequent being as conditioned can't necessary being. The necessary being is self sufficient and self subsistent, and is a condition to the universe, David held believe. He thinks that, from a condition of a thing is does not follow that it could exist. And whereas to be able to a condition is require knowledge or to have says is a condition is to able to say and even the condition of life the knowledge does not attach to the condition of saying says does not necessarily mean the ability of saying. This condition of a thing does not necessarily attach to existence of a thing. Of course, the existence of a thing, requires a condition.²⁷

A cause can cause itself produce its effect. Thus existence of effect necessarily entails from its cause. In this way David held believes that between God and world there is a causal relation. Agreeing with Aristotle and other philosophers, he holds argues that God and the universe is his knowledge and what he was in his, it must have come into existence. Some other philosophers held

that the universe was in the divine essence and God wanted it manifest Himself externally. Iqbal Akabi agrees to this view but adds a temporal priority. He does not share this view of creation that the universe was created out of nothing. He relates the creation as *ibidiah*.²⁸

Regarding the eternity of the world Iqbal Akabi says that it is eternal because it was never un-created but apart from it he believes that God is the only eternal being and the universe being the outward expression of eternal, infinite and everlasting being is also eternal, infinite and everlasting. Regarding the next world, Iqbal Akabi thinks that it is always in making. This world and the next world are inseparable, the things that highlighted are transferred to the next world to come into existence again. The moment in which one form disappears is similar to the one in which the other comes into existence. There is no other process of creation apart from it. The time interval, as conceived by others in the process of creation has no meaning for Iqbal Akabi. He only believes in the logical priority of cause to effect.²⁹

Like Ibn Arabi, Iqbal Akabi believes that a thing is a renewed existence. He thinks that a thing is an eternal related to its 'cause' and a temporal existence to its

'unknown'. To say that a thing exists is nothing more than to say that some one appeared in the known today. The appearance of today does not imply that he had no previous existence. In a passage in 'Powers' Israel Abadi says that God does not create any thing. Creation (Yakula) is the concrete manifestation of a thing and it belongs to itself. To say that something is in existence means that it has manifested itself. God only wills a thing to reveal itself in concrete manifestation. God does not will and command which does not necessarily result from the things themselves or from the nature or laws of things. Laws of things, according to Israel Abadi, are nothing but God. All things in their essence exist in one essence, that is, the divine essence which manifests itself in concrete form. To explain morality on logical grounds, Israel Abadi admits the possibility of two triads, each corresponding to the other. One triad consists of essence, will and word. It is the trinity of God. The second triad is constituted of essence, obedience and learning. It is the trinity of world.³⁰

God is the creator of essence in this sense only. The world is eternal in the same sense. We derived the eternity of the world in the sense that co-eternal with God is only the essence of the world and not the forms. Israel Abadi

does not admit the temporal interval in the process of creation. He only believes in the logical priority of before and after. Going a step forward he says that the creator and created are related in the way as yesterday with today. They cannot be conceived to be temporally related for they are timeless.³¹

Causes of the divine names : Most great considers the divine names to be the cause of things (in the way as the Authoritas considers the divine knowledge to be the cause of creation). The divine names are considered by him as the lines of force each of them denotes. They are the attributes of Godhead. For instance the lowest denotes something to be known and the greater something to be created. Each of them corresponds to an aspect of reality and in a way it is the cause of that aspect. Every aspect (sugh) and every reality (Maqluh) corresponds to some divine name. It may be said then that he always does not call the divine names as causes. He sometimes calls them conditions. He goes on saying that God was when the world was not. This statement should be taken to mean that God was when the world was not and the divine names express the potentialities of God. With a view to reconciling his pantheistic doctrine with the negative concept of Allah,

he believes in a metaphysical paradox and asserts at one place that we are the attributes of God and that the divine names have no meaning without the phenomenal world, and at another place, he says that God existed upon all his divine names before the emergence of the phenomenal world, *Essence = Attributes and Names* : As it has already been explained that the divine essence is the universal substance and the divine names are the names of the aspects of the divine essence, they are, as Ghoul Arabi thinks, the manifestation of divine essence in the material world (Wajis to rather). The attributes are the manifestation, they are limited or determined in one or the other aspect. The divine names are the manifestations of the divine substance in different degrees (Maratib). ✓

To see the terminology of existence, the divine substance in its absolute indeterminateness is a *void*, void of all qualities. The thing in itself is not a substance, but the one substance which is indestructible and unchangeable. The destructive and changeable is only the accident (form) or manifestation.¹²

Ghoul Arabi considers that the attributes of God are neither the same nor other than the same. He considers them to be mere relations, determining the manifestation. The

distinctions in Hindu thought are like the metaphysical ideas of Plato whom are an abstract reality, yet determining the external reality. These are obligatory stipulations to be realised identical with and not apart from Him. The divine essence are multiplicity, determining the manifestation of the divine essence in one aspect or the other. Each of these qualities as aspect and is also identical with God. They even after determining an aspect remain one with the divine essence.

Reality in reality is our knowledge : Reality in reality is our knowledge has three aspects (1) Reality as we know it, we need not explain it too it stands evident and sustained (2) Reality as manifested in the external world which is limited to our senses and intellect and in which the activities are thought of and done. Though it is great as multiplicity, yet Hindu thought regards it a unity. Every part of the phenomenal world is the whole and thereby a unity in itself. It has the capacity of manifesting itself. The third aspect of reality can be viewed by intuition alone. It can be realised by a will but intellectual realisation can be inferred. It has no other attributes except necessary being. It is certainly and very much different from a historical deity. Hindu thought admits no such conception of

God which fascinates him of this absoluteness and makes him
 a lesser unity. He even admits any reality apart from him.⁸³

According to David Apple, reality can be conceived
 through the phenomenal world. A quotation to make it clear
 is needed. "The key to the mystery of 'being' is then"
 (The phenomenal), apart from it the reality as conceived is
 a logical construction of the world. In the attribution of the
 phenomenal world to denote their logical construction with
 an arbitrary human necessity, freedom infinitely and
 relativism absoluteness. The fundamental difference between
 reality as conceived in (i) and in (ii) is that in (i)
 instrumental attributions are logical correlations of
 human attributions which have no application and the
 attribution of God in relation to the universe. The latter
 have been already explained. Now we have to explain the
 instrumental attributions (logical world) and the human
 attribution (logical world). We must not predicate of him
 his attributes like hearing or seeing. Although he is the
 source of all that hears and sees. It is by way of hearing
 out the God - apart from the less subjective aspects of reality.
 Let us inquire into the meaning of this proposition of
 David Apple that we ourselves including the phenomenal world
 are the attributions of God. There is nothing in the phenomenal

world which can be attributed to Him. His meaning and spirit are not limited in the phenomenal world. The first part of the proclamation explains the limitation of God, the second part gives an account of His transcendence. To quote 'Glory is His, who is worshipped by all the creations of the Godhead and created objects; 'One name are His names, He is called the said al-Husna'.³⁴

The reality which is not directly perceived, but logically inferred is like a substance perceived by His accident. It admits of oppositions as contradictions, yet is a unity of all oppositions or contradictions. It has no quality or quantity, yet all qualifying and quantified come from it. Like substance it can be perceived in the stated (muted) way, which, in this time, is the phenomenal world. This reality is often referred by Sages using as 'pure light', it is often called it, as 'pure good' or blessedness 'al-husna'.³⁵

It is a state of complete unity. It is not an object of worship. The object of worship is the Lord not the one. This unity admits of plurality. Though multiplicably blessed is it, yet it is a unity. Multiplicably belongs to blessedness (al-husna) of which it can never be manipulated. It is the state of the 'one' to whom belongs the bounding splendour.

The manifestation of multiplicity in the phenomenal world is to vanish, as one will remain except God. The veil of unity can never be removed. To quote : Do not hope, O my friend : the veil of the unity will never be removed*, limit your hopey therefore, is the attainment of knowledge of the Oneness, the unity of divine Being*.³⁶

According to Ibnul Arabi reality as explained in absolute symbolism and gnosticism rest in the essential unity. Only God knows what He really is. The divine essence is not known even by a veil because he always is multiplicity. Ibnul Arabi admits no such personal God either within or outside the universe controlling it externally. This leaves the realism of Ibnul Arabi's metaphysics. God being an object of belief is an object of our knowledge. He has both positive and negative attributes, He is known as is by us. In this sense God becomes only a phrase.³⁷

In place of ethical God of Islam Ibn Arabi's God is identical with the universe who is a principle controlling the universe. The absolute is reduced into a more limited or logical relation. His attributes belong to his rank (misrata, al-haraka) God does not create but creates beings belongs to his rank. In fact, the creator and the created

are one and the same. Ghoul Arabi has tried to show the ethical and personal use of Islam in the best ground, we always see his pantheistic God on the forefront.³⁶

Explanation of ethical & personal names : In order to explain the ethical and personal names of God, he uses two methods, [In the first place he reduces the names in the same logical and psychological relations. In the second place he gives a philology of terms. Ghoul Arabi does not touch those attributions which have a pantheistic bearing. A common view of God, if it fits in his doctrine of pantheism, he steals the sight from it. Only those attributions are explained which have no pantheistic bearing and interprets them in accordance with his methods outlined above. The explanation of such attributions follows in 'Fetahat'. The presence of God which he calls 'Madrut' is a state of mystic bliss. A mystic realises his presence in the Fajette. Here the meaning of 'Madrut' is different from the meaning of five 'Madara' which are the five states of being. The presence of Godhead (al-ghoratal ilahiyah) is the state in which God is revealed as 'Allah'. The attributes of his servitude is revealed in the servitude in the universe. The interpretation belongs to Ghoul Arabi himself.³⁷

Each of the 'Madara' has two aspects, one transcendental

and the other inward. We shall first consider the aspects of Ismāʿīlism which is explained with the help of philological method. The philological method even changes the form of the concept. To illustrate it the following examples are given :

1. The name 'shamālī' (peace given) is interpreted as extinction of the supplication of the soul, and is identified with the mystic isolation.

2. Al-jahar (all compulsion). Jahar is derived from 'Jah' which means circulation not this compulsion, according to Ibnul Arabi is internal not external. We interpret it as necessity against contingency. All things follow their inner law of necessity, and no compulsion on the part of God is the necessary manifestation of Him in things.

3. Al-mutakabbir (The proud), is interpreted to mean that he transcends his contingent attributes.

4. Al-mutawallī (the partner). We derive it from wallā the wall as cover and interpret it as his walling in the form 'Amshar', the external is the greatest form in which he walls.

5. Al-muallī (best man) is derived from 'Allī' which he takes to mean to bring from one thing to another. According to him, God has bestowed from His essential necessity

(Hajjarepui wajjarepui) to that ,Jammusal secondary(Hadrato f'ajwa(jahilghayar). Ihsal Arabi explains Wa will (Itrada) in a similar manner, the state unmanifested is in the state of equilibrium (Hiladai) and the state of manifestation is all. The divine essence is involved in manifest itself in the ,Jammusal world.

6. Allaili (the mother, the concealment and the most pleasant) is understood by him as substance. The explanation that Ihsal Arabi prefers for it is almost naturalistic. God cannot be any subtle than he is in the phenomenal world. He is not obvious in the manifestation, no eye can see him other than me. Ihsal Arabi notices all the passages of arya and prophetic traditions to support his naturalistic doctrine.

7. Al Hilla (all preserving one) is rendered in interpretation as the preserver of all existence in the sense of being. He enables in all beings to preserve their essence.

8. Alwaili (the provider) is interpreted to mean the leader with all beings.

9. Al Naqib (the watchful) , is interpreted to mean the being watchful in the essence of all things. God is watchful of all things because He is the essence of all things.

10. Alami (Hearing one) is often interpreted in relation

to all knowing (Halla) in the sense of revealing oneself to himself. All knowing, Ibnul Arabi thinks, on the part of God means responding to the inner call of the things lying in the state of latency. Halla] and Ibnul Arabi both agree on this view with a difference of potentially of nullity. One believing in it and the other disagreeing with it. It is on this basis that Ibnul Arabi builds the edifice of 'Iyazimud-din' which shall be considered later.

11. Qudsi (The remember) : He interprets it as responding to the call of nothingness in the sense as a substance responds to the call of its form. It becomes what its form says it is he. In the same way God responds to the metaphysical instant in it and becomes what it calls in he. 12. Al Qadr : (Time), by his it is taken to mean Infinity. Time to him is eternally and ever-changingness and in between, and is extended to infinity.⁴⁰

Notably, he interprets many other names. His interpretation is based on the object he has in his concept. The creative God of Islam is no more creative but remains in the infinite form. The problem of ethical and personal attributes arises when there is a quality of God and existence that is something other than God, but Ibnul Arabi's system admits no such possibility. Any kind of quality or plurality

whether be is the duality of God and universe or the plurality of attributes is according to his subjective. But Ishaq Arabi himself often makes the subjective an objective because of his meaning to it. The duality of God and universe which is held by him as subjective often becomes more concrete and real than his system should admit is.⁴¹

The two aspects of the divine names : The description of the two aspects of the divine names is another way of explaining the distinction between the real and the phenomenal. One aspect of the divine names belongs to the real unity and the other to the external world. Each of the divine names expresses one or the other activity of the infinite collection of the divine names. The external world being manifestation is nothing but the divine names and it is possible. The lower aspect is al Tawqif (the point of view of the real), the later is called al Ishhad (the point of view of the created). The way with which the manifestation becomes possible is called Al-illah.⁴²

The divine names are active in relation to *ayn al shakhs*. They are nothing but the phenomenal world in reality. It is a hierarchy. The higher one is active in relation to the lower one and the lower is passive in relation to the

It is an important point in the metaphysics of
 Ibrul Arabi that he is categorically convinced that there
 is only one reality. Multiplicity, activity, causality,
 attributes and names are merely the modes of that one reality.⁴²
 The fixed prototypes are the latent realities
 (Aswat al-Imkaniyya).

It is for the first time that Ibrul Arabi uses the
 term (Aswat al-Imkaniyya) in Muslim philosophy by which he means
 the latent reality in the divine essence. We shall see
 later on that the Aswat al-Imkaniyya of Ibrul Arabi has a
 resemblance to the Platonic ideas on one hand and the
 Ishraqi (Ishraqiyya) and the scholastic attributes and
 names on the other. At present it will suffice to say
 that according to Ibrul Arabi, the phenomenal world was
 present in the divine essence as potentiality. This
 knowledge is the divine knowledge of His becoming in future.
 God knows Himself through Himself. The eternal knowledge
 of His self His term of "Aswat al-Imkaniyya" lying in His
 as potentialities. They are expressed in the terms of
 divine names. The Aswat al-Imkaniyya have a two fold nature.
 In one, they are the intelligible ideas of God and they are
 the modes of the divine essence. This two fold nature is
 explained by using the terms of "Aswat al-Imkaniyya" and "Aswat al-Haqiqiyya".

As symbols the 'types' are the intelligible ideas. As humanly they are the essential codes of the divine essence.⁶¹

Since the Agnosthikais are the potentialities in the divine essence they cannot be regarded as separate from it. They, as states of the divine essence, have no other existence than the divine essence. We can say as Hegel the mental states of our mind are nothing apart from it. It is the same way the Agnosthikais are the divine essence themselves. Conceptually, of course, we can separate them from the essence as states, as we do it in case of our mind and its states. Similarly the 'agnosthikais' are the parts of the divine essence as individualized, but as states they can essentially be separated from the divine essence. Hegel also calls them as non-existent. By saying so he only means that they do not exist actually. Having gone through his theory of Agnosthikais, one is led to think if Agnosthikais can stand apart as concrete forms or if they are simply the intelligible ideas of God. In connection with this we shall quote Hegel about himself. Regarding the question about Agnosthikais Hegel also prefers two explanations. In accordance with the first the Agnosthikais are the states of non-existence transferred into existence. In accordance with the second, it is

'house' or content brought into the intelligible relation
 also the apex of God. It is the relation of the image and
 the mirror. The so called things, the external objects, the
 intelligible world must see each other in and through the
 mirror of the type of God. God manifests them and they see
 each other when he manifests himself in the mirror. In the
 state of latency they are mere non-existents. However, in
 my case, these world-mirrors are the mirror of the
 existence of spiritual things. It is never considered as the
 objective being having an independent existence. Even as
 intelligible ideas, the spiritual things are nothing but
 the subject not determined or particularized. It is not to
 explain it, I must use some poetic language. God
 revealed himself to them if in the most holy communion
 in the state of apex (at capital apex). I must hold
 that there are nothing in the beginning. God at the instant
 manifested himself in the 'apex of the idea'. In other
 words, I developed 'spiritual things' with existence
 (actual things). To say it briefly, God first
 manifested in spirit in the manner of things and thereafter
 manifested the existence of it (things). It means that the
 very being of things including the very being is in the
 act of manifestation himself in the way of things (things)

and enveloping them with assistance is manifested Himself in the world. It is for this reason that the philosophers had sought to 'rehabilitate' epistemically advocate that God is the only existence and the other existences are nothing but the manifestation of the one.⁴⁵

Shaul Avidel often properly 'Appreh' things as the pure and simple ideas and emotions he describes that is he the essence of things. Not only this, but he also calls them the spirits. 'Apprehensions', as he views them, are the intelligible ideas in the consciousness of God. God cognizes them with the help of their essences as spirit (Ruh). His knowledge of them is not based on perception, but he cognizes them as they are with Him in his consciousness with their own essence. The knowledge based on perception is acquired by the mind of man in which there is a duality living in thinking and being thought. God cognizes the spiritual beings through their spirits. His knowledge of them is based on the complete unity of them with Him.⁴⁶

Having described the spiritual beings, we now come to their position in the world. The apprehensions have an intermediary position between God and the phenomenal world. They are the beginning of the future manifestations. In describing it more clearly, we can say that by cognizing the

esoteric wisdom he revealed himself to them and through them in the 'ages' of wisdom. As stated already no man can have the knowledge of the beginning of this process, that is to say when God organized the intelligible forms, present in his consciousness. The knowledge of esoteric wisdom is possible for a man by making efforts to know his own essence 'again'. Having realized his own essence, he can regain the knowledge of the divine essence. The esoteric wisdom, being intermediary between the divine and the phenomenal world, are at the same time passive and active. They are passive as the intelligible forms in the consciousness of the divine being and active as the potentialities in human the future subject. Esoteric wisdom distinguishes potentiality and actually is esoteric wisdom. This distinction makes them potentiality, having a determination to become actually. The determination or (fatum) is only a logical determination.

His particularism - I have explained the doctrine of Esoteric wisdom to a great extent. Our explanation was so far based on logical grounds. We shall now speak of the metaphysical grounds of his particularism.⁴⁷

Esoteric wisdom, like other particularism, considers God as the only existence. He exists above all things. He

existence is self proved and self evident. To him no proof of existence is required for it stands indisputable and proved. He thinks what proof can be required when we know that His existence is every thing or, in other words, all the objects are His manifestation. He is present in the essence of every of everything. Being so, no proof of His existence is required. He created all those and still ever be. There is not even a 'thou' 'them'. The creator of all things is one. It means that God alone exists and there is no existence apart from Him. The multiplicity of existence is already the notion of His Reality. God alone is the ultimate reality. He is infinite, eternal and real.⁴⁰

Ismail Akbari likes to keep his pantheism in Islam, but there is undoubtedly a difference between God of Islam and pantheism of Ismail Akbari. Islam presupposes a belief in the proposition that there is God and God exists alone. He is eternal, infinite and real. The difference is seen in the proposition of pantheism that God is in every thing. To be in different from to be is everything. The doctrine of pantheism is based on the philosophical speculations of the unity of the universe with God. Like other pantheists Ismail Akbari also believes in only one existence and it is the existence of God. There is something more which

distinguish him from other pantheists like 'Welling'.

where coming is this, let us make it clear that pantheism is either looked upon from a philosophical point of view or a religious point of view. A soul arrives at pantheism with the help of his experience. The philosopher before pantheism finds the unity of the universe with God. Henri Armand reaches it with the help of both. Having perceived the essence of the universe, he concluded its unity with God. Unlike other pantheist souls, he derives the belief in its union with God. Contrary to this he holds that for a soul to become one with Him, has to realize himself. He has to see what exists in Him. He is one that there is nothing like knowing one with Him as it shows the reality of existence. He is the only existence and is present in Him as well. What is required on the part of a soul is to realize his own essence (ayna) through which he realizes himself. Thus there is no question of union with Him for He is in everything. This belief makes Henri Armand distinguished from other pantheists. He is indeed a thorough religious pantheist. What he shares with others is the belief in the unity and absoluteness of God. The pantheists advocate the belief in 'nothing is nothing'. God is one and absolute.⁴⁵

Despite all the fact that all the objects are the

manifestation of God, there is bound to be a distinction between Him and His manifestations. His manifestations are the forms, and as forms, are depend on Him. Our dependence distinguishes us from Him, who is independent. That Arabi holds 'as on Him alone we depend for everything - our dependence on other things is in reality dependence on Him for they are nothing but His modes. In connection with the dependence on God Sayyid Nisrati reached the similar truth. He once asked God a 'O, Lord, with what can I draw thee in side ? Thereupon God replied , "With that which does not belong to me, with servility and dependence". Thus it is clear that the manifesting and the manifested are differing from one another. The manifested depends on the manifesting. In this way the worship to God is justified. We, despite of being His manifestation, worship Him as forms depending on Him.⁵⁰

Shed Arabi does not believe in God's immanence only. He also holds the belief in His transcendence. Although He is manifested in every thing, yet He transcends the universe. He sometimes emphasizes on His transcendence and identifies Him with the primal substance of existence and the phenomenal world with His modes or accidents. Contrary to this he sometimes speaks of His transcendence. As a matter of fact,

what he holds is that God is reflected in the objects as he manifests Himself in them. In other words, the objects are the mirror reflecting His being and perfection. It is obvious that the reflection is different from what reflects. That is to say the being reflected in the mirror is not pure reflection but more than that. The reflection makes him imperfect. But he stands apart as being reflecting. To conclude we quote Ihsai Arshad. He says, "For He, glory is His, has no resemblance whatever to His creation. His essential cannot be apprehended by us, as we cannot compare it with tangible objects, weighed and his actions like ours etc. (Part. 1, p-122, of, *Lesson on Transcendence and Immutability*).²¹

We have spoken of the Immutability and transcendence of God. Let us understand his particular as compared to that of Plotinus. As Ihsai Arshad uses the term like (Fala), the first time or the imagination of the divine being, we are led to believe that he was under the influence of Neoplatonists theory of imagination. But we are wrong to hold so. Ihsai Arshad propounds a theory of manifestation, not of imagination. He does not believe, like Plotinus that one thing or one thing was emanated from God and from it came certain other things. Contrary to this, Ihsai Arshad

believed in the infinite manifestation of God. He manifests himself in the tangible forms. In Ghosai Arabi's doctrine there is a circular movement. It ends where it begins. While in the theory of manifestation the movement is in a straight line. Ghosai Arabi believes in the infinity of manifestation without any terminal assumption. The terms like First and Last are relative. The intelligible forms or 'ajural' 'thabias' were present in his consciousness. He recognized them, as a divine tradition explains, due to his love of being whom God reveals in a divine tradition, "I was a hidden treasure, and I loved to be known, so I created the world that I might be known". We quote it here to assert that no temporal pre-existence can be ascribed with the manifestation, Ghosai Arabi proclaims. It is because that we do not know, nor can we know as to when he recognized the intelligible forms out of his love to be known. Thus we can easily assert that Ghosai Arabi's pathos is not similar to that of Plotinus, there is no doubt he speaks of the degree of manifestation. The pathos end is in him and the love is in the mirror. As also speaks of the different stages of manifestation. When he reveals himself to himself, it is 'Akshayak' (state of unity), when he reveals himself to the essence or the blindness, it is

'al-aw'. His revelation in the phenomenal world is 'al-jah al-kull'. His revelation in the state of Oneness is 'al-mutamad al-ilahiyah' or eternal Being. His revelation, in the state of Ishtiaq, is 'al-mumaniyyah', his revelation in the universal consciousness in the state called as 'muqim-al-haqiqah'. In this way he has given different names in the states and forms of manifestation, as he ascribes these names to Him, many of his critics are led to believe that he is following the doctrine of emanation. Let us understand it clearly that he himself declares there is only one religious manifestation itself is different forms. No other form emanated from Him can manifest itself into others. It is thus clear that he is not propagating the doctrine of emanation.¹²

His conclusion is based on Islamic sources. He derives his theory of reality largely from the Ash'arite theory of causal existence. Here again, he does not echo the Ash'arites. There is a difference, as he himself states, that the Ash'arites call the essence that underlies all phenomena, a substance, and he calls it God or His essence. In spite of this difference, the prime conclusion of his doctrine is, in fact, from the theory of the external world of Ash'arites.

we have discussed the metaphysics of Paul Aul6i which presents the 'majidi' view. We shall now take up Sheikh Ahmad Rabbani, known as Mujaddid Alf Farsi to understand the Shari'ah point of view. The comparison of the two will make it facile for us to understand that mysticism, was aimed at synthesizing (uniting) the view points of the two schools.

SECTION - II

In the previous section we have discussed Ghoul Arabi's metaphysics. The belief of it explicitly explains his position as the proponent of 'Majdidi 'ujud' as nothingness. We shall now, in order to understand Ghoul Arabi's, discuss the metaphysics of 'Majdidi 'Al-Farabi', a great exponent of 'Majdidi 'ujud'. He is a poet who stands in a juxtaposition contrast with Ghoul Arabi and criticizes him for several reasons. We shall, at first, deal with his criticism for he himself builds the edifice of his thought out of the criticism of 'Majdidi 'ujud'.

The main task of Ghoul Arabi was to explain Tawhid as unity.⁸ To him Tawhid means statement of God. As a matter of fact it is not only he who gives it this meaning. Tawhid in Islamic perspective is so explained. By unity and statement of God Ghoul Arabi thinks that he is the only existence and the world of objects is nothing other than

⁸The concept of Tawhid undergoes a historic development. There has been a vital difference of opinion regarding the meaning and concept of Tawhid. The philosophers of different schools have taken upon themselves to explain it and we also does Ghoul Arabi.

His manifestation. We have explained his point of view and the way he justifies it. At the moment it would suffice to say that Ruzbihani believes the things to be the manifestation of God. The creature, as Ruzbihani explains, is a form of emanation. The being in the complete unity is indeterminata (is empty). In its descent or determination (taqayyud) it passes through five stages. The first two are 'ilmi' or cognitive and the other three are shanaji or relational. In the first stage the being becomes conscious of itself. The consciousness of its attributes or sifat was 'ilmi' or brief.¹ In the second stage it becomes conscious of himself. It takes shape and becomes conscious of himself. In this stage the consciousness of the attributes is 'tafaiil' or in detail. Both these moments or determinations are conceptual and being conceptual they are logical or 'ghabali'. From the third descent or determination there begins the actual emanation. The third one is the 'taqayyud-ahli' or the determination as spirit or exoteric. The unity emanates itself in several

¹The word 'ilmi' is the opposite of 'tafaiil' and 'ghabali', therefore, he translated as "brief" and not "general".

spirits e.g. snakes. The fourth document is the 'T'ayana-Mithali' or ideal administration from which comes the world of ideas. The fifth and the final is the 'Tayani-Justali' or physical administration which gives the world of objects. Thus Azadi and his followers consider that these stages are the gradual realisations of what was latent in the attributes.¹

The unity between 'that' or being and 'this' or attributes is explained in another way as well. God is satisfied as regards His existence and He as regards His being and so He is 'shastiyata Nagala' like Nagala as matter or a conceptual unity as regards His being. The divine names or nama-vilakhs are one with 'ananta' or the cause for each one having the aim the same being. The divine names are indicative of His attributes but the being denoted by them is certainly one and the same. Thus the unity of the attributes and causes is explained.²

Having spoken about the unity between God and his attributes Dada Azadi comes to explain the situation of the world with God. In explaining it he adopts two different approaches namely the negative approach and the positive approach. By adopting the former he denies the relative existence of the world and by taking the latter he affirms the existence of God. In the negation of the world he

proceeds by declaring that the world has no independent existence. The essence of the objects has no existence of its own. It is, as a matter of fact, an expression of the manifestation of God in infinite forms. The world thus, in spite of its multiplicity, does not exist in itself; what exists in itself is God and the world is the multiplicity of the different modes. In order to justify ourselves we quote Ibn Arabi:

الوجودات ما تهيئت وانما هي من الوجود

(the objects possess not even a bit of existence).

Taking the positive approach he affirms the existence of God as the existence, and proceeding from it holds that the world is God as it is the manifestation of its action. The unity differentiates itself in different modes and beyond this it cannot be perceived as there is a stage of absolute nothingness.³

ما بعد هذا "الوجود الحق"

(There is nothing beyond this but absolute nothingness).

God is so the unity cannot be perceived, it can be perceived only in the action of which the world is a manifestation, since the world is God. The unity between the world and God is explained through another experience called *ta'ayyun-haqq* (difference after union), whether a person considers God to be the only existence or the

world is to be one with God, it means one and the same existence for the world in the 'allih' or adoration of the 'avi' or the actual 'allih'.^d

Having spoken the relation between world and God, Imam Arabi speaks of the relation between man and God. It is clear as it is expressed in the verse :

ما اقرب اليه من جبل نور

[I am nearer unto him than his library].

It does not mean anything other than that God is the centre of the time of man. Man is created in His image as He Himself says :

خلقنا آدم على صورتنا

[He created man after His own image].

There has been a controversy in interpreting this verse's value. 'His' can be used either for God or for man with the difference of capital or small 'h'. Imam Arabi, however, interprets it as the image of God and utilizes it for the support of his argument to prove the likeness of the nature of man and God. To him it seems that man is the continuation of His creating. As a witness it is he possesses all of them in miniature form. By creating 'after His own image' he means that He has manifested in him all His attributes. Again it is said :

من عرف نفسه عرف الله

(One who cognised himself, cognised his God).

The knowledge of the self is the knowledge of God for it is evident that if man cognises himself he cognises God of which he is the manifestation.⁵

Thus Arzbi comes to a yet in urgent question as to what was the subject of creation. It is concealed in the inner urge of God of being known.

كُنْتُ كَرِيماً خَفِيّاً مَا جِئْتُ أَنَا أَمْرٌ فَخَفِيَ الْخَلْقُ

(I was a hidden treasure. I wished that I should be known, so created the creatures).

It explicitly explains that the secret of creation is covered in the urge to be known. God created the world by realising the infinite potential qualities in him.⁶

Having given the gist of Ima Arzbi's thought, we come to 'Hajjaid Ali Thani and his criticism on Ima Arzbi's philosophy. Before we begin it we should comprehend the evolution of 'Hajjaid's thought. In the evolution of his thought he passes through three subsequent stages namely (1) 'Wajidiyat or unity of existence (2) 'Ilaliyat or substantiation and (3) 'Adiliyat or servitude. 'Hajjaid Ali Thani begins his philosophy from 'wajidiyat'. In the first stage he was a 'wajidi' by his own experience but he soon realised the invalidities of wajidiyat and passed over to the subsequent 'Ilaliyat' stage. He was

not satisfied with this stage as well and finally one is the stage of 'shadilyqt' or asphyxiation. Upon he was confirmed that the relation of the world and God is not directly and also realized that the world is not manifestation of the actual or 'ash', i.e. Allah. He held that the world and God are different, here and another; one is like created and other is the creator. Having being convinced of the reality of the world and God he built his previous mystic experience as lower stages. He came to conclude that the direct knowledge of God or His distribution is beyond is for He is beyond the beyond :

اِنَّ اللهَ وَرَاوِ الْمَعْرُوفِ وَتَحْتِ الْمَعْرُوفِ

(Allah is beyond the beyond, and again beyond the beyond.)⁷

He gave the evolution of 'tajwid' thought. He came to his criticism on Imam al-Gh. He begins it by establishing the two principles i.e. 1. The 'alif' or attributes are identical with the 'shat' or being and 2. The world is the manifestation or 'Tagallil' of the attributes. As regards the first, the 'tajwid' holds that the 'alif' or attributes are not identical with the 'shat' or being. But they are near and close to the 'shat' or being. The truth of it is established by 'Kashfi takwil' or varietal initiation. The well experience and the right reason both

justify that the essence of God must be above His attributes.

The Quran also supports it :

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمِنَ السَّامِعِينَ

(Verily God is surely Independent of the Universe).

As God is perfect in Himself, the attributes must be other than His essence. The Mujtahid does not believe in this world's way of manifestation. To consider the world to be a creation for man's sake. He is of the view that the world is not the manifestation of His attributes because His attributes are perfect and the world is imperfect. For example the human knowledge has no resemblance with the God's knowledge. He argues that the Kaafiri (Kafir) or materialistic objection also demands to believe that the world cannot be one with God. In support of his point of view he refers to Revelation :

سَمَاءَهُ رُفِيعٌ وَهُوَ غَنِيٌّ مِمَّا يَدْعُونَ

[The Lord is richer than the qualities which they ascribe to Him].

Thus the world as he thinks, is not the manifestation of His attributes.⁸

Imam Azhar considers that the world of objects has not its own existence and holds that God is the only existent being. The Mujtahid is of the view that Imam Azhar was at the stage of being an annihilist as he could not even

the higher stages is when a soul realises the difference between the world and God and also comprehends its objective existence. As a matter of fact, as Mujaddid points out, it could not realise even the stage of 'Fana' or annihilation because he even in it remembered the world and called it as one with God. At the stage of 'Fana' in annihilation soul can not see any other existence except that of God. Iqbal though did not renounce any other existence, yet he was not forgetful of the world. The Mujaddid criticism did not yet mention reason. Qasim, (ibid) as he puts forward, is an attribute of God. In calling it a manifestation of God the creation is denied which is against the 'Kashf-i-haqq' or esoteric intuition and revelation (wahy). The revelation teaches us that God is totally other than the world and that the world has an objective existence. He continues that had it not been so the annihilation and annihilation i.e. 'fana-wa-mumalik', which have become meaningless. There could be no question of reward and punishment. For if the world is the manifestation of God, whatever is being done is being done by God Himself, for it is He speaking in different voices as being different self. To call it such a stage could either be annihilation or purification. Insumam's view is criticised for it will

make the concept of Hereafter as baseless. The Mujtahid calls this subtle denial of the world as insignificant existence to be a scepticism. He argues that "Faith" may mean many things. It, for example, means something of imagination. By calling the world "Faithful" in respect of this meaning, it means that it should disappear as soon as the imagination disappears. It is projected in the world of ideas only. To him it is a scepticism. "Faith" may also mean that the world does have an objective existence but its existence is insignificant as compared to the existence of God. It is the necessary being while the world is contingent and the necessary and contingent cannot be identical with each other.³

Now to his proposition that the world is one with God is further criticized by the Mujtahid on the basis of his contention that he was speaking of it at the stage of "Faithful-to-Faith" or the manifestation of the essence of God. At this stage a soul feels that he is directly apprehending God. Yet it could have led him to the denial of the world and not to finding the sources of existence between the world and God because, as the Mujtahid points out, at this stage a soul is absolutely occupied with God and sees nothing other than Him. Yet this soul recognizes the world. It

aim to prove that he could not fully realize the stage of 'Majall-e-shati'. Furthermore, the Majahid adds that there are higher stages of self-experience than the 'Majall-e-shati'. Had Jinn Azadi risen to a higher stage, he would have realized the difference between the world and God and would not have spoken of his oneness with God. He also points out that if Jinn Azadi's majles would not be interpreted ethically, it is against revelation and according to the revelation it is a haraam of the worst kind.³⁰

The Majahid also criticizes Jinn Azadi's doctrine of fery had-sh-jay or difference after union. According to Jinn Azadi 'saghat kharija' or the slightest existence do not have even the slightest existence, God alone is the only existence. The Majahid asks us to ask it is possible that our perception of God, as a transcendent being can change His individual into individuals? Can the world being imaginary can limit the existential reality? Secondly, the Majahid adds that if Immanence is joined with transcendence there would be nothing other than He. It is therefore that Jinn Azadi maintains that of an object is the world, of God too he is maintained to it but it is against the teaching of the Quran. The Majahid in respect of his

استقامتكم وكنتم :

قُلْ ! احسن كتاب تقاروا في الحق سواء بينا وبينكم الا نتقوا
 الا الله ولا تشركوا به شيئا ولا تجدوا بيعة منكم الا بالله
 ربهم ، فاعلموا ان الله لا يهدي القوم الظالمين .

[*O followers of the Book I come to an equitable proposition between us and you that we shall not worship any but Allah and (that) we shall not associate anything with Him, and (that) none of us shall not take anyone for lords besides Allah I, but if they turn back, then say : "Back without that we are Muslims".]

The verse closely defines the world-view of an object other than Allah. It also gives a clue to the existence other than Allah. It says that the existence of the world cannot be denied as he called one with God. The Mujtahid also criticizes those who are considering similarities with Islamic teachings. It is of the view that God is beyond the reach of our reason and all 'Zanbi-e-Chahed' or intuition and experience and perceptible. Besides, he holds that those who did not reach even the stage of Faqr have not seen the world as it is and is able to see the difference between the world and God but they used to see them as one with each other.¹¹

Having criticized those who did not reach the stage of Faqr have not seen the world as it is, the Mujtahid takes a serious point of criticism in those who are following the path of the world. He holds that they are one with each other. Imam Abbadi reproduces his contention basing on the fact that this is

contemplation cannot be one with 'real' or being as the Will being outside is the copy of the real and the copy of a thing cannot be one with the thing itself. On the first place he objects that the world is the contemplation and if at all it is taken to be, it cannot be proved to one with the real or being as real, is the necessary being and the world is contingent being. The Imam also criticises those Ash'ari's who believe that God manifests Himself in man. He holds that 'Thalib-i-Khas has wrongly interpreted the verse :

مَنْ أَقْرَبَ إِلَيَّ مِنْ حَبْلِ الْوَرْدِ

(Who is closer unto Him than his own life artery).

It does not mean that God is in the pulse and veins of man. Of course, there is no doubt that He is nearer to the life artery but we are not aware of the nature of His proximity. The Twelver points out that the verse :

لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَاكَ مِنْ نَفْسٍ مَرَّةٍ

(God created man often His own essence).

has wrongly been explained. It only means that the human soul and God both are non-spatial. Besides, those Ash'ari's have been criticised by him for his unconvincing interpretation of the verse :

مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ

(One who knows his self knows his creator God).

To him it only means that the knowledge of its self reveals the imperfections and defects in the soul as to man and the soul is able to understand that perfection and values are possible only through God. By rejecting interpretation of these verses the Mujahid seems to prove that man and God are different from each other.¹²

Discussing the purpose of creation, Imam Arabi points out that God created the world for His self-manifestation. In the description of the five stages of spiritual journey Arabi seems to imply that God was not perfect in the beginning and created the world for His self-perfection. It is against the religion and the revelation as the Mujahid points out and he is true in holding it as the Quran clearly asserts a

إِنَّ اللَّهَ فَخْرٌ لِّعَالَمِينَ .

(Verily Allah is sufficient unto Himself and needs no worlds).

It stands as a constitutive proof that God did not create the world for His perfection. Mujahid also claims that the knowledge was not the purpose of creation. To him it was "Ibadah" or service. In support of his view he quotes a

مَا خَلَقْتُ الْإِنْسَانَ إِلَّا عِبَادَةً .

(I have not created man and jinn but exclusively for Ibadah).

Ibadah, as he points out, may be taken to mean "worship" or knowledge of God and the knowledge of God, however,

complete in the perfection of not the not in the perfection of God, Who is perfect by Himself.¹²

After these criticisms the Mujaddid, finally rejects *ashghat-jam'at*. He holds that *wujud* the being, as *Ita'at* and *ma'at*, are not identical but apparently identical. To advance his contention he traces the origin of the will experience in which a will sees the existence or being as identical. He is of the view that there are the levels namely the cognitive level and the emotional level or the level of feeling. Some souls have the experience of unity on the cognitive level. They experience the one source for the knowledge of God like him is thinking and meditation. The unionism and the unionism take them to the conclusion that the only existent being is God and hence the essence of the *wujud* and being is unionism. Some souls have the experience of unity on the emotional level. They have the *shahid* and the intensity of their love makes them look like in every particle. To what he is reflected in the world. The love of God they become conducive to them to have this experience of unity. In the love of the Beloved they are unable to think of themselves. Their ideal is unionism. They have no rest, for if they need to draw themselves to the state of *faqr* and *ghayr*, it is impossible for

this due to the immense love of God. Yet it is necessary and along with the others *wahdati-shawad* is the way it achieves it.¹⁴

We have given Najmabadi's criticisms on Imam Aggah's philosophy. Now Aggah for a long time has dominated the thought and influenced many circles of Islamism. To say it in other words, *wahdati wahad* was the philosophy of the day and every circle did not only adopt it as their belief but contributed a great deal to its development. Just, a Persian circle, for example, was very much interpreted and explained the doctrine of *wahdati wahad*. To put it in brief, the circle accepted *wahdati wahad* with all its implications. But long after Imam Aggah, Najmabadi and Thani made no attempt to reform *wahdati wahad*. It is true that like Imam Aggah, Najmabadi's criticism also contains in the arguments based on legislation and experience. It, however, does not mean that the arguments are not rational but many of them are derived from the self experience and intuition and revelation. It was, indeed, a great contribution of Imam Aggah to make a personal and critical study of *wahdati wahad* and having rejected it he used to propound his own philosophy generally known as *wahdati-shawad*. It should be born in mind that he was not the first to propound it, yet it is true that

he presented it as a compact and consistent philosophy. Having given his criticism on this level we shall now discuss 'Ibn Arabi's philosophy of universal Sufism.

God is, as the 'Ibn Arabi presents, beyond all his names. Putting it as he wants to describe his manifestation. The knowledge of the divine being is possible only with the help of revelation. Even after being beyond of them He is seen in His manifestation. He is wholly or Creator of all things and forces belong. He created them out of 'shay-ah' (he gives nothing). He possesses all the attributes like 'Hakim' or omniscient, 'Ghani' or self-sufficient, 'Qadir' or all, 'Sam-i-Sami' or hearing and seeing, 'Kalam' or speech and 'Qadir' or creative. He is 'Qadir' or Qadir who enlightens the humanity through his creation or prophetic. He deserves all praise. In fact, as he points out, man is incapable of knowing His value. He is all pervasive and self-sufficient. It is, therefore, we say that He is transcendence that has no life history but the nature of His greatness or 'Qadir' is beyond our comprehension. He is whole even to comprehend His attributes.¹⁰

The 'Ibn Arabi speaks of two kinds of attributes of God namely (i) negative attributes and (ii) positive attributes. Each of them are again of two kinds. The two kinds of the

negative attributions are :

- a) denying the imperfection in Qur'a being like that he has no equal or rival, nor parents and children.
- b) indicating his beyondness like that 'he is not body or physical, is neither substance nor attribute or words, is not gross or aerial, is not limited or finite, has neither themselves nor motions, i.e. he is above the application of any categories of thought.'¹⁶

The two kinds of positive attributions are :

- a) relative attributions and b) essential attributions. The relative attributions are those which are relatively true of Him like 'glorious' or self-subsistence, almighty or eternity, 'majest' & necessity and 'almighty' or stretchability. We ascribe these attributions to Him as the opposite of them denote imperfections and they denote His perfection. As the human mind conceives three categories of being, namely necessity, possibility and impossibility, we ascribe necessity to the almighty, as majestic being, as has nothing to do with His essence. The essential attributions are those which adequately describe His essence ^{They} are absolutely true of Him. They are like 'deputy' or life, 'ill' or knowledge, 'object' or power, 'Irade' or will, 'hears' or hearing, 'sees' or seeing, 'speak' or speech, and 'created' or created?

Spring described the kinds of attribution he then speaks of the relation between 'cause' and 'effect' i.e. being and attributed on one hand and between God and the world on the other. In his criticism on Ibn Arabi's theory of identity between the attributed and the essence we have given his opinion regarding it. In order to make it more explicit we add that he considers God as being perfect and needs no attribution to contribute to His perfection. It is then evident that he considers the attribution to be other than His essence. Thus it is contained evident that He is perfect by Himself and His essence is other than His attribution.¹⁸

Regarding the relation between the essence and the attributed and the world he is of the view that attributed are the determinants or dependents of 'the essence'. In fact, he hesitates to use the word 'Tasarruf' or happen for Him, they merely identify which he takes as to happen. However, he is of the view that the attributed are the dependents of the essence and the world is the effect or all of the attributed. In order to explain it he gives an order of essence as 'wujud' or existence, 'sifat 'alavi' or the quality of life, 'sifat-'ilmi' or quality of knowledge, 'sifat-'i-jabari' or the quality of will, 'sifat-'i-sami' or the quality of hearing, 'sifat-'i-ba'ar' or the quality of

being, 'ilfat-e-kalam' or the quality of speech, 'ilfat-e-Takwin' or the quality of creation. The Perfect being is the cause of existence or the quality of 'wujud' and the creation of the world is possible through the attributes of 'Tahsin' or creation. He advocates that the attributes are the Will or the effect of His being and the world is the effect of His attributes. He denies Imam Azhar's contention that the world is the 'Tajalli' or the modes of His attributes.¹⁸

Having spoken about the relationship, he gives the theory of creation as propounded by him. He holds that God is 'Kamil' or Perfect or 'majid-e-kamil' or Perfect being. Having in Him all the 'ilfat-e-kamil' or the attributes of perfection. He is satisfied with Himself needing nothing besides Himself. He created the world out of 'qaym-e-mahar' or pure nothingness. He decided to create the world and in view of His own decision He first created the 'ilfat-e-majid' or the quality of existence in the being and thereafter other entities which are forms of this 'ilfat-e-majid'. In the case of each quality He considered its opposite in the form of 'adul' or nothingness. The 'adul' of 'wujud' is different from 'the adul' of the other e.g. the 'adul' of life is death, the 'adul' of knowledge is ignorance and the 'adul' of good is consciousness. Similarly the opposite of each quality is

received. God casts the reflection of His existence into His opposed nothingness and creates the finite existence. In the same way He creates other finite beings by casting the reflection of His qualities into their opposed nothingness or 'ghair-mutabahili'. Thus the finite beings are created essentially out of pure nothingness. They are the 'ghair' or the effect of His attributes, yet are not identical with them.²⁰

The real and the actual being is one and He is God. The world, as the Mujasid holds, is nonexistent and that too out of a genuine reality. In maintaining the reality of the world he gives two meanings, the first one is of a fire circle made by a burning stick. If the circle is made it exists by q.i. viz. it is a participated appearance it will keep on existing with it equally in it. The second one is of a juggler who created a person bearing family and the king ordered for his execution so that the person may exist for ever. Since then it exists, yet it is a person of magic. The reality of the world is of this sort. It exists, but its existence is made up of God.

The Mujasid strongly holds that there is no valuation between the world and its creator except that He has created and it has been created. All such questions like 'khai'

(*am-e-shawiat*), '*ibthalat*' (*ib-tahyat*), '*maizat*' (*ma-izant*), are the beliefs of a soul at the stage of '*makr*' (the scientific condition). All the souls come such experience in their cyclic journey but many of them reject it when they come to a higher stage of '*taqr*' (*taqiyat*). Considering the world to be one with God is like taking the alphabeta and their encounter to be one with each other.²¹ We are aware that any such belief is beyond the facts.²²

As regards to our the Mujahid holds that he, in him, has a stripe easily known as the soul. It does not belong to '*alam-e-ibtalq*' (world of creation) but to '*alam-e-amr*' (world of command), and hence it is non-spatial. He speaks of three stages of the soul. The soul is originally inclined to seek the divine Approval but it is interested with the '*alam-e-ibtalq*' (the world of creation) and has been given the body. Its arrangement with the material world comes in in the incarnation of disincarnation and sin. This is the fountain-

²¹ The Mujahid is certain it gives an example of a person who has invented certain alphabeta. If a person comes and tells him of them to be one with another, he will be wary. Similarly God being creation of the world cannot be one with it.

head of evil. The soul at this stage is called 'unimam-rumun' (the evil-self). Despite the disobedience and sin it preserves the capacity of conscience and good. It can be realized through its purification. The purification gradually brings the soul to the stage of repentance on which it repents for its inclination towards vice. The soul at this stage is called 'nafa-takwamu' (the approaching-soul). Having achieved in the soul programme it attains yet a higher stage known as 'nafa-muhamadu' (the beautified-soul). At this stage it is placed to act in accordance with the commandments of condemnation and mission. This is the highest stage of man's perfection. The stage of the beautified-soul is known as the stage of 'shadidat' or servitude. Having attained it man is freed from all bondage of 'ma-sha-lik' (things other than Allah). Its attainment is possible with the help of love of God which is a means not an end.

Regarding the relation of man with God the majestic holds that the relation between the two is of 'abd' and 'malik' (of submissiveness and ownership). Man's perfection lies in the fact that he should realize his life in accordance with the will of God and obey the commands of condemnation and mission. Another relation between man and God is revealed in 'marifat' (knowledge), 'taqat', or the majestic guides

but, why come that one should realize that he cannot know
the essence of God. To support his claim he quotes an
expression of the Imam-uz-Zaman :

الْحُجْرَةُ مِنْ دَوْلَةِ الْإِمْرَانَةِ أَوْرَاقٌ . صِرَاحُكَ مِنْ حَيْثُ لَمْ يَكُنْ
لِلْحُجْرَةِ دَلِيلٌ سِوَاكَ أَوْ دَالِيٍّ مِنْ مَعْرِفَتِكَ .

(To realize one's inability to comprehend 'He is the true
comprehension, only is 'He who has not kept any road to
opened up to his creatures except by way of realizing
their incapacity to know Him).

Thus the Mujtahid considers God to be unapproachable
and unknowable. He must be contented to know of 'His whatever
the Revelation tells.²²

I have studied substantial mujtah, especially as presented
by Imam Khatib. He has also formed substantial mujtah as
presented by 'Ajallid All Thaqib. We shall now come to
Sheikh Khalkish who acted as an arbitrator in the controversy
of 'Ajallid mujtah and 'Ajallid Thaqib.

SECTION - III

We have dealt with *Maqalat Majma* as expounded by *Muhammad Ibn Arabi* and *Mubashir Shukri* as confessed and propagated by *Shaykh Ahmad Raza Khan*. Having explained their views we are now in a position to study *Shaykh Mujibullah's* doctrine of 'Tathbiq', but before we discuss it, it is apt on our part to probe into the meaning of Tathbiq.

The word 'Tathbiq' comes from 'Tahajj' which means to bring together. 'Tathbiq', thus, retaining the originality of the meaning denoted by the root word literally means the same. Clearly it we add, to bring together is the literal meaning of the word 'Tathbiq'. But the word has become a term which has repeatedly been used by the scholars of theology and also of philosophy, and for every it has acquired different meanings. We are mainly concerned with *Shaykh Mujibullah's* use still, however, mention some of the scholars who have given a connotation of their own.¹

Probing into the meaning of a word we are customarily led for enquiry to lexicon and Encyclopaedia. In view of it we alight to 'Jameer talim' and 'Lisane Arabi' which

¹ For the word 'Tathbiq' see following :

a) In Islamic poetry, it means the consequent position of one part (e.g. hand) in relation to some other part (e.g. the thigh). In this sense term XII of 'Kamus al Nughl' is called 'Kish-sh-Fathiq'.

'Lisan-ul-Arab' gives a peculiar meaning of the word. It defines it as the comprehension of a question. Defining the word it cites the discourse of Ibn Abbas with Abu Hurayra. The former asks the latter of the possibility of marriage of a divorced woman with the previous husband. Replying to him Abu Hurayra affirms that she cannot marry the previous one unless she is taken in Nikah by a person other than him. Hearing the answer Ibn Abbas says that Abu Hurayra has made a Fathiq by which Ibn Abbas means the comprehension of the question. The word has not been used to mean comprehension of a question in philosophy. We, therefore, put Lisanul Arab aside from the point of view of philosophy. What is revealed in the discourse of Ibn Abbas and Abu Hurayra, is the interpretation of Fathiq having its prototype in the classical interpretation of the term which, in accordance with it, is applied to mean something oval, insidious, vigorous, invincible and penetrating - and not so much to harmonize two discrepant things. The inclusion of vigoriveness in the connotation, invincibility and

construction gives a clue of the presence of a force in H. And, as a matter of fact, it did include in its construction the forces which could impose itself upon two things resulting into the destruction of the latter which is as is suggestive of nothing but outright rejection of the latter. [Refer for this interpretation to a, 3 'Types of Islamic Thought' ; Kuvaili S. A., p. 112].³

But when Bahadilish comprehends the term is even something other than expressed in the classical interpretation. It begins with his interpretation we should refer to one of his well known books "Inzai al Khifa" wherein he ascertains whatever has been given to it is from Allah and human and has been supported by the gathering of the great leaders of the Muslim community. The arrangement of the material has been made by him (Fakh Bahadilish) in the form of deductions.⁴ It is suggestive, then, of the important fact that Fakh Bahadilish does not challenge the authority by applying a force is whether he said one or the other in the name of 'Tahqiq'. Contrary to this, he interprets the term 'tahqiq' as an active process which attests the possibility of an-

³ Arrangement in the form of deduction means from Particulars to Universal.

existence of two independent things different in nature but equal in status and authenticity. Let us insist that, then, could be 'Tachig' if two independent things different in nature are both capable of existence. The answer is not pondering in one word 'reconciliation' or synthesis made in the form of deduction meaning thereby keeping them on their proper place in history. Before coming to this let us state it explicitly, and to do so we fall back on 'Tachigat' in which, existing on Tachig, such unlikeli holds that in every age man has received or possessed a science but of the hostile or God. In the early phases of history there was only one science by which the media community was blessed and nothing about his age he says that man has now known all the sciences, rational, traditional and scientific and age profoundly penetrates into the diversity in its age, with the discrepancy. By pointing out the phases of history he states that the quest of knowledge increases with the pace of history. It goes to suggest that he is of the view that the thought of a particular age should be interpreted and comprehended by keeping the line in view to which it belongs. Such a consideration would enable us to make a parallel study of the development of knowledge in that period. By doing so we shall be in a position to assign it a proper place in

history. In correspondence with the name, Shah Waliullah points out that truth as veracity is a real ocean and the comprehension of the whole is impossible and a comprehension is expected to be impossible. The seekers of the Truth are like the tiny birds who drink from the ocean of Truth in accordance with their capacity and desire. Not only drops of it do quench their thirst.^{2 3}

Shah Waliullah prefers this simile for the communication of his thought in full. He points out after referring to the episode in his simile that the seekers mistakenly consider himself to have grasped the truth as a whole. What he actually wants to suggest is that there is an almost of truth in the thought and it is so it grasps it and understands it. Hence he wants that neither the seeker nor others should take it as a whole. He also points out that some people are bewildered by the diversity and their humbleness.

*The simile has been taken from Sahih Bukhari, (III, 44). It points out towards the episode of the seeking of the prophet Muhammad with which in which some seekers were anxious regarding the secrets. As one pigeon came near a bird sitting on the bank of the sea and drinking water from it by taking only a drop of it in its beak. After that explains the seekers of truth comparing it with an ocean and the seekers with the tiny bird. The knowledge about the truth gained by the seekers is compared with the drop from the ocean in its beak. It is analogous to say that taking drops from the ocean means almost nothing. Thus the knowledge of the truth gained by the seekers is very little amounting to nothing.

realizes them have soaring high as a festination where multiplicity and diversity are received. Such realisation points out that some people do rightly interpret their realisation but wrongly understand the interpretative speculations of their predecessors. It categorically suggests that by Tathiq he never meant rejection. But, contrary to this, adopting it as a method, he assigns the place of thought is history. Taking upon a thought he is categorically confident of the almost of truth to it but desires and wishes to inform the people of its validity. Thus Tathiq (in his sense to find out the almost of truth to a thought). Besides, he also takes upon himself to make corrections. It should be done to find if it making correction is not rejection.^d

From the preceding lines it is evident that such realisation does not was the sense Tathiq with its classical interpretation. He gives it a meaning which must be taken as a contribution.

Coming to the deductive arrangement of which we have made a similar such realisation sense by it assigning a proper place to the thoughts of the ancestors in historical perspective and the same is meant by him by rationalisation.

As the word suggests, it does not take it to mean to find

not an affinity in contradictory terms. He only means by it to keep things in accordance with the phases of historical development. Such an arrangement will definitely resolve the difference because by it we shall have the place of a thought in the history of the development of Islamic sciences, and it understood it we shall take into account the development of our own time. Chah 'Abdullah being that by taking each type of reconciliation as mentioned above can be thought about by having the elements of the indivisible and integral whole in the phases of history in which they belong.⁴

Chah 'Abdullah is aware of the difference between his works and those of his predecessors but is of the view that his propositions and beliefs are deduced from his predecessors, but the basic reason of the difference between him and his predecessors is the development of Islamic thought. In his opinion the development of national trend in Islamic thought belongs to his age and before that it was considered as an stigma. In his own time it is taken as an act of devotion. Thus due to this development a difference between him and his predecessors exists. And, therefore, as we shall see later on, he rejects neither of the non - validated, valid and validated Shari'ah - but only places them in the

history of the development of Islamic thought in the ages in which each of them belongs and also points out the stage of the development of Islamic thought reached in the respective ages.⁶

Disregarding these two good signs let us consider an analogy offered by Ibn Khaldun in *Tarikh*. Some blindmen saw a particular tree. Each one of them touched a particular part of it and was determined in his mind that the tree was like the part he touched say that approached to a man of sound vision and told them the whole truth about the form of the tree and also informed them what each of them had touched was one of its parts and not the whole. They were thus as far as the part was concerned but mistaken as far as the whole was concerned. It was an example to substantiate that many of the people fallaciously regard the part to be the whole and the man with sound vision corrects them. This stands as a line of demarcation between the sound vision and *Tafakkur*. A man with sound vision can correct, as explained in the case of the blind, the bewildered weakness of truth. The correction can be made in both the partial perception and the idea based on this experience. The partial perception does not reveal the truth as a whole and the idea based on an experience may be determined by

some prior condition. Thus the revelation of truth is often incomplete in the idea based on an experience as well, and at both of them are open is correction. A man with sound vision is able to correct them for he has had a complete perception and his limit of it is not determined by any prior condition. A syntheist can only depend on his limit and in ascertaining the truth of a thing he must have the revelation of an obscurement with which he has deduced it. Thus the difference is both of them is revealed in perception. The former has made it and the latter has not and cannot as that puts it. The difference is suggestion of the fact that (1) the syntheist should have complete knowledge of island history and (2) is aware of the universal laws in operation of the universe to analyze his material. He should also know that the material is a source of deception to help his synthesis.⁷

That syntheist proceeds in his synthesis by making a primary postulate that island history is a unity and with the help of this postulate he boldly affirms that every thing otherwise considered as non-island is categorically island for they are the part of the whole. With the result of his attention the previous experiences that constituted the intellectuals in the past were registered.

Considering the Islamic history as a unity all the controversies in the Islamic history become its part and if the allegation created by them is accepted as Islamic, the charges of innovation, heresy and ignorance levied on the parents should be taken on their face value. The implication of the charges would then, even be denied the parents of these Islamic states and if the charges levied against them are taken to be invalid, it would mean their vindication. And such vindication would result into a negative attitude and cannot be held for long unless changed into a positive one. To put it in other words, one who finds the heretics, innovators and ignorant as full of limits, must also learn to excuse them. In the rejection of the claims against them Shah Waliullah makes a distinction between the form and the spirit. Rejecting the form consisting of exaggerated words and empty content, he takes up the spirit which underlies the arguments and the action they adopted. Shah Waliullah did it out of his respect to the nature of Islamic thought.⁸

In his Tuhfat Shah Waliullah comes to a generalisation based on innovation that the methodology of the Intellectuals at the past is perfect. It has helped the scholars in the dissemination of knowledge. Its impressiveness is the proof

of its perfection and it was the reason that even the
 handling and annotation could be impressive. The writer,
 recognizing this fact that Mishailov comes to the difference
 between the age he lived in and the period of Islamic
 history. He acknowledges the difference between the two
 ages for two reasons. The first is the imperfection of its
 methodology adopted by the contemporaries in writing their
 handling and annotation against others. and the second,
 as he thinks, is the stagnancy of knowledge. What was
 considered in his time as knowledge was nothing but the
 accumulation of its knowledge given by the scholars in the
 past.⁹

The perception of the contemporaries in the Islamic
 history that Mishailov considers to be a work of justice
 and equity: the scholars who propagated and upheld them
 and also those who sought a time against them. Having
 realized it he even is the acknowledgment of his own time.
 Let us remember that he denies the originality of that age
 by calling the contemporary knowledge as reproduction or
 record of the previous one. In conformity with this he
 calls them as mediocrities as they lack originality. In
 order to make it clear it will suffice to say, at present,
 that in the age that Mishailov lived in, was the age of

decline of Hinduism in India. The Hindu society was proceeding towards degeneration and the Jhak was fully aware of these facts. Being conscious of his age he depicts it as one lacking religiously and creatively. He, however, comes to the conclusion that mediocrities of his age are not bad if the contentions professed are thoroughly and unbiassedly analysed. It is a substantial proof of his feeling. Development of knowledge is possible only with the help of controversy.¹⁰

Taksh is a method for Jhak which is adopted in the reconstruction of the thought process in India. He adopted this method as it facilitated him in bringing out a synthesis in the existing controversies, and it was indispensable and the demand of the time for the Hindus in those days were badly hampered in these controversies and like the blind were clinging to what they had explored in one or the other without having an idea of the spirit underlying the arguments. Jhak Taksh's interpretation of Hinduism is unique, thought provoking and creative. The student of Hinduism should take a note of it.¹¹

We have dealt with Taksh as his methodology. He has applied it to the realm of Jhak, tradition and mystic trends.

We shall take up to pursue his application on mystic trends.

before we take up the efforts of Shan Muhiyish regarding the synthesis between the existing mystic strands, it is rather necessary that we should deal with the mystic thought of the time. Let us recall that the age of Shah Muhiyish, as the history records, is the age of decline of the Moghal empire. Adding to this, let us say that it was not only the ending of down fall of a particular empire but it was an age of all round degeneration, deterioration and decay in the field of morality, spirituality and culture. Let us at present limit ourselves to only its spiritual deterioration. We shall describe it in brief as the details do not form the occasion.

Let us remind ourselves of the efforts of Aurangzeb regarding the revival of their religion. It is true that he was only a king and could not do much in this connection. But even then he was successful in a great extent in over-coming the degeneration and deterioration of Islam among Indian Muslims which due the collapse of Moghal empire was begun by Akbar the Great. Aurangzeb, however, tried his best to eradicate the evils in the realm of religion. And being a king he had to attend to many things other than religion and association was one of them. Engaged in it he got little time to take up the religious reforms but what-

power had been done by his own actions by his messages. The time of Muhammad Shah Inqila proved fatal in the history of royal music. It brought destruction in all spheres and walks of life. The king himself did not pay attention to anything other than democracy, economy, liberalisation. Consequently there followed the dark fall of old values and traditions. One thing more should be mentioned here that before Aurangzeb, Dara Shikoh stood up as a champion of Hindu philosophy, tradition and culture. Contrary to this, paradoxically enough, he also had a great impact of music. It is obvious that he did try to amalgamate one with another. Thereafter, many of the music followed him. It proved to be worst as the music were the source of inspiration for the Muslim masses. It became route of the time of Muhammad Shah II.¹³

The age of Shah Sulaiman witnessed many such evils as mentioned above. The Muslim masses in general in India considered certain customs and traditions as religious. The evils and artists in the path of "Tariqat" were securing more and more away from Islam. Such songs were given and away spread on "Jams", a programme of music in which specially, a devotional song with specific tone of music, is often used in high pitch with a purpose to heal the flagrant evil.

There are two reasons for the destruction and decline of the country namely (1) the empty treasury which has been emptied on account of the chiefs of some people, being a soldier or a scholar, to have a share in it. Others of them are the scribes and poets whom the king adorns with rewards and gifts. There is yet another group of people who get their livelihood from the court without doing any work. These people limit the means of others, reduce the income and, instead, are a burden to the national exchequer. (2) The other one is the heavy taxation on the millionaires. It has gone to the extent that the poorest has papers and promised to pay enough to carry the administration of the kingdom and those who do not pay even the regular taxes are not punished for their misdeed. The government went unbalanced the extent of administration and rehabilitation which lies in proper taxation, acquired conduct of employees and essential army".¹²

The words of that Valmiki clearly explain the wretched condition of his time. As a great intellectual and a true follower of law could not have borne it without any anguish and the poet was undoubtedly agonized by the prevailing situation and circumstances at his time. He was infatuated with it to the extent that he thought of an-

understanding of his people. In addition to this, the conflict of the sides were very much entangled with the controversy of *Maḥdī* and *Maḥdī*. The division was quite deep. There was little rationale in the support or opposition of a particular side. It was in fact the faith in the particular mill traditions that directed their course of life. As the conflict influenced the society, the people were also engaged in the controversy without knowing anything of it. *Shah* *Yahya*, on the contrary, was a great pioneer of his time. He did not embrace any philosophy just because of the faith but held it as valid on the basis of reason. He had regard for all the *Maḥdī* traditions and saw them in the perspective of time. According to him he effected the edifice of his own philosophy by arranging the particulars in order to make them able to emerge as universal. He could achieve it, as we have mentioned, by his methodology "Tahiq".¹⁴

In reply to his letter *Shah* *Yahya* wrote to *Shah* *Yahya* the *Maḥdī* *Maḥdī* regarding *Maḥdī* and *Maḥdī*. The author wanted to know his opinion regarding these schools of religion. Addressing him *Shah* *Yahya* began that the people of every age and time have a particular status of knowledge and that status is treated

by him by the help of God. When there was no witness, the 'Other' was not properly related, even at that time the people had not the knowledge of the problems regarding them. The evident age (his age) demands that we should understand with clarity of thought and unprejudiced mind the words of our ancestors. They may belong to any category of knowledge, in instances, 'explicit, tacit and unthought' (logic, tradition and intuition). We must study them from the point of view of not only comprehension but also from the existing controversies, and this could be possible when they would be studied with a purpose it being not a synthesis in them as least the opposite claims of differences must yield in the light or clarity.²⁶

Discussing traditional 'wujūd and ma'ādāt Shabazz, Shah Sulhullah first of all comes to the etymology of the terms 'wujūd' and 'ma'ādāt'. Touching upon it he points out that a person wishing to understand these terms must in the first place be aware that both of them are words having different meanings. No doubt that he is not hiding upon any linguistic trend in the modern philosophy, yet it is also noticed that his approach is definitely analytical. Any concept used as term must have a meaning and background and those wishing to understand it must be aware of it.

The Shah also advises here to take up this very aspect by calling *wujud* and *shuhud* in the first place as *wujud*. He first takes up *wujud* to explain the unity of existence and admits that it is a stage where, when a traveller reaches, he lod in the unity. The fall of this stage, as Shah Waliullah thinks, is completely occupied with almighty God. His meditation and intuition do not let him think of anything other than God. The divine light bewilders him and he loses his reason. But then God, as He is merciful, takes him out of the mist and he goes forward from the stage of the *unmawaj* between world and God to the stage of difference between the two. The lower is the stage of *wujud* and the higher 'shuhud' *shuhud*.¹⁶

Explaining *shuhud*, Shah Waliullah holds that it is a stage at which a traveller (*salik*) realises that the unity as visualised at the former stage has its own aspects and the diversity its own. In other words it may be described as a stage where one begins to see commonness between God and world and there are also spaces to see their difference from each other, meaning thereby that *shuhud* is a stage where the concepts for oneness and difference are well conceived by the traveller. Having explained that Shah Waliullah explicitly points out that the former, the

stage of abstract method, is lower than the latter, the stage of abstract method. Sometimes, these terms are used in the context of the objects. There is a controversy in the relationship between the contingent and abstract being (being as such). Regarding this there are two points of view in particular (1) This world of contingency has only one source of existence. That is in any^{where} there is one all pervasive reality in the world and what is seen as diversity is a unity in itself. An example is by giving an example of a candle, the wax of which could be moulded into different forms of human beings and animals. All these objects are their existence is the candle as with its wax they take this existence and as they use their existence to the candle they do inherit its nature. The candle having captured the existence on them loses it too, but does exist in the objects owing their existence to it.²⁷

The second point of view regarding the existence of things consists in conceiving their antonyms. It should be recalled here that negation of said is explaining the existence of the objects, states not that every thing that exists has its antagonism, contradiction with its opposite of life is death. Whether is the case of other things.

They also have their opposites. 28th Edition here

expains the same point of view. The opposites are explained in the existence and being existence. To put it explicitly it means that the phenomenon of the opposite creates a new face of existence. For instance the opposite of will as arrangement is humility. When arranged will is reflected in its opposite it will be seen as existence, when all the things are taken in come to existence in this way, it is, then, possible to pursue the principle and see its implementation on the principle and ~~under-implementation~~ ~~to the principle~~ of existence. This point of view is presented by the upholding of spiritual growth.¹⁰

Having explained both the points of view that Malakiah presents to justify them. In his opinion both of them are correct for even after the difference of particular law conclusion is the same. To explain the similarity he first takes up material growth.

Some of the critics are of the view that the Mujahid has not been able to explain his point of view clearly but even Malakiah does not share any one of them. He holds that the Mujahid has explicitly explained his intention. In order to understand it we shall have to unfold the metaphors and conceits and by unfolding them we shall come to realize that the Mujahid's universe is full of many

flaw. Their substance is revealed with less imperfection. The proponent and the followers of religious faiths justifiably uphold the assertion regarding the words consisting of apostles. We can come to the conclusion that the contingent beings are the apostles of the necessary beings and the coming of the observation of the necessary beings in the apostolic results into the new form of existence.

The discussion taken up here requires a great detail. The first of all that draws our attention is God. He also is present like the world of objects but with the difference that His presence is felt and the feeling of His presence is in the nature of man. For the realization of His presence one needs to perform an evil practice. Every "sala" with illuminated heart is aware of Him as the creator of this world. That with realization is in the nature of man is expressed by the Sharīf and Sāhib.

ظفر اللہ علی مطروف سے عظیمہ بابت یہ لفظی اللہ

[The nature of God on which He created man and His form was not to be changed].

سکس سرفور برور ملکی المظفر

[Every one who is human, is created according to his nature]

This state of knowledge and understanding which depends on right intuition and true indication is one of the many divine lights (nūrānī). This light appeared in his being

world of space possesses the quality of necessity. It is the duty of man to comprehend his nature. If he understands it, he is on the right path and any deviation of time from this nature makes him an infidel. The knowledge that the reality of things is captured is conveyed in the nature of man. It also consists in the fact that every object has a quality which is in the nature of its constitution. In order to make it clear he gives some instances, for example, hardness is the quality of iron, cooling is the quality of water, prayer is a virtue, adultery is an evil. Thus the qualities of burning, cooling, heaviness and lightness are in the nature of things and inseparable from them. Let us recall here what Abu al-Faraj speaks of the quality of things and divides them as the primary and secondary ones. That Mulla Ali also conceives of the qualities which are almost the very elements of objects without a lot their existence cannot be thought of.²¹

Having described the nature of objects and the nature of man Abu Mulla Ali now enters in a very interesting discussion. Admitting the fact that the scholars of 'gharib' as well as those who probe into the nature of the existence of things, yet the sofis, justifying it or their own grounds, have perused the probe and in their probing they have taken the concept and existence of a thing to mean one and the same. Both Mulla Ali

is of the view that the concept and the existence are different. For example tried of concept is different from the tried of existence. Similar is the case with other objects. Thus it separates its existence from concept. It is because of this difference that the things come into existence. We mean to say that the concept precedes existence or in other words the existence proceeds from the concept. On the level of existence the thing acquires the qualities of ability and objectivity. If ability is it means that an object is able to perform something, its concept, burning is the ability of fire, walking is the ability of water etc. etc. It would also seem that an object has got a power, and that power is its ability. As we have already pointed out, it is inherent in its object itself. The coming of objectivity needs no clarification, it would suffice to say that it is the form that makes it an object, in this way the form recognizes that the form of a thing is concept is different from the one perceived in existence. The difference brings him to ponder over two important questions : (1) the question regarding the reality of existence and (2) the question regarding the relation of the quality to the existence. It will be apt to mention that here with similar words to what we have said, this is,

also differentiates the concept describing it as 'the that' and 'the what' of a thing and Parshl does not speak with addition of qualities on the existential level in the objects, unlike that which is the main philosophy, except Parshl had blurred the concept and the existence and considered both of them as existence separating it from non-existence. The meaning of it is evident. They accepted the two states equally, the one of existence and the other of non-existence. That which is the one and categorizes the existence itself in the existence themselves and the existence themselves.²²

As regards the first question that which is of the view that the existence is objective and qualitative. We describe it by saying that it does not mean that we have created the concept of it and therefore bestowed the qualities upon it by being it into existence.²³

It clearly means that the concept and existence are nothing but the notions of a substance and objectivity. Now again he only focuses a view synthetic in nature by explaining it to be that from one 'what' view and false from the other. As that which is the latter point of view as long that it is wrong because the substance and the concept are blended with each other and listed in one category. Contrary to this we are aware of the fact that the qualities

are the determining factors of existence. They are also united with the concept of things because whatever the qualities conceived in an object, are contained in its existence. It is evident that the concept and the qualities must exist absolutely, else there would be no meaning of objectivity and subjectivity. In connection with this some philosophers are of the view that God has created the concepts only but when they conceived that the concepts first possess the qualities, they came to believe in the objective existence of them. Such idealists have again pointed out the absurdity of holding that truth is the proposition and belief. The closest of reality lies in the fact that the existence is here limited to the concept only.³⁴

The qualities which determine the existence of a thing have also been treated by God just as he has grouped these concepts. It will be understood that this world does not have different types of existence which are related to the concept and existing in it. The existence is divided into different categories namely : (1) the absolute existence meaning by all existence and (2) the existence possessing the qualities. The existence possessing the qualities is not only a matter of limitation. It is less, yet we do not know the relation between the absolute existence and the

objective existence. Both of these groups of philosophers believing in the objectiveness and the objectivity of existence do shape the elements of reality and truth and by studying them one is not satisfied.²⁶

The proponents of "abstract" view are of the view that existence perceived is presented in the form of potentialities in the absolute being. It manifests itself in the object as different states. Thus in order to exist it is necessary that it should be present in the potential form. To this potential form they call the characteristic features of a particular state in which the being manifests. Thus the existence is divided in the necessary being and the contingent being or possible being. In the case of necessary being there is no question of potentiality ("what is there said) and in the case of contingent or possible being the potentiality is necessary. The potentiality is an existence surrounding all the objects. It is reality by itself, it is divided of all qualities as it is a quality in itself. It is independent and is created by itself. These potentialities are the actualizations of knowledge which are actualized in the objects in the world. Thus the conception of "abstract" view comes to the stages of actualization. In the first place it is the appearance of God or the divine being. In the second

place it is the knowledge of the essence and in third place it is its manifestation in the *Apokal-Subjekt* or in the objects. All these three are abstractions and realized by intuition.²⁶

Having understood the stages of divine light (*Wajadilayat*) it becomes easy to understand the existence of possible being. It is the being in which the necessary being unfolds itself through the potentialities of it. The manifestation through the potentialities makes the existence of the contingent being possible. As we know the propensities of rational subject are of the view that the *Apokal-Subjekte* (object) are in the knowledge of God. It means that they are present in the form of potentialities in God and He, having realized them, brings them to existence. When these potentialities are actualized they become the contingent or the possible being. The existence of the possible being is pre-constituted by actualization. The actualization makes it possible and determinate and at long as it is in the potentially, it is indeterminate and the necessary being. The existence of the contingent being is the expression of a relation between the existence and the potentialities of the objects. The relation can, however, not be established or expressed but it is self-evident. On this stage of

existence God manifests Himself in different ways. The manifestation means that the potentialities have been fully actualized and become determinate.²⁷

Having given his own interpretation of Substantial Being, Spinoza then goes on to speak of his conception regarding the necessity of one thought. In establishing it he justifies it on the basis of cause and effect. He is of the view that Descartes' philosophy of Pantheism is in correlation with that of Substantial Being. To explain the truth of it he takes up the example of a battlefield in which all the participants are bodies and being the bodies they are one and the same. The invader and the invaded, the murderer and the murdered, the conqueror and the conquered are one as all of them are bodies. In spite of the fact that all of them are bodies they cannot be understood as one just for the reason that they are bodies unless some common and essential qualities are ascribed to them. It is, of course, evident that when these essential qualities will be visualized in their potential form, they will be indeterminate and void of all qualities. But as soon as they are ascribed to an object they become qualities and would themselves become causes and manifestations and also be the causes of time. With the addition of the qualities as in other words, after the

actualization of the potentialities the form becomes meaningful and it appears in the form of many things having the manifestation of one in whom they live in potentialities. These different objects come into being and together with this the relation between the object and its potentiality also comes before us. Though we do not understand its nature yet we know that there must be some for without it things could not have come into existence.^[10]

By calling something a seed we mean that the relation between its existence and the potentiality has been established or we can say that the existence has been objectified or that the potentiality has been actualized or that the potentiality has manifested itself in a particular form known as the seed. Before its actualization or manifestation it could have presented any other form but now when it has appeared as seed we call it 'seed'. Thus essentially it is the potentialities which could have come in different existence. The particular existence in a particular form, then, does not mean anything more than that it has come in that form just because the necessary being has manifested itself in that form. Such a viewish supports the view and is of the opinion that it is undoubtedly true, provided the complications are removed

which is not the least difficulty for a man of reason. We shall see in later chapters grounds he supports it.²⁸

In the preceding passage he has explained the unity of being (by it we mean that the existence presented a priori in the potentialities could assume any of the forms out of many which means that the existence is prior to the being). It will be clear when the concept of matter will be discussed. At present we should recall Thom Aquin's view regarding the issue which Thom Aquinism has explicitly explained in the foregoing passage. The matter is the something when the potentialities present a priori in the necessary being are started upon it and then different objects come into existence. Thus the unity is diverse; it is the fact that the existence could be in anybody before being objectified or getting actualized. Having it explained, he comes to a more subtle point which has been a matter of dispute.²⁹

What it has been proved that being or different objects have one thing in common and that is its existence. There remains no difficulty in comprehending that the existence is prior to the matter or objects, for it is because of this that the things come into existence in a particular objectified form. Thus it is in fact as to be true in case of being and it definitely is true, for as

It has been explained, the body is not prior. However, if
 being true of body must necessarily be true of existence and
 when a will pronounced 'al alim alim haq' (The world is God),
 he means nothing other than that the existence of the
 world is a reality and it comes from God. In our opinion
 the conclusion is, however, quite logical for something from
 God does not make it but has the will of rational being
 which did not make it either. The manifestation of God
 in things as advocated by them means that God is in them.
 'Al alim alim haq' would better be interpreted if the term
 'haq' is taken to mean the real. The world is real. The
 whole of it means nothing more than this and it is real
 because it comes from the all pervasive reality. The
 conclusion can be supported by substantiating it on the ground
 that Mawlānā reduces the categories of being into two
 from the three, that is, the necessary, the possible, and
 the impossible. The possible or contingent is reduced to
 necessary as it is present a priori as the potentialities in
 the necessary being. Thus the world being the potentialities
 of the necessary being is real as they themselves are real
 since they are the part of reality. Thus 'al alim alim haq'
 as pronounced by the will would mean what we have interpreted
 on the basis of the arguments.³¹

Such criticism justifies it on the basis of logical grounds. A logician when asserts that laid out upon are one, is never telling other than, by asserting it, that both of them are one and share the common and essential qualities of a man. Similarly when he says that man and horses are one, he only means that the quality is common to both of them that they are one as animals. In the same way when the brave and the lion are said to be alike, it means nothing but to point out the common quality of bravery in both of them. Similar is the case when a man pronounces 'all that about God'. By the pronouncement he only means that the existence of the world is real as God himself is real. He does not deny in his assertion the determination and objectivity of the things around. Contrary to this he seems to affirm the existence (nature) surrounding the world which is present & potent in God in the form of potentialities. It seems that God is manifesting Himself in the objects of the world by bringing them into existence through the potentialities present in His own being. Thus in the pronouncement he affirms the manifestation and its reality. He, then, proceeds to overrule an objection against Wholistic thought. The objection raised against it is that the existence and reality must be one and the same as the former comes from

the latter. Having affirmed the first truth, that is the reality of God, it is clear that it cannot be challenged. He, being the source of existence, is also affirmed and his affirmation proves the reality of existence (matter) but both of them are on the equal footing is not correct and justified.³²

Assessing the objection that nihilism says that the existence does not stand upto the mark because the reality of the existence (matter) is not believed to be of the nature of the reality of the world of soul. The reason acknowledging the categorization of existence does not perceive any relation between them. Yet it does not satisfactorily reject it. Contrary to this, it admits the manifestation of God in the world and acknowledges Him as the source of existence. It is compelled to admit it for reason (log), what (what), and existence (Existence (Existence)) are related in such a way that each of them is the image of the another. It says it evident that nihilism puts forward an example, i.e., the man is capable of being made into many determinations. It says that it is not same different from whatever desired. Last of them will be a determinate. Likewise, the mind possesses the capacity of being negated. In the same way the whole which is God (soul) is capable to exist

(senses) in different material forms (matter) (Matter). Each of them is the part. The reason admits that the parts must belong to the whole or the whole must be seen in parts. Despite of being seen in parts the whole does not lose the identity. This type of relation is existing between soul and matter (Matter). Then it manifests itself in different forms, it is in parts and when not apart and above, it is the whole. A man of intuition must be aware of these distinctions. Justifying it on the basis of synthesis, which is the methodology, it comes to similar method. The result is of the view that the attributes are present in the objects. They must be distinguished from the essence. Describing the effects of the attributes the result is of the opinion that each of them has the opposite e.g. the opposite of knowledge is ignorance likewise the opposite of power or arrogance is humility (E.g.). In the knowledge of God they are distinct and being distinct they become the source of existence. God is opposite of them and creates them on the opposites. It means that the essence and the attributes are reflected in their opposites. Thus, results or 'atom' to the being are the attributes existing on the opposites are reflected in them.²³

Regarding this Shah wilayah explains the differences

between Husi Arabi and Mujahid Alf Thari. Husi Arabi is of the view that the existence is nothing but the manifestation of the names and attributes of God but Mujahid Alf Thari holds that it is not the opposite on which the attributions are imposed. The matter of fact remains only that God has the knowledge of all the forms and when He wills any of them to give a particular existence, He bestows it upon the form by reflecting the attribute in the opposite and thereafter the form comes in the world of existence from the world of knowledge. Both Mullaishah is of the view that the Mujahid is not clear on the point. He completely asserts that the world is the manifestation of the existence of the One and at others he holds that the world has a virtual existence which is real and systematic. In our opinion the statements are not contradictory but simply different ways to explain one and the same thing. The image of the existence of the One is comparatively virtual to that of the real existence. It means that it should remain so long as the One reflects in it and when it ceases what it ceases to reflect. Despite of being virtual it is real as it is the image of the real. We should explain it with an example. A man looks into the mirror. His image would exist in it as long as he stands before it. But as soon as

he never says, his image would also disappear. In this way his image is actual but real is void because it is the image of a real man. There is certainly a difference in his reality and the reality of the image. He, however, wish to assert clearly that by calling the world a virtual existence the Mujahid, like Bhaskara, did never mean to call it illusion or mere appearance.³⁴

^{virtual} But we have asserted has also been pointed out by Shah Waliullah. He is of the view that reality should be viewed in different stages. For example, the reality of man is different from the reality of horse, and the reality of horse is different from the reality of wages. There is a difference of the nature of reality. Apart from it is the reality of the forms (Usul-e-thabatiyat). They are either existent or non-existent. They come into existence when it is believed upon them, also they remain in 'state' of non-existence. A legislator (Musaqil) calls them as forms and is aware of their nature but he does not understand their relation with God. Shah Waliullah here points out that their relation with God can be positively realized by the walls of material World only. By the process he understands that God first created himself and in His self-creation He created His system (Zab), His powers (Kawafid)

(Perfection), and evolutionary capacities (evolutionary power).

having explained the essence he explained the attributes.

The explanation of names and attributes followed the explanation of the potentialities present in them a priori.²⁶

At the second stage of the explanation, he explained the whole (kulliyat) and at the third stage of explanation he explained the elements or parts (ajziyat). These elements or parts in accordance with their nature, are possible (to be acted upon) (mumkili), determinable (muqarrar) and are capable of the possibility of existence. In this way the contingent existence belongs to the knowledge of God. The contingent needs explanation. It is required to stop at explaining its relation with the names and attributes. The contingent existence and the names and attributes cannot be considered as separate existence. The possible being, in particular, demands for its existence on the names and attributes. It is between that each of them influences one another. What is known as contingent is actually that which is connected in its names and attributes. To make it clear let us said that Imam Ash'ari calls the contingent existence to be the conformation of the names and attributes in which they are present as potentialities (asma thabitah). Mujtahid Ali Thani, though rejecting Imam Ash'ari's position, does

recognize that the objects are the substratum of the names and attributes which appear the same after their application to the opposites (śamā). Here, as a matter of fact, as we shall see, that realization also means the opinion, there is a difference too of the scope or the way of expression. From that we must acknowledge the difference of realization and reflection.³⁶

Having given the two traditional interpretations regarding the existence of the contingent being that willful man is his son, we are of the view that the same possible being has here been used in a limited connection. It includes in its connection only the travellers (mātr) and his sister (śatā). We further explain it in the self terminology that the names and the attributes are conceived by a will as believed (śāntā). The contingent existence, which is the will himself, is the form (śāntā) and its all pervasive reality, which is transcendent and immanent, is believed (śāntā). Thus we are of the view that the contingent existence, as used here, does not include ⁱⁿ its connection the whole of the universe. To make it clear we explain it further that some times it so happens that the believed directs the form. In the self terminology this is known as 'śāntā'. At this stage the believed does not only

attract the soul but also beginning upon him the love and absorption in this being. The so attracted soul in the soul terminology, is 'mukil' (lover). In order to sustain his connection with Wilkiah gives the example of Al Ibrahim who had been guided by the Reality (God) 'Himself. God imparted upon him the knowledge that the worldly things cannot be the object of worship (as we Huk) as they are subject to destruction and change. The object of worship can only be the thing which is apart from and above the subjection of destruction and change. The stage described here is one. There is yet another stage of the expression of love of the soul. At this stage the man on the basis of his worship and attraction of God and purification of heart and soul attains the proximity of God. At this stage the man will be called as 'salik' or traveller. Apart from it there is still another stage in which there is a reciprocity. The soul proceeds towards God for 'his proximity on one hand and God, in response, to his remembrance and inspiration, comes near him and in the journey of the lover and the beloved there comes a destination where both of them meet. Shah Wilkiah calls this stage as one reached by the souls of destiny only. The soul, ^{only} reaching this stage is called 'mujaawid' and 'mukil' bearing in him the grace of

the beloved.²⁷

When Mikhailin goes on expressing himself in self terminology. Whatever has been said in the preceding passage seems, as the Shah points out, that God enlightens the heart of a self with the divine light. This divine light is one which transcends even the mystical gods. This divine light reflects itself in 'males alai' (higher angels). It is the kind of the divine light on which depends the Divine name. Discussing the nature of the divine light Shah Mikhailin is of the view that the will of God leads on transgressing. The lecture of transgression is, perhaps, brings forth to contain the contemporary existence. We shall see it later on. He, however, is of the opinion that the divine light (sajadi) described above is the one towards which the ear is attracted because it is in the nature of man.²⁸

This divine light is grace. It is bestowed by God as in other words we carry it is His gift. Sometimes God chooses someone for His knowledge, grace. The person person in self terminology is 'maured' and, as it has been mentioned earlier, it is attained by worship and effort of God and purification of soul. One who attains it in this manner is called as 'Mawrid'. There is yet another

possibility is which the soul does not attain the grade in the complete sense but he attains only a part of it and the part attained by him becomes the whole of him. It is a matter of influence. Any one of the names and attributes very much in him a lasting influence and the lasting influence would lead him to absorb himself in it. The Shah gives here an example of a soul influenced by one of his attributes "Raher (Memory). But in the influence he will completely be assimilated in it. The qualification is that attribute would be the only terminology he relied on the comprehension of the reality of the attribute by a soul. In the light of the above discussion of the divine light (Noor) Shah concludes comes to the conclusion that the view of regeneration of "Rajabid al-Farid is in contrast with that of the manifestation propounded by Imam Arabi. He says of the opinion that the interpretation of the correspondence in its limited correlation is his own interpretation and it has been given to justify the view of the Rajabid.²⁰

Stephan, interprets Shah's "Rajabid" concept as a synthesis between the two views viz. Wajedi and Ghafuri. He has already explained in the preceding passage that the theory of manifestation (Tajalliyat) does not in any way stand as

contrary to that of Ibn Arabi's. In that sense to bring out a synthesis and points out that Ibn Arabi's theory of manifestation is not in contrast with that of Majma'is. Ibn Arabi's contention that the realisation is nothing but the manifestation of the names and attributes in the other way of saying that it is their reflection. The synthesis is justified on the basis of his own interpretation by which the counterpart is used in a limited connection. In this sense the Sheikh is of the opinion that a soul realises in reality in his the names and attributes of which he is the manifestation. It depends on the soul itself for which one of them is as long and broader the possibilities of knowledge are unfolded to him. The Majma'is is also of the view that the soul realises the attributes of which he is the reflection and, as that Sheikh is of the view, he must be attracted towards them as referring to the source (Raja) in it the nature of self and things other than him. In this way with his own interpretation of possible being as being a synthesis.⁴⁰

The other intuitive differences are not aside by him considering them to be minor and thinking that the minor ones do not, however, carry any effect.

Having explained the counterpart and possibility

Dr. Salimullah is a member of the metropolitan committee of

attributions. As these great points out that the attributions cannot be distinguished and differentiated in categories, Shah Waliullah, supporting his views, holds that the souls in general do not believe in any distinction and difference between the attributions. In support of the assertion he puts forward two arguments. In the first place he contends that undoubtedly there is reality viewed as the Haqq and Quat (God and Quat). But to say that there are distinctions existing independent of quateness cannot be justified on any rational grounds. To amplify it he gives the example of the movement of a man. When we see him moving we assert about him that he is alive without taking into consideration that the attribution namely movement and life are there in his essence or other than his essence. Thus any distinction in the essence and attribution would, as he points out, be illogical and irrational. That can be generalized about them is that they are the necessary existence and being the necessary existence are the causes of finite existence as these great holds.⁴¹

In the second place he argues that the necessary being (God) keeps on unfolding itself in different attributions and forms. It is a truth which the reason admits. But it fails to accept that the attributions exist independent of

the essence. At a certain of fact the Shah regards it to be a simile with which the attributes are taken to be dissimilar to something with the forms of existence in the contingent objects. Thus on the basis of the second argument as well he rejects the theory involving the essential and independent existence of attributes and thus shares with Imam Azhar who dissimilar it. It will not be off the point if we mention that by rejecting it he rejects modalities too he rather stands by the attributes who believed that attributes are one and above the essence of God. What he means to point out is that the attributes are in the essence of God. It is Imam Azhar's position as well.⁴³

Having spoken of the distinction to now come to the world of objects. Tying it up to tying the discussion with coming contradiction is the view of the Mujaahid regarding the existence of the world. We have seen that for the Shah it does not bring any such contradiction. The Mujaahid is of the view that the world is the glorification (arid and laihah) of the reality. Together with this, he also holds that the existence of the world is a denial. Shah Wafai's considers, as we have already pointed out, that there is no contradiction in the two assertions and if

⁴³ It is taken to be a contradiction if it is taken as important.⁴³

disregarding the subject's own opinion place his own view regarding the objective existence. He is of the view that God is in agay with the objects and their potentialities (Agyar). It means that He is transcendent and being transcended He is not in either of the two. But as Shih said in 1904 there is a divine light which is the source of existence and it is this divine light which represents itself in different forms and shapes. It is this divine light on the basis of which it is asserted that God has bestowed existence on the potentialities and the objects. It would also point out here that Shih said in 1904 that the existence of the objects depends on the mercy of God. This assertion is, owing to the divine light described above.⁶⁸

Regarding the differences pointed out the Shih is of the view that they might due to the misinterpretation. I. that they are there just because of the fact that they have not rightly been placed. It is a matter of instead as to what he means by right placement. In our opinion he means by it that the critics have not realised that in the historical perspective of events. In the discussion of his methodology we have pointed out that he gives it a great importance. He however is of the view that the right

placement would be given correct interpretation and more

than that could not have left them as differences at all.
 Regarding the attributes the Imam holds that the attributes
 have been considered in the sense that divine light which has
 been expressed is considered as attributes. The divine
 light has expressed itself in many folds and in each one
 of them an attribute has been considered. It is because of
 this fact that the souls have considered them to be
 separate from the essence. He explains it with an example
 of the "white" and "whiteness" (bayaz and abrayal). The white
 signifies a colour distinction and the whiteness also
 shares for the same with a difference that one is the object
 of the sense and the other is the attribute of the object
 in the sense.

Thus he gives a basis for the explanation of his view
 regarding the attributes. The whiteness being the attribute
 of white refers to something but the white, in the same way
 the attributes of God can be viewed. He possesses all of
 these attributes. Some of them are mentioned here to
 explain the point of view and others can be viewed in the
 same explained. When we take up the attribute of creation
 in this (20a) it means that it is the logical consequence
 of His knowledge; when His essence is considered in the
 related to the contingent it means that His essence reflects

Itself in the objects before the process of creation. The attitude of Power (qadrat) is action of in the context of the action of creation when the will (iradah) is described, it means that God has chosen the end of the two present in his knowledge spiritual. The attitude of action is emphasized in the statement that He sends revelation in the prophets and the angels. In the same way when he is called as 'Master' (al kamil) and 'Power' (al qadir), it means that He is the source of all that is heard and all that is seen.

Such emphasis in the discussion of attribution explicitly points out two important things. Firstly that they can be understood in the context of objects but understanding them in the context of objects does not make them independent of His creation. They are the forms expressed in things. The source of the expression is the divine light. Here he is in proximity with Ibn Arabi. In the rest of the discussions he is more inclined towards Mujahid Alf Tami.⁴⁵

We conclude his metaphysics by describing his thoughts regarding the ten schools presented in 'Fayaz Gharnai'. The book describes his dreams. In our opinion, these dreams should be taken as the expression of his views of

which he is fully conscious.

The first observation of the book "Psychical Harmonies" is related to material light and material shadow. In his vision that enlightens visionaries the followers of the two schools. The first is the one following in material light and the other belongs to material shadow. Regarding the followers of material light he observes that they are deprived of the divine light, are ashamed of their efforts and interpretation and the fire of dissatisfaction is burning their heart, body and mind. The stage got of the followers belonging to material shadow is corrected, illuminated and cured of their doubts. The latter asserts upon the former that it is better. The Shah intervenes the discussion and is invited by the two as a judge. Having heard their arguments Shah explained that the knowledge is of two types. The first is the one which purifies and refines the soul. The second is the one which purifies so much as not. Regarding the acquisition of knowledge he is of the view that every soul has its own capacity and it requires knowledge in accordance with its capacity and aptitude. If the knowledge acquired by the soul is in accordance with the capacity and the aptitude, the soul is absorbed in it and is consequently reformed by it.

unbaptized subject is a true knowledge but those who acquired it, did not have the ability capable of its completion.⁴⁶

Coming to the other group of people he asserts that the knowledge acquired by them was in accordance with the capacity and aptitude of their souls, and it is, therefore, that their souls were refined and purified. Contrary to this the followers of unbaptized subject indulged themselves in explaining the manifestation of god in the world but they failed in directing it to the fathers took away from them the message and the revelation of God which is the guiding principle of the soul. These souls for this reason are classified and they are subject of it. Addressing the followers of unbaptized subject the Shah asserts they would not have surmised the secret of manifestation as their propensities were not expressive enough to explain it. Their souls would have reflected it they had worshipped God like angels. The proposition suggests that their worship like that of the angels should not have been based on inquiry into the secrets of manifestation.⁴⁷

In the light of the discussion in d 'Fayruz Sharaf' it is evident that the Shah inherits the unbaptized method. Here again the tendency of synthesis is apparent. He does not challenge the truth of unbaptized subject but he does

defy the pretence of its advocates (Raymond Karussalt,
pp. 93-97).

CHAPTER - IV

ELABORATION OF SUFISM AS PRESENTED BY SHAH WALIULLAH

The discussion regarding Mubtatai Najat and 'ubdati placed in the previous chapter clearly shows that the Shah was a great soft and his 'latbiq' is nothing but the expression of his own intuitive experiences. Therefore, it would be desirable to present the elaboration of sufism as presented by him. To begin with his soft thought we describe the nature of 'tasawwuf'.

Prophet Muhammad, the Shah says, was sent to the world to preach Islam and God giving him this responsibility wanted to help him in his mission as is evident in these words :

(يَا أَيُّهَا مُحَمَّدُ)

(Verily I am his assistant).

Islam is revealed to reform the people of the world. The information must be internal and external as well. Thus there are two aspects of Islam namely the external (Zahir) and the internal (Batin) aspect. The external one concerns the externalities such as social dealings, individual actions etc. and the internal aspect refers to the (the inwardness) of the heart/mind.¹

It is evident, as the Shah points out, that the two aspects of religion in accordance with the promise of God, must be safeguarded and God fulfill it by creating the capacities to do the job. After the death of the prophet, God entrusted the task to the chosen ones. As it was difficult for man to take up the whole of it, God divided the task, two of them were chosen to reform the religion from the pollution caused by the amalgamation of different beliefs of the people and by the evil that creeps in the due course of time. The group of these reformers includes the traditionalists, scholars and jurists and rationalists (mujaahids). It reformed the external aspect of Islam. The responsibility of the reformation of the internal one was given to the other group which includes the苏fis, history witnesses that the Islam has been reformed by every revivalists and苏fis. One task up to wipe out the afflictions from the religion and eradicate the evil from the society and the other bore the responsibility of justifying the truth and goal of the individual. Thus the external aspect was reformed by the reformers and the internal one (Akhaq) by the苏fis.²

The Shah names the internal aspect as 'Dharm' - beautification. In order to make it explicit we should

give the etymology of the term 'Ihsan'. It comes from the word 'Ihsanah' which means virtue or beauty. He uses the term for the internal aspect of religion as it beautifies the soul of the individual by purifying his soul and its beautification definitely induces him to virtue. He, however, defines 'Ihsan' by saying that it is a state where a soul has the vision of God or at least realises his presence.⁵

The soul who reaches the state of Ihsan is given the capacity of attracting the people towards himself. His words are effective, his deeds are impressive and his prayers are granted. He becomes the source of inspiration for many people and they become his disciples. He starts in three different stages (Karamat) and by meditation and contemplation he reaches the hearts of his people and loves the future. The attraction (Karamat) confers the belief of his followers in his spiritual leadership. As he is chosen to attract the internal aspect, God helps him. His prayers are granted and his disciples are relieved of the afflictions and pains. He is followed by many and thus found an order (Jama'at). Those following the call of Allah share the invitation of God. The school in course of time loses its effectiveness, importance and dignity and God, then,

shoesaa aana other well is watahdish another ailedish having all the spiritual qualities. As Shah Waliullah points out that the effectiveness and the attraction is not at all worldly. It is neither effected by the time. It is based upon the mercy of God. So long as God is kind to a particular 'ailedish' it remains effective and its centre of attraction is well. But when He chooses to demolish it the other one is established and is equally effective and attractive. Thus it is the mercy of God to make it effective and attractive and it is at the time of the rise of a 'ailedish' that its aafia are heard to have been saying that their ailedish is better than others. Shah Waliullah here comes to point out that every ailedish of aafia is valuable and true. On becoming its ineffective and unattractive we should not find faults with it. For all it depends on the will of God.⁴

It accords with his presentation and greater reforms to preserve the original spirit of Islam and the aafia to purify the state of the followers. To fulfill the mission, as Shah Waliullah points out, many orders of aafia (ailedish) came into existence; some of them still have their aafia; others have lost their integrity and still others have merged into the existing ones and have

became their part. Regarding the number of such orders there is a difference of opinion. Some are of the view that they are fourteen (14) in number, some of which are named as Isfah, Arzai, Ashraf, Mubarak, Chikhti, Jangidi and Qadiri. Some other writers give a list of twelve schools different from the previous ones. Some of them are Jangidiya, Bakshiya, Mubarakhiya, Naqshiya, Shariya, and Talibhiya. In addition to these many other orders were also established such as Jangia, Qadriya, Akbariya, Bahmaniya, Kikoriya, Gwalidya. Having noted these orders the text gives a brief list of the schools established in India. Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti was the first to found the Chishtiya order in India. As he was the founder, the order is also named after him as chishtiya. This order was followed by Suhrawardi order founded by Shakh Shihabuddin Suhrawardi and then Naqshbandiya order was established by Khwaja Naqshband. The Naqshya like one started by Khwaja Naq Shikh. Shakh Ahmad Rikhi founded Ahmediya school. Shah Chahkhalil Akbar established Akbari order; Khwaja Gwalidari began the Gwalidya order, and Shakh Abdul Qadir Gajvidi set up Qadiriya order. Thus the orders described here are those named after their founders. Shah Talibkhalil asserts that he had had spiritual attachment with every of

these schools. He was attached with Ishtaiyya order through Shaikh Muhammad Mansoori who was among the companions of Shaikh Badrudin Badari; with Ishtaiyya and Chishtiya orders through Malik Muhammad Jahanian; with Junaid order through Khwaja Masud Ghilmi and with Qadiriya school through Khwaja Nazimuddin. With all of them he had spiritual bonds and took benefit in learning their soft discipline.

In the light of the above passage we can conclude that Shah Waliullah considers sufism necessary for the spiritual reformation of the followers of Islam. To him sufism is the instrument for the preservation of the internal aspect of Islam. This sufism as manifested in his thought is essential like the 'phoenix'. The former corrects the internal aspect and the latter reforms the external one. Consequently for the reform of the religion as a whole both of them are indispensable and even after standing apart both of them contribute a great deal to the development of one another. Thus the nature of sufism as suggested by him in the book 'Husn-i-tauhid' is reformatory.²

Having discussed the nature of four phases of sufism Shah Waliullah comes to its development. The development is traced in four ages. The first one of them begins

from the time of the prophet. In this age it is not a traditional religion but that, we can say, was in initial stage. At the time of the prophet the followers took pleasure in following the religion as it was revealed to the prophet. Whatever was their problem regarding the religion and their own affairs as well, they went to him and the prophet presented the solution of their problem. They were satisfied. The externalities of the religion like that of the Shariah and the revealed book did not only correct their outward behaviour but also reformed their within and they were guided by it in all spheres of life. They did not perform any act as they were asked to do it but did it as they thought its doing to be necessary for them. They were aware of the true spirit of religion. None of them showed any negligence (Kasrat) and if any of the miracles (Karamat) did happen from them it was just by chance. It was because the prophet was alive and was taken to be the source of all miracles (Mujaizat).

The reason for their not desiring any miracle (Karamat) as that Mikhailian puts forward was the absence of the excitement in them which leads to those rapturous conditions. And if they came across any such rapturous conditions they took it as the signet of faith. The followers in this

one often knew things of future by their vision and
 guidance. The Shah gives the example of Harriet who tells who
 in his serious illness said that he himself had made him
 ill. To put it brief, sufism as a discipline and as a
 tradition was not present in this age. They never
 pronounced the 'shatah' or the words against Shariah. They
 followed the commands of God to restrain themselves
 not because they are asked to do so, for instance they said
 Zuhd so that they should save themselves from the evil
 of slavery and not only because God made the poor to share
 their wealth. Thus the sufism in the first age was in the
 discipline form.

The Shah very rightly points out that the sufism in
 its disciplinary and traditional form was not present in
 that age but he has not either explained sufficiently. In
 the lifetime of the prophet some people, who had nothing
 to eat and wear, lived at the terrace of Masjid Nabawi.
 Some of them were those who had no interest in the worldly
 affairs. These dwellers were known as 'ashaka wafis'. Some
 of the writers on sufism in tracing the etymology of waf
 take it as the source of the term.⁵

In the second phase of sufism, as the Shah points out,
 some of the followers of Islam were occupied with the waf

practices. The number of such people was not very great. Most of the followers lived a life prescribed by Islam. But some of them considered the World to be a place of misery and illusion and they took refuge in the forests or in the hills. Thus they segregated themselves from the world. These people worshipped God and always engaged themselves in His remembrance. They did it not because of the fear of hell and imposition of heaven but because of their union with God. Their sole desire was to see the divine light, aware of the secrets of the world and the union of the soul with God. The object could be achieved through love and as they worshipped Him out of alone love. The self practices drove them into self forgetfulness, meekness, and rapture and meditation and contemplation helped them to read the hearts of the people. Thus the characteristic of the second phase of mysticism, as pointed out by Shah Waliullah, is the beginning of the self practices.

Shah Waliullah is of the opinion that the suffix of the second phase termed absorption of oneself in God. They were highly concerned with the worship of God. In other words, they were the true devotees and worship of God was the only goal they aimed at.⁷

According to Shah Waliullah the third phase of mysticism

beginns from the time of prophet *Abul Kalam* and *Isaiah Abul Hasan Khazari*. In this age there lived three kinds of people. The first were the common devotees; the second were the people who took it upon their inward self by their facts and actions and the third were those who sought absorption (*Jah*) in God. The first were worshipped but as they were punished for it; the second who did it in return themselves; and the third were worshipped in the remembrance of God. Their sole desire was to be lost in Him and to know the secrets of the world. Thus they sought the union with God with the help of meditation and their whole emphasis was on it. In this age the sages did not engage themselves in the problems of *wujud* and *shuhud*. They only wished to actualize their existence in God.⁸

The fourth phase in his opinion begins from little before *Isaiah Ashraf* and *Imam Ashraf*. In this age the sages were occupied with the problem of existence. They did not limit themselves to the worship of God and attention to God but also took up the discussion of the problem like that of existence. They signified as to how the world came into existence and which one is the first to come into being.

The souls of all these four ages have differed from each other on the basis of their actions and deeds but all of them, in his opinion, are in union with each other essentially. Their souls were purified and illuminated. They paved way to comprehend the First Cause. Their practices illumined the material and spiritual worlds. They have rendered a great service to the humanity. Shah wilailah says: that in the discussion of the phases of safiya we should not amalgamate one with another. The contribution and the state of a safi should be discussed in accordance with the age he lived in. Let us recall that this very opinion of Shah wilailah is in accordance with his own theory of history which we have discussed earlier. In the conclusion of the discussion on the phases of safiya let us assert that we have described here what was said by Shah wilailah regarding them.

We have discussed the phases of safiya. We shall now take up the 'sals' or travelling and give an account of its nature and importance in the progress of a safi. It is customary that we should begin with its definition. As it is a safi experience, an extensive definition cannot be given. We shall, however, define it as it has been defined by Shah wilailah. He is of the view that Sals

is a fact which he has realized with the help of the prophet Muhammad. The realization of this fact is not in totality. He has only been given the knowledge of its path. It means that he is not aware, as he himself admits, of the reality within the path, whatever is known to him he takes up in description.

Halak, as he says, is the will of God. It is a method by which the will of God is to be pursued in the world. The method of pursuit is decided by God and the decision is conveyed to the world of angels. From there comes his idea in the world of souls and thereafter the man follows it. It should be borne in mind that all of us do not know the method of the pursuit of the will of God (Halak). It is known by the chosen ones and God chooses them. When Walidiah states that the method of Halak is decided by God, genuine protest is the result and whatever is done by God cannot be undone by any power in the world and so is the case with the contrary. Thus Halak (pursuing) is the will of God taken to the world through the agencies, namely the world of angels and the world of souls. The will can be pursued by some method and the method is also decided by God. Thus the Halak in his pursuit also includes the method of pursuit. To put in brief, we should define

is as the method of the permission of the will of God.

Shah Waliullah is of the view that "Sajdah" is not the contemplation. As it has been said it is the will of God. Having declined it he proceeds to state the method of the revelation (Wahy) of the will of God. The will of God in the form of letters and garbs first appears at the first sky and from there it comes down at the second sky. Here it assumes the form of knowledge and the formulation of rules and regulations is also done on this very sky. It helps the people to learn and write about it. On the third sky it takes up the colour of comparison and becomes the element of the temperament of the traveller (Safir). It gathers speed and stability on the fourth sky and thus the scholars are categorized as great and small. On the fifth sky the will gets strength and security and due to this stage who do not follow it become the victims of catastrophes and atrocities. On the sixth sky it takes up the form of instruction and direction and the dreamers who are enlightened to show the correct path are the purveyors of the will of God to their fellow followers. On the seventh sky God makes it stable and its stability is at the end, as the Shah says at that of the living is the power which cannot be demolished until answered in

particular. Thus the description mentions seven elements of the will of God. All these elements become one body in the world of angels and from there its trace or idea comes in the world of souls. These souls who are chosen by God follow this order of the permeation of the will of God in their travelling.

Spañ Willich includes the religion in the definition of the term *salut* and he is right to include it as religion is also a method to know the will of God. It has been said before that there can be no decline at one place and at another the least one being rejected yields place to the second. Here he particularly discusses jurisprudence. He is of the view that all the scholars of jurisprudence agree that to be knowing the will of God and so all jurisprudence cannot be in accordance with the will of God. It can be only one of them and only one of the scholars can claim to be knowing the will of God. It is true, as he says, all scholars and all laws cannot be chosen to know it. There comes a problem, then, as to how he should join the chosen man and the chosen jurisprudence. Regarding it he only says that the chosen man is filled with illumination and grace. It is true that it cannot be the method of verification, yet let us accept that it is so

experience and that the *ṣ mall* experience which cannot be explained in objective terms. It is subjective to a great extent.

Having described the *ṣ mall* as method and as the will of God he describes his own experience. He states that he learnt it from the prophet. He saw the goal of the prophet which taught him the method of *ṣ mall* (travelling). The soul revealed as the *ṣ mall* came of the divine light. The first one revealed to him was the light of the existence of the prophet manifested in his ideal being. The *ṣ mall*, as he says, was established in it and thereafter came in the state of assistance (*ṣ mall*). The second one of them was the light of the essence of the previous manifestation. It is the light shining through the being of all things. The *ṣ mall* was established in it and again got assistance (*ṣ mall*). In the third place the light revealed to him was that one of the realities of the being (God) which also included the method. The fifth one was the light of the spiritual reality of the being of (God) devoid of matter. It was the point where a mystic desires to reach and return; going to and coming from the point is the travelling of a *ṣ mall*. This point in the *ṣ mall* terminology, is called

(Indrajai mahaya ill mahaya¹). The fifth time when he sees the soul of the prophet it made him recognize a crisis in the realm of knowledge. This point, as he says, is similar to one described above. He does not tell what the crisis is but only states that knowing it is profitable in realizing the absolute. Thus by this ascending and descending he completes the travel he undertakes with the will of God. Each time he is stimulated and comes to the state of consciousness (buddhi).

Stages of the Travel (Mahati) :

We have discussed the definition and nature of the travel. We now come to the stages of travel as put forward by Shri Vallabha. In his travel a mystic passes through many stages. According to the Shri 'Te'g' he subdivides in the first one of them. Beginning with it he asserts that at the outset a faith or a traveller has to cultivate in him the feeling of surrender to the Almighty for without it he cannot put even a step into the wide realm of union.

1. A traveller when starts in search of truth goes forth by creating different manifestations of existence and in the end reaches a point where he sees, the nature of his existence. Coming on he returns to the starting point. This rise and fall in the will terminology is known as 'Indrajai mahaya ill mahaya'.

As we have seen principles on 'Tarikat', besides of the apparent differences existing in the 'Silsilah', are one in spirit and all the souls belonging to any of the lines follow the 'Tarikat' presounded by Sheikh Ahmad Raza'adi. The Shah is of the view that the Shah is the ideal that is given within a definite shape in the form of 'Tarikat'.¹ and thereafter souls of different spheres follow it. Such mysticism takes the example of mysticistic men who did not belong to the Qadiriya line, yet claimed to be following the discipline of Qadiriya order (Silsilah). Thus the source of soul discipline is one and he is Sheikh Ahmad Raza'adi.²

1. In his soul discipline servitude to God is the first. It is indispensable for him, in the beginning that he should from the core of his heart be servile to the Almighty, the core of servitude is the faith and the source of faith in all the comprising of the prophet and the companions of

1. 'Tarikat' is the inner aspect of 'Shariat'.

Shariat as we know is the law of Islam and every Muslim irrespective of brotherhood follows it. All the souls have their inner lives of life and the loyalty of them is known as 'Tarikat'. It is understood that they know the secrets and that they have achieved union with God, in otherwords, communion in Him.

the competition. In the first stage of his travel a Sali or Traveller should not indulge himself in the fascination of the five stages of existence as described by Mahatma Mujid - Essence of God, sensation of unity, world of souls, world of ideas, world of Nature. The Samskrit is advised not to contemplate even those as they are complex, multi-faceted and difficult to acquire. By this indulgence he then he may be facilitated from the right path of faith.

The traveller should also take a note of the fact that if he is not able to understand the traditions he should only study any one of the four schools - Jurisprudence (Dharm) and be its staunch believer. And if he has the ability to comprehend the tradition he should study them and be guided by them and should also observe the legal complications in the schools of jurisprudence. He should avoid such things and be a simple follower. Thus keeping these things in view a Sali Traveller or Sali should follow the path of simplicity in the beginning of the course of his travel.¹⁰

The second stage in the travel of a Sali is of *Likha Akhar*, sacred and venerable. At this stage a Sali should engage himself in the remembrance of God, recitation of the Holy Quran, prayers, assigned occupations of the seven

of God (sawd) and Maail. Shah Waliullah here clearly points out that different maail have prescribed different sawd and wazail and also different ways to perform them. He specifically mentions the following :

1. Shahih Abdul Qadir Jilani (Qasas uss) prescribes different sawds and wazail in his book 'Qasidat-ul-Talibin'.
2. The Chishti mystics recommended another way.
3. Shahih Abdul Haq Shami proposes the repetition of 'Hameed Bahr'.
4. Mir Qasim Ali Nadwi prescribes his own 'Maail'.
5. Shahih Shahrullah Saharwardi advocates for his Maail.
6. Imam Ghazali in his book 'Ihya ul Uloom' approves of another way of 'Maail'.¹¹

Shah Waliullah very weakly supports the way prescribed by Ghazali.

In the second place a translation of this stage should give Maail from all sides. He should in particular not indulge himself in the details of small things about hypocrisy. Regarding it he should believe in and follow whatever is written in the book of tradition and sunnah. His going in its details will certainly turn him. He explains it by giving an example of a child afraid of a wolf.

Contrary to this his father, should have taken all the steps to keep out his feet from the animal. In this case may a well indulging himself into the details of hypocrisy and dissimulation fall a victim of the fright concealed therein. Thus like the child he must keep himself aloof of them.¹²

In order to refrain from it a traveller requires training and his training lies in the transcendence of almighty and the servility of man. At the time of recollection to God he should completely be absorbed in the so that he is not able to think of any thing other than God. In addition to this he should be taught to contemplate over the high and lofty objects of the world instead of thinking over the low and ordinary ones. Moreover, the traveller must not have ideas for wealth and the other worldly things. It is to be removed gradually. When he is engaged in the contemplation and meditation nothing should disturb him. In addition to this, he should cultivate in him the love of God, and it should be an intention that when he pronounces that he loves God, his heart should witness his pronouncement.¹³

In the third place Shah salasilah again emphasises on the importance of 'awrad' and 'mawrid' by recommending

that some of the gaffs belonging to the Nagabhadra line do not think them to be necessary for them. Yet still that is all the view that he is stating in way of an *apavāda* and *āvaraṇa* beneficial. He argues that Kṛṣṇa Nagabhadra has not challenged the validity of 'amaras and vaṇas' but he has only not prescribed any specific way of their pronunciation and performance. He recommends the way prescribed by tradition. In his opinion Kṛṣṇa Nagabhadra has done it because he took it as a matter of expediency. As it is better to follow the tradition when there is a great difference of opinion regarding anything Kṛṣṇa Nagabhadra considering it a problem of this nature related it to the tradition and preferred to act in accordance with it.¹⁴

The fourth stage in the ritual of a *gaurī* is prayer or worship. A *gaurī* must spend most of his time in the worship of God. That *milakish* suggests to perform fifty 'rakṣas' of prayer in a day. In addition to this, a *gaurī* should also perform the remembrance (*ākarṣa*) and *vaṇas*. He is also suggested to be conversed in connection with God. Regarding the dress the *gaurī* is of the view that he should be seen in the garb of his status and profession. Sumarāṇḍī 19, in his opinion, a *gaurī* must follow all the duties as

and which consist in the five cardinal principles namely

faith, Karam, Saad, Zakat and Hajj.¹⁵

Shah Waliullah has often spoken of the importance of the remembrance (zikr) of God. It has been repeated because it is the basis of safiya as its foundation is a safi the love of God, and the love of God is the counterpart for a safi to reach the goal. In the preceding lines the Shah speaks of the way in which the remembrance of God is to be made. The first and the most important thing regarding it is the testimony. At that time he should not think of any other thing except God. A safi should make all his efforts to bring himself into this state. In order to prepare himself he is recommended to read love stories, listen to music and do things of this sort.¹⁶

Regarding the remembrance (zikr) of God, as the Shah points out, three things are to be kept in mind. The first one of them is the way in which it is to be made - consisting in the shaking of head, striking at the heart and pronouncing $\frac{1}{\text{sub}} \text{ji} \frac{1}{\text{li}} \text{ya}$ (there is nothing to be worshipped except God) in the proper way. The second one of them is the controversy regarding the remembrance loudly (zikr jali) and the remembrance silently (zikr khafi). The sufis of Naqshbandiyya order reject the remembrance loudly but Shah Waliullah very strongly approves of it. He is of the

opinion that Shamsa Nazafshad himself did not outrightly reject it but only profected the latter to the lower. Moreover, he asserts that the Shamsa being a great soul had a transcending effect on his remembrance and he could achieve by it all that designed by others, but they do not. Thus for others remembrance merely is mere than indispensable. The third one is that is the difference between remembrance and contemplation. As Shih Mullaish says relating to other souls that are not related, there should, therefore, be something to bridge the gap and relate the two. Establishing a relation between them is necessary in our opinion for verbal proclamation should not be full and its leading to contemplation is a must. It is never stands necessary that the remembrance and the contemplation should be related. Shih Mullaish bridge in remembrance by heart - 'Hikre Qalbi' - so relate the two and justifies its importance and existence as spring by the tradition :

.....

[When the believers see as good is good to God].¹⁷

The next stage in the travel of a soul is the reflection. At this stage a soul should devote himself to the reflection of God. The stage follows the state of

less and solitary. In order to engage himself in meditation a seeker must be in the state of absorption. It means that he should be kept in the remembrance of God. Realization means that a soul should see the divine light in all the objects of the world. He should be kept so much in it that he is unable to see anything other than the divine light. It is worthwhile to mention here that it is the stage when saints like Nanak Wali[pronounced 'anal har' (I on the earth)] and Harid[pronounced 'harbi on ear (ear)'] (only on I a has great is my glory). Shah Waliullah is of the opinion that having seen God in all things a soul in the next stage should visualize the divine light as separate from the objects of the world. Disengagement between the two is possible only in the state of unionism.¹²

To begin with, a soul should start his meditation by suggesting himself in every possible way from one variety desires and sensual pleasures. Now Shah Waliullah speaks of the course of meditation. Many of the saints have recommended different ways of meditation. Meditation is however voluntary. It gives a soul a tremendous power to penetrate into the things having an objective existence. For instance, some of the saints in their meditation see their ideas in objectified form. Shah Waliullah is of the

opinion that meditation to God is the only describable goal of a wali. It is the one permitted by Shariah. Explaining it he asserts that attention is essential for meditation. He categorizes the attention as attention to the name and attention to the named. Attention to name is like the pulse with pulse is beating and each of them being disjoined from one another and attention to the named is continuous like a cover sewing thread or a sound continuously heard. Having achieved this state of mind the latter type of attention a wali gets a great power, he is able to penetrate into the secrets of the world, and his heart, mind and senses speak of the knowledge revealed in meditation.

We have discussed the stages in the travel of a wali, we shall now take up the obstacles barring a wali to go on the way to his desired travel. These hindrances stand in his way as the dialectical enemies but a spirited and true wali overcomes these obstacles and proceeds on his way.¹⁹

The most important of them are the ideas and temptations. It is often noted that concentration is difficult and a man is disturbed by the new ideas. Similar is the case with temptations. They also occupy a greater part of the human mind. It is thus more than

essential that a grill for when concentration is a regulated requirement need do away with those ideas and temptations. Shah Waliullah thus suggests measures for doing away with them, but before he he should speak of his classification of those distracting ideas and temptations.³⁰

He classified them into two categories. In the first category he includes the ideas and temptations admitted willingly. In them he includes the ideas and temptations like to have a jar full of honey and having a good heard of cows from one's own. Such day dreaming and false imagination is very common but for a saint it is necessary to avoid them. However Shah Waliullah also includes the logical discussions of how and why in this category. We are not concerned to debate the validity of the logic of things and ideas. He speaks of them from the point of view of afflict and out of its stupidity. A grill in the course of his travel has to begin from stomach faith, and logically does shake it. The second category consists of the usual and occasional ideas which enter the mind and disturb the will. He should also be conscious of them and avoid them effectively. Another equally important hindrance is the study on superstitions. A saint reaches this state due to many causes. Shah Waliullah mentions

them and also suggests the measures for their avoidance. The third one of them is indigestion. It should be immediately be overcome by treatment. The second one of them is pollution. If a scholar is profane, he loses respect and although he should always have a bath and clean himself. Thirdly committing sins also causes worries and anxiety. A traveller should refrain himself from committing sins. The effect of the evil words and deeds also pollutes the mind of a scholar. He ought to avoid it. The scholar should practice the remembrance of God. Fourthly, the disrespect of great souls and scholars also causes worries and anxiety. The scholar should not indulge himself in any such thing. Fifthly, the love of the world is concealed in him in the form of tendency and he often indulges a self to engage himself in the worldly affairs. In attraction with this he should try to overcome these tendencies. Sixthly, the difficulties and accidents in the course of the travel also sometimes terrify a soul. To overcome these horrors he should take lessons from the life of the souls. In brief, he is advised in this way the diseases hampering his progress in the course of his travel and thereafter follow the necessary treatment. If he feels unable to overcome them his guide (Pir) should come

to his teacher and help him in his progress.²¹

Having given the student Shah Waliullah wants the traveller not to be satisfied and contented with what he often sees in his dream or thinks in the course of remembrance and contemplation or visualises the divine light in the world. Having seen that he thinks to have got something valuable and puts a stoppage here his progress. The Shah therefore wants the traveller to exercise patience at this stage and to go ahead in search his goal. The lights that he sees, if he is fortunate, may be divine lights or the lights of the saints or of the souls of great souls. Some of the souls whom he does not meet give some messages going on which resemble the vision of a particular light. Shah Waliullah does not agree with them. He leaves it to the saint himself.²²

Unity of God (Tawhid) :

In the realm of sufism, unity of God has been a matter of discussion for all its scholars. The Mutawallians, the Asharites and the individual philosophers like Aflakani, Majidi Alf Thani and Shah Waliullah have expressed their views regarding the unity of God. We have discussed Majidi Alf Thani in an earlier section. We shall here content with the views of Shah Waliullah

regarding the problem. But before it we should say a word about Al-Ghazali who has also written on the unity of God.¹ He speaks of the stages of the unity and esoterically he is agreeing with the scheme of the purification and aspiration. Since we have outlined it we should discuss these stages in brief. The first stage of the unity as Ghazali thinks is the utterance of

لا اله الا الله (There is no god but God)

The second stage is of the utterance by the tongue and confirmation by the heart. The third stage of the unity is reached when the unity is seen in oneself. This is the stage of those who are in proximity with God. The fourth stage of the unity is of the annihilation in the unity of God. At this stage one sees no other existence except that of God. This is the stage of the Sufis. In the preceding lines we shall discuss Shah Waliullah and see the impact of Ghazali in his description of the unity of God.

The stages of the travel (suluk) have been discussed. When a salik has passed these stages he has two paths open to him to reach the goal. The one is the path of absorption (jam) and the other of union or travel. We have discussed union previously. We shall now briefly describe absorption

1. Dr. Al-Ghazali's description of unity by
Dr. Muhammad Ali Nadwi, Lucknow.

as *jash*. At the outset Ghaz Mullaish gives a negative definition of absorption or *jash*. He is of the view that absorption does not mean being lost in something. It also does not mean to be something against *Shaykh*, neither it means to lose self but it means the removal of the layers of rationalization of the existence. We should explain it clearly by asserting that existence is perceived in the rationalized form. Absorption, then, means not to take the rationalization. When a saint reaches this stage he is absorbed in the existence and sees it to all things taking it transcending them all. Regarding soul he briefly asserts that it means to create in a saint the state of love, ecstasy and plory.²²

Having defined absorption or *jash* we now come to discuss 'Tashid-e-Afraid' (unity of death). Ghaz Mullaish is of the view that if a saint is absorbed in the existence he should, then, discard his vision in the secrets of death (silence). Having been lost he would come to know by his intuition that all is done by God so that there is no other power but God. Having realized it he would understand that He is the creator of all things and that He is responsible for the movement of all things in the world. We will take it as the sight of puppets which seem to be moving

themselves but actually there is some one else to make them move. Similar is the case with the world. All the movements made by the things are caused by God. It does not mean that one should not believe in the chain of causes and effect as believed in it, as the Shah says, is approved by the creation of the prophet (Muhammad) and rejection of it would mean deviating from the Maṣṣad. However, the door of all doors is God and this is the reality of the unity of deity which is revealed to the Jalid. When he is disturbed in this and the way of being absorbed in this is the predominance of God with the things and by heart; when he has achieved it he becomes dependent and knowledgeable a belief in *كل من الله* (all from God).²⁴

Disputing is further that Sadr al-Shah asserts that unity of deity does mean to consider God to be responsible for the actions like hunger and dismember, health and illness, life and death, prosperity and poverty etc. Thus all such actions are attributed to Him. Not according to the Shah the minute changes in the things should not be attributed to God and should not be included in the periphery of the unity of actions although he says the unity does cover various in philosophy these actions and ask the disciples to pronounce *لا إله الا الله* *في السر والعلانية* meaning

there is no other power except God is the universe. But
 Ibn Arabi holds that as such attainment makes the saint
 realize the unity of existence, meaning thereby that it is
 not the only way to realize it. However, whenever
 realizes the secret of the unity of existence considers the
 world of matter to be the administration of the world of
 heaven and whatever is done in the world of matter is
 taken up by him as the result of the efforts made in the world
 of heaven. He explains it with an example of a ship man
 who by seeing a shadow sailing immediately infers a body
 of which he is seeing the shadow. Similar is the case
 with the one who has known the unity of existence. Thus
 'tashid-e-safai' or the unity of existence is first step in
 the path of sainthood.²⁵

Having discussed the unity of existence he now describes
 the unity of attributes or 'tashid-e-safai'. According
 to him unity of attributes means to see one essence (sai)
 running through all attributes. A saint should be able to
 distinguish the essence and the attributes in which it is
 present. He should realize by intuition and reflection that
 the essence is separate and above the attributes. Thus he
 should be able to see the reality as distinguished from the
 attributes though inherent yet transcendent of all these

attributed. That individual holds that the self, however, should not see any paradox between the reality pervading the attributes and the one outside them. The realization of the reality as one should be made by reflection and intuition. The other way of realizing it is by contemplation. The other way of realizing it is by contemplation. Both the ways are the stages of the realization of the unity of attributes. Its realization by contemplation is a lower stage and by reflection and intuition is a higher one. Repeating the unity of attributes the Bhāṭya asserts that it is like seeing one in all men.²⁶

At the stage of the realization of the reality of attributes the saint realizes his own ego which serves him as a mirror to see the reflection of One reality in all the objects of the world. But he does not stop here. Going ahead he realizes that the reality of the one ego is the one pervading all egos and thus he reaches the source of existence. This is the stage of 'Tatvidya-mukti', or the unity of essence. The unity of essence as discussed here is a step in the path of union.²⁷

A saint usually in the first place realizes the unity of essence, in the second place unity of attributes and in the third place the unity of ego. But there are

some who having realised the unity of actions have an action is the unity of essence. At this stage he knows the reality of realities and is absorbed in it. He also comes to realise that it is this reality which, in a particular determinate, is embodied in his ego or 'me'. This realisation brings him to the state of 'bhava'. Shri Nalinidra calls it the last stage of absorption or *jah* and suggests it is which is a try here for some time.²⁰

All of these are the stages of *jah*. At the first stage the *salik* knows the unity of actions, at the second one the unity of attributes and at the third the unity of essence. At this stage whether or not a *salik* believes in the unity of realities, comes to conclude that in the first stage he had blended the contingent being with the necessary being. The Shri explains it with an example of a man seeing a wild animal in his dream and when he awakes he realises that it was not animal of his own creation. It means that the contingent being is not the part of the necessary being and seeing it as the part of the necessary being is nothing more than seeing something in the dream. Thus in the second stage the *salik* confirms his belief in the transcendence of the reality pervading through all the objects. He also tells that ignorance and transcendence

are same due to veils and when these veils are removed, only remains the *haseen-e-hayat*.²⁹

Shah Waliullah holds that all the souls have to go through these three stages. There may be difference in the stages adopted by them. There may also be a difference of interpretation and a counsel into them would resolve them. There might be shown his tendency of reconciliation in 'Ishkiyy'. To put it in brief, all the souls pass through these stages travelling in the path of just an absorption. Regarding the soul he is of the view that it is a 'soul' and a soul should fully realise it and be bound by it. The Shah also asserts that regarding absorption 'Ishkiyy' is aimed and supporting it by 'Ishkiyy' is aimed' involving the union of souls from the fuzun book of process (Kulliyat) of Im Raddi. After passing through these stages a soul develops a relation (al-wahd). It is of many kinds and will be discussed in the following pages.³⁰

Imam Ghazali has discussed Tawhid haqiqi, tawhid ul-fail in his book 'Ihya' and it shows the complete identity between the intentions (Kashf) of these two great scholars.³¹

In discussing these relations (al-wahd) we deem it essential that we should know the definition of relation as a soul terminology. It explains in explicitly we should

and it is the beginning that these relations, are the acquired attributes of a saint. Defining these attributes or (Mishkat), Shah Waliullah asserts that it is a state acquired by saint by doing something repeatedly. He repeats it so many times that it becomes his attribute and the state created by the attribute is one acquired by him. In other words we can say that he likes to live in that state and loses his egoism and egotism. Having acquired that particular attribute he becomes its master and like the angel it becomes a part of his individuality. Explaining it we should say that as the angels have some attributes, so also man have a saint but it is acquired by his own efforts. These attributes are of many kinds. Explaining it otherwise Shah Waliullah asserts that there are many ways for a saint to present himself before God, one of them is the path of love and devotion and the other is of self mortification. It depends on the will of a saint to choose any one of them. Travelling on any path would result into the creation of an attribute. Apart from it the repetition or 'sawab' and the waqaf prescribed by the saints also serve the same purpose. They are performed with a view to purifying the heart and or 'sawab-e-qadim' and when the heart is purified, it acquires an attribute

in accordance with the repetition on 'saint' and the way chosen by a saint. The attribute does not only reform the soul but also becomes its end. Thus the soul becomes its leader and when it reaches this stage it is said to have acquired an attribute, i.e. 'saint'.³²

Coming a step ahead Shah wilayah clearly points out that the repetitions and the magali are not the only ways to acquire any of these attributes. Certainly it is this he holds that the companions of the prophet adopted other ways to acquire them. Out of them he mentions some ways of their acquisition. For example, as he reports acquired them by praying to God with all love and devotion in isolation. Besides, they always remembered death. The very idea of it did not let them fall in love with the world and its attractions. Moreover they always kept in mind the reward and punishment for their actions as provided by God. They also recited the Holy Quran and comprehended its meanings. Apart from it they repeated the least softening traditions and heard preachings and sermons, i.e. 'sunnat-wilayah'. Thus to Shah wilayah these were the ways adopted by the companions of the prophet to acquire these attributes.³³

The other ways of the acquisition of the attributes

are the fear of God, Chasteness is God, true dreams,
honesty and ingenuities. and having passed through
all these stages the mystic comes to the stage of 'I am
all sleep.'²⁴

We have discussed the nature of the attitudes. We
find ourselves now in a position to deal with the kinds
of attitudes. Shri Yuktesh is broad categorical division
these attitudes into two kinds and thereafter discusses
various attitudes under them. By his classification he
takes the categories as (1) attitudes related to absorption
or Jash and (2) Attitudes belonging to 'sargat' and 'nirgati'.
Instead of discussing one longer Shri Yuktesh first takes
up the latter.²⁵

Attitudes relating to Sargat (continued stages of God)
and Nirgati (relative stages) :

The first of these attitudes is the one relating to
piety. Explaining it the Shri asserts that the attitude
of piety is the one resulting from discipline. Having
had a bath, worn clean dress and made devotion (meditation) one
begins himself in a state of calm and peace. This calm
and peace is not due to his being any because of his soul
which has a tendency to favour piety and when a man is
alone, his soul has its tendency realized and the realization

these acts brings him in the hands of being pious and if he does the contrary he loses nothing. His heart is filled with representation and his soul remains dissatisfied and discontented. He remains in this unhappy state as long as he does not do in accordance with the tendency of his soul. In other words he should say that unless he becomes pious his soul is not satisfied. It wants that pious state to a tendency in his soul and he should act in accordance with it to keep it in a state of satisfaction, relief and release.²⁶

Having explained the tendency of piety the irascible or 'gall' between the people of the world. He comes the again lighter; he experiences divine knowledge like the virgin. He visualizes himself in the path of purity. He feels himself one with the people and when he is dead, according to Shah Waliullah, he is included among the people in the ray of judgment.²⁷

Having described the attributes of piety Shah Waliullah prescribes the way of its attainment. He suggests that a irascible should go to solitude, have a bath, wear shalwar and pray to God. He should keep on repeating 'I am, he is, he is' and should engage himself in the remembrance of God by getting rid of all worldly desires, ideas and distractions.

Having done it repeatedly he should carefully study himself and see if he finds a difference between his present and previous state. And if he finds difference he should take himself to have obtained the attributes of piety. The Shakh cautions the traveller that the recommended steps must result to yield the desired goal.²⁶

Shah Waliullah points out that both t.a. (fasts) and abstinence are not the only ways for the attainment of piety. Besides these are, wearing and using clean dress and tidiness, visiting the mosques and other holy places, remembering spiritual lessons and the prophets, offering the charity (zakaat), doing good, at the time of sleeping, making a remembrance of God ten several times in the day and before sleep at night and some of the other ways are also necessary to attain it. The traveller is advised to adopt as many of them as possible. Shah Waliullah also points out the obstacles in the way of piety. He is of the view that calling God names in the mosques and temples, too much engagement in the worldly affairs, negligence of prayers and remembrance of God and being cruel to humanity and gathering unnecessary wealth - stand as bars in the way of attainment of piety. The traveller (the saint) should avoid all of them and should not let them to be

obstacles in his way.³⁹

The second of these attitudes is the one related to tranquillity (*śānta*). The *śākhā* comes to it as the attribute of selfish. The other *śākhā* to denote it he sets the right of servants (more fast). The *śākhā* describes this attitude into three parts. The first one of them is the tranquillity of remembering (*śānta* *smaraṇa*). The traveller attains it by remembering God in his prayers, and facts. All of these facts which is then a particular enjoyment which the traveller gets by performing them. Repeated performance of these acts brings him in a state in which his soul becomes capable of attending to the secrets of the world of heaven. When the traveller has attained it, he feels satisfied and contented and if he fails to remember God and to perform these acts his heart is agitated; his mind feels application and his soul is agitated. He remains in this state as long as he does not return to the performance of these acts. Returning to them he again feels satisfied and is able to attend to the secrets of the world of heaven.⁴⁰

Having described the tranquillity of remembering the *śākhā* comes to get forward the way of its attainment. The last way, as he suggests, is the full comprehension of the

tradition : *استجاب للمعذرة من ربي ما ركب*

[I divided fault between He and My needs, i.e. mankind].

The traveller should have a faith that God heeds and responds whatever is said in the prayers and remembrance. He, the traveller, is responsive to the sixth line of the 'Ghurah Fatiha' verifies and makes assertions about his prayer. In the same way God heeds and responds to every assertion of his creature. The traveller should, therefore, check himself in his remembrance, and then he will see his soul capable of attending to the secrets of the world of heaven.⁴⁴

The second phase of this attribute is the inclusion of mercy (*ghumla rahmat*). Explaining the inclusion of mercy Shah Waliullah asserts that the soul having attained the capacity of receiving inspiration (*ilham*) gets a specific power. The Shah does not name it but only says that it distinguishes the animal tendencies from the soul. Such a power must be angelic in nature and as it is, from the animal tendencies become angelic. It is one of the stages of the human soul and having attained it the soul becomes pure and clean.

Shah Waliullah also speaks of the way with which

it is to be achieved. In the first place the traveller

must have a staunch faith in God which should be expressed in his actions. He should devote his life in accordance with the principles God has laid down and should also submit himself with all humility and servitude before the will of God. And in the second phase the traveller should seek his body and senses (Jewaria) habitual of doing the deeds which are recognised in the world of angels. What Halliday is of the view that the deeds in the world of angels are present in the world of angels in the form of images. He explains it by saying that as a man wishing to make a table imagines its design and visualises it as actualised without its objective existence, the deeds, in the same way, before being actually performed remain present in the world of angels.⁴²

Now the question arises as to how these actions are present in the world of angels. What Halliday in answer to this question gives two reasons. The first of them is that the pious and saintly men have been doing these deeds and their actions have been held high in the world of angels. And since these actions have been favoured by God, their forms have been preserved. The other reason that he gives in its support is that the deeds of pious and doing men are preserved in the world of angels after

their death. We have elsewhere pointed out that the *Shah* is of the view that the divine can affect their death and included among the people and since they are included, *Ishah* actions can also preserved. and thus he supports preservation of actions in the world of people. Having given a preamble to the inclination of Marq the *Shah* comes to define it. Beginning with it he says that at the time of the resurrection of our is the stage we can be the party during the course of remembering ourselves only beginning from the people and when a man remembers God his heart is filled with divinity. His remembrance is created in the world of people and if he remembers him with more devotion the people and if he remembers him with more devotion the people receives it and when he remembers him with still more devotion it reaches the world of heaven (*haxiratal qota*) and there it becomes the part of the divine light present over there. The tradition of the prophet 'when the people climb with is the merited faith why' is a clue towards this very fact. Thus we can say that by inclination of Marq the *Shah* means the inclination of the resurrection in the divine light in the world of heaven (*haxiratal qota*).⁴²

It is also noticed at the same time that as a traveller

remembers God, he is surrounded by a divine light. It is not necessary that such a gift is given in the prayers. Even without it, as the Shah thinks, it can be departed. He also holds that there are many kinds of shadiazs such as offering sacrifices, visiting the sick, taking care of 'Kashas', running between 'jalis and istisnas' and going with the funeral procession that can bring this gift in the person performing them.

Having defined it he comes to discuss its attainment. Regarding it he says when a traveller performs the actions mentioned above his soul gradually becomes divine. It becomes capable of admitting the divinity in it and when it acquires this capability the divine light envelops his soul and thereafter the soul becomes lighted. Defining this divine light Shah Waliullah refers to this verse of the Quran from 'Quraan-Majeed' سَيِّدُ زُورِهِ كَشْفُورُهُ قَبِيحٌ مَبْجُورٌ which means the divine light is like a lamp put in an arch. The divine light illuminates the soul and when it is illuminated its actions become the acts of God and whatever the man performs is done by Him. It is this last indicated in these traditions :

"I become the ears, eyes, hands, feet of the devotee and whatever he does is done by me." and that :

"I have that proximity which is attained by the devotee by fulfilling his duties". Thus the inclusion of mercy is attained by the pious deeds and the remembrance of God.⁴⁴

The third phase of the attributes of called (ishlah-e-sa'at) is in which the light of the divine names in the soul is the traveller. Shah Waliullah is of the view that the divine names whether in unity (Haail) or diversity (Mumadilat) have a light akin to them. He holds that the divine names are present in the world of ideas and on the basis of his own experience he asserts that the body of Divine names comes from the world of ideas. Their inspiration is from the world of unity and their soul is their own attributes categorised as essential names (Haail) such as 'alight', 'rahman' and eternal attributes (alif-e-ladai) such as 'ghar' (highly) 'karamah' (unassailable power). Each of these divine names in the world of ideas is the embodiment of a divine light.⁴⁵

The soul admits the light of the divine names. When the traveller with all devotion remembers that, the remembrance fills his heart with a specific light and the heart receives its true population. When they are repeated the light becomes brighter and even clear. It is therefore that the prophets came when their followers

is laid around of the words and their sense according
 in their prayers. The form illumines the soul and as soon
 as the words are pronounced a divine light is laid by
 the devotees. Thus the repetition of the divine names
 illumines the soul. The devotees must be clear about
 their images as well. The sūtra following in the
 continuation of the names of God are of the view that
 the recitation of any one of the names helps the soul
 as the devotee is associated with the image of the name
 in the world of ideas. When he gets associated with it
 he visualises the light therein and unites his soul
 with it. Thus his soul is enveloped by the light of
 the divine name he repeatedly recites. Similar is the
 case with the prayers and meditations. Their repeated
 performance results in him the divine light this is light
 and it becomes the element of the soul of the devotee.
 Thus at this stage i.e., when the divine light becomes
 the element of human soul the devotee attains the
 attribute of united (yuktah bhaktah) and becomes the
 source of bringing the power of God in his world of soul
 and of matter.⁴⁶

This attribute can be obtained by remembering the
 name 'Akshat', by thought alone. At the time of

concentration the devotion must be pure and free of all thoughts other than that of God. The path is continued about the fact that the repeated and regular practice of remembering the name of 'Allah' with its right pronunciation will help the devotee to attain this attribute. During the course of the remembrance he should also attend to the light of the word of 'Allah'. It can not be attained by offering the prayers (salat) to God. To attain it by this way the devotee must devote his prayers but increase the number of 'rukua's. After every one rukua the shition it testifies. He, by the regular practice, will however attain the attribute.⁴⁷

Shah Waliullah says that those who do not believe in offering prayer (salat) are categorically wrong. Prayer is one of the ways of the attainment of this attribute. Those who deny its necessity are not aware of the validity of remembrance. The attribute of belief (ishqat-e-vaqifa) can be achieved either through the world or through the stages of the lands in the world of ideas or through the divine light of the divine names. Each of the sources is equally important and beneficial and all of them are included in shodhana. Some of the shodhanas have some of the images and others some of the divine

lights of the divine names. The traveller can however choose any one of the means to attain the attribute of relief.

In the conclusion the Shah points out that at the day of Judgment there will be no distinction between the *majnun*,¹ and *Qasbiha**junk*. He is of the view that a *majnun* attains *barzakh* just for his sake and does not acts as a source for the attainment of any other thing. On the day of Judgment the criterion of distinction in the *barzakh* will be the progress of relief. The Shah, in the end depicts that the people are away from this difficult feeling that is interfere with their work but they do not know that the prophet and his companions had attained this attribute. Thus in Shah's view the attribute of relief is very important as a source of forgiveness (laughter).⁴⁰

Having described the attribute '*Sakina*' we now come to discuss the attribute concerning '*Qasbiha*'. This attribute of *Qasbiha* is in between the attribute of *Takara* and attribute of *Sakina*. Each of the actions and stages has its own tendency and there is a great difference

1. *Majnun* is a person who is overwhelmed by his state (Jash) & does not know in his rational condition.

between tendencies of the bodily actions and that of its spiritual states. The travellers transcending themselves from the world of matter into the world of higher souls reach that high and it is therefore these souls are in proximity with other souls of higher degree. The proximity is possible only when they have got rid of the attachment with the worldly desires and impious ideas. Having attained this proximity the souls are absorbed in the states of the world of heaven and then they become eternal. With a view to impious if the High gives the example of a balloon which even after being in water is not touched. Similar is the case with the soul which has remained proximally and soared into the higher spiritual state. The retained proximity may either be with the souls of the angels, of the prophets or of the sages. That is yet another question to be attended.

Each of it depends on the relative things. He will have proximity of whatever he is attached with. The that explosion of saying that sometimes it so happens that a saint due to his love, attachment, contemplation or natural inclination gets proximity with the soul of a particular saint. To have obtained this proximity is the Gnostic concern and when it is attained, the traveller

became aware of the secrets of the world. He has the knowledge of God and His four attributes namely, cognizance (Itke = It is bringing into existence of anything from non-existence), creation (Khalaq). It is to bring into existence of anything through causation), indur, and Ishtai. The traveller with the help of this attribute also knows the secretisms known about the world in 'hastat qade' - the world of heaven. Shah Waliullah here writes about his own experience. He says when he attended in the world of souls he saw the souls of people such as of Jibrail and Michael and also saw the souls of some souls entered in souls fifty. One that is of the view that this attribute is particularly obtained by the prophets and it was with the help of this attribute that they had the knowledge of the world of heaven and of God as well. All that is about 'maise aqil' and at this stage the attribute is obtained with the souls of higher kind like that of Jibrail and Michael etc.⁴⁹

Shah Waliullah writing about his own experience asserts that in the world of souls he also saw the 'maise aqil' - souls of lower kind - and the souls of aqil. Some of the travellers obtained the Qasida attribute with the souls of aqil and having obtained they are placed

aspire to dreams and have the knowledge of the work done by them. These souls are absorbed in them. Some of the transcendentalists divide souls into attributes with the work of the soul. They see that in the dream and are attached to them. Those having obtained the ultimate attributes with the souls either of higher kind or lower kind experience a similar state but those assimilated in the matter (have full faith) experience different states. However, some of the common ones are the love and the soul of a particular soul giving respect to his occurrence, going to his grave and offering 'sodha'.⁵⁰

Having obtained this attribute the soul sees that what is done to them is to be concerned with, say it be a prophetic, spiritual or self soul. He is so very much attached with it that he takes all the work done by him the death of that soul. In all the difficulties he sees the help and when solved he takes them solved by the concerned soul. Due to the intensity of attachment the concerned soul becomes the element of his soul and he thinks nothing other than that soul. He understands different aspects about the soul in the state of sleeping and waking. That realization is at its view that there was a time when the state of the soul was done with the souls of the saints and holy people

obtained the Qasbiya attribute with them. This attribute is not acquired but it is god-gifted attribute. In the recognition of this attribute Shah Waliullah, again, speaks of the world of ideas. We have mentioned it elsewhere as well. The Shah is of the view that whatever is present in this world has its form in the world of ideas and each one of the objects is attracted towards its form. Regarding prophet Muhammad he says exactly that before his coming in this world his form was present in the world of ideas and when he came in the world, his form was revealed.⁵¹

After prophet Muhammad, as Shah Waliullah holds, Ali was the first to have obtained this attribute. It is therefore that all the sufis belonging to any order established a relation with him. Shah Waliullah himself admits that any such assertion cannot be historically justified. But even after that Ali is the rank to the prophet for all the sufi orders except Naqshbandi order. After him comes Abdul Qadir Jilani who also is said to have obtained this attribute. The sufis of the Baya to obtain this attribute seek proximity either with the greatest, Ali or Abdul Qadir Jilani. In addition to this, many of the sufis have obtained this attribute with the heads of all sufis. In such a situation they are made

attention leaped in different forms, not the attention is imaginary for it is created by immediate causes like the love of the wife. After the lapse of time his love is easy is extinguished and he was is increased. Thereafter his attention is visualized in a particular form. Writing about his own experience the Shah describes the essence of the situation in a particular soul. He is of the view that the effect of the attention is a particular soul diminishes the power of the actual immersion and they adopt the values of the divine technologies. Explaining it he asserts that after some time the physically actual his soul is completely removed and it becomes its abstract in itself. and at that time when it is attended to the abstract separated from the physically (Kama) affects the attending soul of the wife, and since it is divine it makes the other divine as well. To explain it even explicitly the Shah gives the following example. It is like the net which removes physically from the water to the standing soul is like a tank surrounded by the air and when it is surrounded it gives all alike the sun. In the same way the divine abstracts removes actually (shakimyat) from the standing soul and surrounds it with all its divinely around.³²

In the conclusion of Omala's attributes, Shan Melilish speaks of the ways of contemplation (¹ *managala* [*managala*]). To him there are two ways. The first of them is that the traveller attending to a soul should think of the state of his own soul after his death. At this stage he should visualize all the possible states of his soul. The attention is to be paid in the manner as the height of the sun is measured by the instrument or as the fate is seen in the mirror. The other way of the attention is to sight the grave of a particular soul. There he should think of his soul. It will be revealed to him and he will have the knowledge of all his states. Here again he asserts that the prophecies were sent by God. They had their attribution with the angels assigned with different duties in the world. The prophets had the knowledge of all things. They read not even anything in the world. They were told all about it by God with the help of revelation. Thus their knowledge was complete. In the end he asserts that the followers of Vedanta shaped who try to understand the prophets in the context of their philosophy are actually not aware of the concept of prophethood.³³

Having described the attributes of a saint we should add a word to make it more evident. The Omala attributes

in the proximity with the world as it is proximately with the proposition, *aspiratio* or *unfi* *aspiratio*. It is, as the *Shah* says, an attribute resulting between the attribute of piety and the attribute of relief. How far the proximity is possible is not a question for our discussion as it is a matter of well experience and a well experienced cannot objectively be verified. He however, very philosophically explains it and describing it as one of the important attributes of a saint.

We have so far been discussing the attributes concerning to *aspiratio* or *unfi* of a saint (traveler). At the outset we have explained that there are some kinds of attributes intervening in the realm of '*Jaah*' (absorption). We now turn to describe these attributes.

The first one of these attributes is concerned to *amariy* and as is agreed as the '*attributes of amariy*'. *Shah Valiullah* has been discussing it somewhere that when we see something or word is born about it we form its image in our mind. The knowledge of the thing is, as a matter of fact, the knowledge of its image in our mind. And having attained its knowledge we completely forget its image present in our mind. Explaining it more explicitly he gives two examples. He is of the view that it is like giving something

through glass. When we see something through glass we become aware in rather unconscious of the glass and we take it as being perceived directly by the eyes. The other example that he offers is of some one seeing the shade of trees in the water. When he is lost in seeing it he forgets the agency of water in which it is seen. Similar is the case with the image of a thing in the mind. Though it helps in the acquisition of the knowledge of the thing yet it is completely forgotten when the thing is known. The *Shih* seems to suggest that although the agencies like the glasses, the water and the image are not taken into account yet they do exist and drawing them to attention does not make them cease their existence. Regarding the acquisition of the knowledge through images there exists a difference of opinion between the schools. The *Shih* points out that the old masters think that the image only functions as with the thing to be known and the *shien* men are of the opinion that before knowing something the image is formed and the image formed and the thing known are one and the same. The *Shih* belongs to the second category of scholars and shares their opinion. Now there are two ways in which something is known. There are the means which the acquisition of knowledge passes through.

In the first place the thing is known through its image and the image loses its identity into object. It is the knowledge of the object. In the second place the image is known through the thing and the thing loses its identity. It is the knowledge of the knowledge (ilmulilm). The latter state is more important for having reached it the man understands the former one as well. Thus the knowledge of the objects, be they abstract or special, can be acquired in these ways.³⁴

Having spoken about the acquisition of the knowledge of the objects the next comes in the knowledge of God. He is of the view that the divine light is seen in its objective forms but to visualize them the intellect should detach himself from the worldly desires, and since the complete darkness is retained in the sleep, he sees the divine light in objective form in his dream. And it is not necessary. He can see these forms even in the state of consciousness provided his soul is segregated. When he sees the divine light in its objective form he aspires to obtain its knowledge. Now there comes a question as to why the divine light projects itself in forms. Explaining it the text asserts that man has two powers namely the power of imagination (*tasawwuf*) and the power of fancy

(ashim). The power of imagination presents the abstract objects in bodies for instance the shapes (shams) and farantly are seen in the embodiment of a wild animal and greed and temptation is visualized in the body of snake. The power of fancy removes the colours and shapes from the objects and presents them in their meaning. Regarding the function of this power the ghaz writes that it helps in recollection. He, for example, had seen a person in the past and wishing to recall him in the present we see his face which is general and can be applied to many other persons but we keep on recollecting until we recall the face of the person. Now it is a particular one and cannot be applied to any other than him. Thus the imagination gives objectivity to the meanings and the fancy gives meaning to the objects. In this way the divine light reveals itself before the soul in different projections. But the Ghaz also informs that revealing of the Haki in projections is not necessary. However, he is of the view that the knowledge of God is also gained with the help of the images formed in the mind before the acquisition of knowledge.⁵⁸

Having discussed the two orders to the attributes of sensory. The Ghaz concludes that having established the

stimulus with the unknown or extracted the reality carefully
 attends it it will in course of his attention be conscious
 aware of the reality of the unknown or extracted (highlighted)
 as realized by his own mind. He realizes it either with
 the help of the fancy or the imagination. The fancy
 perceives the reality in a meaningful form and the imagination
 realizes it in the objective form. Any such realization is
 taken by a soul as a divine light and having realized it
 he preserves it and attends to it. The stimulus concerning
 sensory in action was popularized by Chait's husband and
 characterisation established by Chait's husband.

After Chait's husband this stimulus was not
 provided for long. During this time the soul knew the
 attributes of sensory but forgot the state of the 'realized'.
 They only realized God of their faith inspired by the
 religion as the common man but could not reach the
 abstractness. The soul had points but it was there are two
 aspects of this stimulus. The one is related to the
 realization of the reality by the senses (senses) and the
 other is the realization of the unknown as the abstractness
 by the soul. The soul of the time remained at the lower
 stage. They could not be abstracted (fact) to the unknown
 and untraceable which is a higher stage even as by this

attributes. The former is the external aspect and the latter is the inner one.⁵⁶

Describing some of the features of this attribute the Book holds that the one who attains this attribute becomes aware of the existence of eternity and realises the unknown and unsearchable. It is the display of the unknown and the unknown which confirms his belief in the existence of eternity. The soul who attains it acquires a great will power and holds others in its domination. The attribute also helps him to know the secrets of the other persons by his meditation and contemplation.

In discussing this attribute the Book very systematically presents his theory of knowledge which we have discussed in detail in his epistemology.

Moving back with the attribute of unity Book whitish comes to discuss the attribute of the unity. With a view to explaining it he holds that A, B and C are persons. Inspiring into the fact of individuality we come to infer that all of them possess the common and essential quality of humanity which groups them as human beings. And contrary to this we also observe that all these individuals even after being human beings are individuals on the basis of their individuality which consists of

their individual qualities. It is evident that these individual qualities do not make them men. For if, as he contends, they were to make them men, there would have been no difference between them to distinguish them as individuals. It goes to prove that some of its individual qualities is common and essential quality of man. There should, then, be a common and essential quality to what man can and is is, as we have mentioned, namely, that individual will forward yet another reason for their not being common and essential qualities. To this it is categorically wrong that something being asymptotic would, at its own time, be asymptotic to something. The asymptotes exist ahead and can in no case be asymptotic. Here he is quite logical and rational. There comes an important question whether these individual qualities are quite apart from the common and essential quality of humanity. The answer to this question is negative. We mean to say that the individual qualities even after being separated from the humanity to have some kind of contact with it. We can not substantiate it with any strong contention except that we should assert that there is a relation between them as they are present in man. Their being in man is a sufficient proof of their being the

qualities of men. Thus Bush Whilolish contends that because of the separation they are related with humanness. He explains it by saying that for instance one is a black man and the other is white. In the former case we should say that the humanness has taken the form of black man and in other case the quality of humanness has assumed the form of a whiteman. Thus the individual qualities, as he contends, are the externalizing or forms in which the essential or the actual is embodied.⁵⁷

In order to explain the relation between the individual entities and concrete qualities of a man Bush Whilolish chooses an example from the field of science. He slightly advances that if we put a jar of water in heat the water we shall experience that the water after heating up will become steam and thereafter being cold will become water again. How does this change come? Bush Whilolish explains it saying that there is a form of body which exists upon things it makes them what they are. It is because of this form that the matter could assume different forms like those of water and air. He advances that usually air and water are not taken as distinguished into their form and body. But actually speaking they have their forms and bodies. There is no doubt that things are even

In bodies and the bodies, therefore, cannot be separated from the things. Thus there is a relation between the body and the thing although, as we have seen, they are distinguished from one another. It is explained that the body and thing are related. It is, then, indisputable that this relation should have a term and the term, as presented by Shih Hsiieh-shih, is "jssu" (manifestation). He explains it with the example of meeting different things from wax. The wax is made in different forms and shapes. Apparently all these forms exist with wax are different things but in reality they are wax. In addition to this all these things have caused the form present in the mind of their maker. Thus all these things may either be taken as a manifestation of wax in different forms or the manifestation of the form present in the maker's mind. Similar is the case with other things of the world. Though the things in the world are different from one another, but they are the manifestation of the form present in the mind of the almighty God. Thus, being different in their individual qualities are the manifestation of the one - the common and the essential quality. In other words the common or the essential causes different forms and they being different in forms have individual qualities

which are related with the common and the essential in respect of manifestation, and that common and essential in respect of manifestation, and that common and essential in the absolute. For example, is actuality which with the difference of form is manifested and the forms are distinguished on the basis of individual qualities.⁵⁰

To describe it in brief Shah Waliullah arranges a hierarchical order of the universe. He explains it as A is a man. Rationality is his essential quality and the same is present in all men. Thus rationality is the category. And 'jins' (sex) is the actuality which in its designation includes all animals including man. Higher than the actuality in designation is the 'jins-e-sami' which includes all the objects including vegetation. Higher to this is 'ars' (attributed) which includes animals and inanimate objects in its designation. On the top of this hierarchy is the 'Shah' (substance). The scholars, as Shah Waliullah says, comprehended this hierarchy and described it as well but could not understand and explain the relation between the substance and attributes. But the sufis, as he pointed out, did understand it and took to conclude that there is a reality that establishes a relation between them and that reality is the unity

(mahadantya) also named as 'existence' or 'being'. The existence is an indeterminate reality and as it is that exists out, there is no difference in the existence in its determinate or indeterminate form. In the same way there is a hierarchy in the world. All the objects are bound in that hierarchy. The objects like the frog, animals, minerals, clothes etc., are distinguished from each other on two grounds namely their form and their individual qualities. The former distinguishes one kind from the other and the latter distinguishes one individual object from the other. However, in the light of the above discussion we come to the conclusion that the form is different from the object and it is the form which determines and gives the individual qualities to the object. We now divide the objects into many species and each of the species has a form to distinguish it from the other. Thus there are as many forms as species and higher than these forms are the elements and atoms (manas or ahat). These elements and atoms also have a form and that form is the form of body which has also been named as 'the gross matter' or 'sukshma rupa' and the same is known as principal matter (jivat-sadaya). This form of body is called its existence and in this way the whole of the universe is

based in a hierarchy. The relation between the existence and its determinations is explained by such examples by these examples. The existence is like the black points and its determinations are like the letters. He gives this example as the letters are essentially the different forms of the same black points or in other words the black points are the sources of the letters. The existence may be taken as a unity from which all the numbers are derived. The numbers, then, are essentially in the unity. The unity and diversity are explained by the example of a river. The river is not constituted of many waves. They even after being in diversity are present in unity, i.e. in one, the river.³⁴

This above discussion tends to prove that there are two common things in the objects of the world. The first is the existence and second is the form. It is evident that there must be a relation between the existence and the form as that the objects may be created or made. Existence in its pure form depends on nothing. And as a matter of fact it is existence only because it is independent. The existence manifests itself in many forms and each of these forms has its own qualities. It should clearly be understood that the existence does not manifest itself in all the

forms at one and the same time. For its manifestation it takes via form and thereafter from that form the other form gains its existence and thus the chain of forms goes on. But the elements remain the same. Let us say, in other words, the only is not affected by multiplicity. Having described it the Bhāṣya speaks of the two aspects of existence namely the external or apparent aspect and the internal or the real aspect. Explaining these aspects he says that a mathematician at the time of doing different operations of the numbers. It is obvious that these numbers do not exist in his mind before it, and it is he who brings them to existence. Just after that when he gets it nothing, testing theory, he cannot change the qualities of these numbers. He, for example, cannot make the odd even or otherwise. Thus the external aspect of the existence is the bringing of the numbers into existence in the mind and the internal one consists of the natural order of the numbers and their qualities like oddness or evenness.⁶⁰

Having seen the chain of forms and the manifestation of existence we come to infer that these forms as they pass from one qualities must have been pre-arranged in this order by some one which is prior and superior to them.

It is evident from the fact that the qualities of the forms

or Indian cannot be changed. The example of the mathematician regarding his bringing the numbers into existence from non-existence explains the external aspect of the existence and also advocates the pre-arrangement of the qualities of the forms. Apart from it there is something known as existence in which both the aspects are present.

Now comes the question as to what is the reality of such forms known as existence 'wajib', 'haazir', 'Khaarij', 'qain' etc. Some of the scholars took it, as God named it, as unconditional reality and unity. But the Shakh scholars say they are wrong. To him it is a stage of existence which is one of the phases of real existence. This phase of existence is the real side one and is immanent to all the objects of the world. In spite of its immanence to the objects it is not one with them but transcends them all. This existence is also known as the universal soul. As the existence is distinguished from the objects, in the same way God is distinguished from the existence. Let us recall it that the Shakh has already called it one of the phases of existence. It categorically suggests that there are other phases of existence as well and each of them is at a higher stage. The existence is related to the substance and the attributes and thus the things are created. God

exists upon existence through *Deus* - creation out of nothing - it means that *Deus* creates existence out of nothing or non-existence. Creation in this way is '*Deus*' and creation from nothing is '*Quidam*'. Both of them are attributes of God but the former is expressed in the creation of existence and latter in the creation of the world of external objects.⁴¹

The relation between the existence as universal soul and God is that of *Deus*. God is the source or '*quidam*' and existence is created or '*quidam*'. As the reason cannot comprehend the relation between the two it is therefore that they are often taken as one and the same as sometimes the existence is considered as the manifestation of God. The great thinkers neither of them for the reason that the reason is helpless to understand the relation. He, however, is of the view that it is an important problem of religion and should definitely be solved, for without solving it we cannot understand every other problems of religion. Thus it is evident that the perceived unity between the existence and God is not real.

The existence of the universal soul is the essence ('*quid*') of the objects of the world, therefore, it is often explained by the analogy of ocean and its waves. But the

stages from the existent or universal soul to the
 Najibul Majid - necessary existence cannot be explained by
 any such analogy as their state cannot be correlated with
 its help of measure. The only thing about them we know is
 that they are related with God through 'Ibad' and in
 addition it is like we know the reality of existence which we
 call 'Majidul Majid - Najibul Majid'. These deal
 in the only such the existent, the universal soul and
 comprise it as all in all or the only - Shah Waliullah
 seems to suggest that it is a lower stage of the reality,
 The higher one is yet to be reached. He asserts it, as he
 says, that the people with greater vision do reach the
 reality and comprehend it with the help of their intuition,
 regarding relation of the attribute of existence with God.
 Shah Waliullah is of the opinion that an attribute can be
 established except that of 'Ibad' to which he adds the notion
 of attributes (Usul nichat).⁴²

The relation of 'Ibad' is explained with the example
 of the number of Two (4). The figures of two can be
 conceived in more than one way. In the first place the
 figure can be conceived as found in a particular state. It
 seems that we can conceive it as the stage at which it is
 established. In the second place it can be understood as

the sum of two and two. Now the first of our steps is the individual form and the form of the other steps is total of the pair of forms. It is evident that the pair of forms and the form are related with each other but they are not one and the same. In the third stage the individual form is associated with the quality - which makes it the individual figure and thus the individual quality is its essence. In the fourth place we shall conceive the quality of form is form itself and thus the form is necessary it attains the unity of four. In this way each of them is necessary for the existence of our process. We shall in this regard consider the form as the greater 'number' as the source of creation and the two pairs as 'number' so created.

Taking the figure of form as the whole and not considering any details we shall come to conclude that the sum of two is the creation of the form and being as they are related with each other. In the same way the relation between the universal soul to the existence and God can be conceived in many dimensions. It is the difference of the point of view. The followers of Wahdati Majid are not wrong in considering the existence or the universal soul as the unity and those believing in the transcendence of God are also right to consider the unity constituted of the different stages of

existence. To put it in brief, in accordance with the point of view the relation of the two can be world as any one of the attributes. Such Malinich prefers to call it as the attribute of "Bodhi".⁶³

Having described the nature of the relation between the universal soul - *saṃsa bhūtiḥ* - and the world and between the universal soul and God, the poet comes to an important point revealed from the fact that the traveller should not mistake one kind of relation with the other namely thereby that the relation between the universal soul and the world should by no means be applied to the universal soul and the world God for it will be like seeing things with coloured glasses. As we know that seeing with coloured glasses does not give the vision of the real object but it is seen in the colour of the glasses. The traveller should be conscious of the fact and refrain himself from it. At this stage the traveller is annihilated in the state *līnā* 'I am fit let'. If the traveller sees (*manahā*) the universal soul with the lower vision he sees it as unity and he sees it with extra-ordinary transcendental vision he sees God as unity. And if he identifies with the two visions he sees nothing but one, that is to say, that the duality disappears and there remains no other

existences except that of God. It, however, depends on the capacity of the treasurer and the same is stated in the Holy Quran :

وَلِكُلٍّ رِجْلٌ مِّنْ رَّحْمَتِنَا بِمَا سَبَقُوا لِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ

(Each one does in accordance with his capacity. One should try to be more virtuous).

That Waliullah explains is with the example of human beings. Each one of them has his own qualities and capacities and his status is determined in accordance with them. Those having higher qualities reach the state of annihilation and subsistence and those having lower qualities and capacities remain at lower stages.⁶⁴

Having described it in two pages, he explains the attributes of unity (of God) (Tahid). To begin with it he says that there are persons who have the capacity of understanding the unity of existence. They are very much influenced by it and see it in every thing and place that one is in every thing they take it as all in all or the unity of existence. Thus the unity of existence becomes the highest stage of their knowledge and in no case they transcend it. Contrary to this they justify every thing on the basis of their knowledge of this stage. Although they sometimes ponder over the stages of existence but due to their tendency of capacity they prefer to the same

stage. In the beginning of his course a traveller realises the existence in the world. Having seen it in all the objects he obtains his knowledge and gets the capacity or 'māyā' to understand it. According to Shri Mahimānāth there are two stages of this capacity. At the first stage the existence is realised by the sense 'agnau'. To this he calls the external aspect of the knowledge of existence. At the second stage the traveller realises the qualities of existence and is influenced by them. This realisation comes to him with the help of a power lying beyond the senses. To this he calls the internal aspect of the knowledge of existence.⁶⁶

He explains it with the example of a man who having heard a great deal about the utility of existence from the sūfi is convinced of the fact that every object is the satisfaction of its existence. On pondering over it again and again he develops a thorough understanding of this fact but he does not realise it by his intuition. It seems that he has acquired the knowledge but has not experienced it. He, as Shri Mahimānāth says, can be understood as a flooded fish with the water of rain without having a capacity catching from its ground. Thus the one who has the knowledge of the unity of existence (icchāda majidi) is at the stage

of the unity by knowledge (Tashidā Ilmī). And the one who arrives or ascertains the existence from the capacity revealed in his soul is at the stage of unity by state - Tashidā Hall. Shāh Mithlīsh does not favour the unity by knowledge for it provokes discussion and leads to deviation. Contrary to this he very strongly favours the unity by state.

The attributes of unity to say philosophically explained by Shāh Mithlīsh. He very ingeniously justifies it by giving a hierarchy. It is not indispensible that every hierarchy has something on the top and that something on the top is on the one hand the basis of every thing and commanding authority on the other. The holiness of Wahidul Mujib takes the existence as the unity and identify it with god but Shāh Mithlīsh believes in the process of evolution and the source, as he thinks, transcends them all. He does not deny the Immanence but more vehemently advocates the transcendence. Thus unity to him is the source that transcends all. As soft as he thinks, has to realise it and to it develop a concern with it. Putting it in brief, the unity above the existence is the unity.¹⁰

Having explained the attributes of unity the Shāh comes to deal with the attributes concerning to ecstasy. It

order to explain it he, at the outset, discounts the nature of soul and holds that the soul by its nature has a tendency to admit the nature of the conditions which it faces. If, for example, admits the effect of the state of anger, hate, love etc. It is also natural to the view of the human soul that if it admits one sort of vision, its opposite vanishes. The conditions may either be gentle or harsh. The spiritual states of human soul are due to these conditions and these conditions have their own causes. The traveller must remove the causes which create gentle or divine conditions. And when he will have known them, anything related to them or inspiring that state, however small it may be, will have a great effect on the soul of the traveller. It seems that his soul becomes extraordinarily sensitive. But it should also be taken into account that every soul is not equally sensitive. As a matter of fact some of them have no power of sensitivity at all. Travellers having souls like this have to love men and women in the world. The love of man makes them aware of the state of love. The presence of the beloved is a source of relief for them and separation inflicts upon them an agony and anguish. The lover is pleased to see the movements of his beloved. In

short, the beloved is the source of all his pleasure, happiness, excitement, success, griefs and troubles. Being aware of the state of love the traveller then turns from love of man to love of god.⁸⁷

The traveller who begins his journey with the love of man should spend some of his time in listening to music as it has a great effect and produces the state of ecstasy and ecstacy. The lyrics and Shal's words in the company of instructors bring him into the state of ecstasy and he is lost therein. The repetition of the state creates in the soul of the traveller a capacity to absorb the extent of the state, its conditions and its causes. The use of getting ecstasy described in the preceding passage is recommended by the soft and the staunch followers of Shalish do not approve of it. They, contrary to this, insist on listening to the preachings and recitations of the Holy Quran, reading the traditions creating ecstasy and absorbing in the course of worship. To them it is the right path to achieve the state of ecstasy. Shal Shalish is of the view that the traveller may reach the state abruptly as well. Seeing of the river with the waves and white, observing the bloom of the flowers and hearing a scholar writing on also lead to this state.

Considering it that Mahatma speaks of the two aspects namely the external aspect and the internal aspect. The external aspect is a lower stage and in it the traveller finds capture and ecstasy with his senses - 'senses' alone. That is to say that the ecstasy appeals to his senses only. The internal aspect is a higher stage. The traveller reaches it with the help of the soul - 'feelings majoritish'. In it the soul gets one glimpse after the other. It annihilates first in the name of God and thereafter in another. Bhagya described among this internal aspect of ecstasy as 'agha' (contraction) as 'bhak' (expansion). The souls who have attained this distribute the love to souls (lova) and ecstasy (maja) and those who reach the state of annihilation (kaya) and subordination (bhaga) have the knowledge of the secrets of the world and hereafter.⁴⁰

We have described the attributes of ecstasy and loving death with it we come to the attributes of love. Love, as we know, is very important in the progress of savior. It will not be wrong to say that it is its basis. To generalize our contention let us assert that it is actually the love which inspires the traveller to get into the path of his unity with god. It is therefore that all

The sūfi and the scholars of sūfiism have been emphasizing on the importance of love in the achievement of the sūfi goals. Shāh Muḥallish like others has also acknowledged it and translated it as one of the important attributes. Psychologically speaking love is a feeling and feeling depends on attachment. It is, then, indistinguishable, who cannot facilitate to connect the feeling of love to should be attached to object which he is in love with. Shāh Muḥallish very psychologically suggests that the traveller should completely surrender the Almighty and should also have in mind His gifts and boons. The repetition of His name will awaken in him the feeling of love and when it is awakened he will become impatient, and restless. Such a state is a proof of his attachment which certainly is love.

Shāh Muḥallish is of the view that a traveller should think to have attained the attribute of love when his soul is equated with the fire of love. Like many other attributes it also has two aspects namely the external aspect and the internal aspect. The external aspect of the attribute of love is the creation of the state of love in the senses (manā) like other states. We have mentioned it earlier that the Shāh holds that the senses exhibit the effect of the states of the soul. The internal aspect of

this attribute is related to the soul. It is a stage reached by the soul. He is of the opinion that it is created in man even before the creation of the soul. We think that the Shah here means that love of God is in the nature of man. The soul has to realize it.⁶⁴

Referring the delighted Imam Shah Waliullah explains that every object of the world has a tendency which can be called its own characteristic. He gives the example of soil, water, air and fire. Going downwards is the characteristic of soil and water and contrary to this is the characteristic of air and fire. Similar is the case with other objects. He is also of the view that every object is inclined towards the thing it is related and all of them come into existence from one source. They, therefore, incline to it. The inclination is their natural inclination present in their very essence. We know that the diversity comes from the unity and thus the diversity is inclined towards the unity. In the same way the existence of which all the objects are manifestation has a relation with the objects and attraction as well. This relation is not a created one but natural. And this natural relation or inclination is the essential force.

The state of love is pointed out in the first place

exists in the senses (senses) and the original love is mixed with it. This state becomes the body and the essential or original love serves as its soul. To him, a will at this stage, is unable to separate the two and understood them as one. It is because of this circumstance (for that, as Ghob Tullishah thinks, the will itself going themselves on the issue. One group of the wills holds that gentleness and eagerness started to exist for a will who attains qilar (quiet) with balance. The other group holds that the state of eagerness and gentleness continues and shall remain continue even in the illa haara alila. According to Ghob Tullishah the former takes left instead the state of love contained in the senses which after being united should be satisfied and if essence diminished is later it be in the instant. The latter group tries to keep almost the original love which is never extinguished and the lower feels its arousal and severity but then not consider it as instant.⁷⁰

He then points out two important facts regarding the recognition of the attributes of love. For him both the things namely the state of love contained in the senses and the original love are necessary. The original love may be suppressed due to many reasons and one of them is

the traveller's observation of the existence in all things of the world. He then takes it all in all and the original love of God is largely suppressed. Contrary to this the creation or awakening of the state of love is also essential and it is possible by the detachment from the worldly desires. The object of love like a will should not be anything other than God. We have discussed different attributes concerning in various states of a will. We consider it necessary to point out that it is not by any way indeterminate that a will would have attained only one attribute. The attainment of the one state results into the achievement of the other with a difference that the one is the fruit of his own efforts and the other being its result is achieved by him as a consequence. To understand it clearly we can say that a will bearing attained the attributes of love would consequently acquire the attribute of duty. And the same is the case if it is otherwise. It is evident, then, that one attribute follows the other. Now it is known, that the will regards possessions as gifts of God which he does not strive for. We should also note it clear that the attainment of these attributes categorically depends on the natural inclination of a will.

CHAPTER - V

JOSH WATSON'S ETHICS

Reading with the ethics of Josh Watson it should be borne in mind that his ethics is rooted in his metaphysics. Surveying the history of media philosophy in particular and philosophy in general we come to conclude that ethics of the most important philosophers is steeped in their metaphysics. As we have seen before but let us find ourselves in some of the examples as that our contention may be supported. Plato builds his ethical philosophy on the basis of his metaphysical theory of ideas. Aristotle erects the edifice of his ethics on the basis of his theory of form and matter which ultimately is his metaphysics. Similar is the case with the phenomenists like St. Augustine, Aquinas and Aquinas whose ethics is based on their metaphysics. Apart from them, all the philosophers propounding idealism have based their ethics on metaphysics. Even the Postmodern Philosophers like Spinoza could not separate ethics from metaphysics. It is clear, then, that ethics of the ancient, medieval and modern philosophers is tinged with metaphysics.¹

The ethics of Mediaeval philosophers, as we have said, is rooted in their metaphysics. In my opinion there are two reasons for this. The one is clear and the other is vague. The clear one is the influence of the Greek philosophers on the Mediaeval philosophers. We need not argue much to support the assertion. It will suffice to say that Alfarabi, Averroes, Ibn Sina, Ibn Arabshah, Ghazali and Ibn Rushd studied Greek philosophy very extensively. The earlier ones were influenced with the Greeks to the extent that they followed them in composing their systems. But Ghazali was the only one who wrote a book called 'Tahafut falasifa' (Incoherence of the Philosophers) in which he rejected many of the notions held by Greeks for long. He, for example, refuted the correspondence theory of causation and propounded his own theory called as the sequence theory of causation which later on was also advocated by him. As ethics comes out of metaphysics in Greek philosophy, so it does in the Mediaeval philosophy. To me it is clear though it is rather yet a vague one, for Ghazali, whose ethics is also derived from metaphysics, was not influenced by the Greek philosophers. There is yet another reason, and it is stronger and categorical, for it is difficult to deny it and to lie is the fact that the

ethics of the Quran has its source in metaphysics. The Muslim philosophers being the followers of the Quran adopted it and based their ethics on metaphysics.²

We have referred to all these philosophers in order to explain that if we find the roots of the ethics of Shah Rabindiah in metaphysics, it is neither new nor unique. The Shah was a scholar of philosophy and theology and in most of the cases he has observed it and also found it in the Quran, as he does the same. It is evident, then, that dealing with his ethics we must refer to his metaphysics, otherwise it can neither be understood nor explained.³

It is better that we should begin his ethics with his definition of virtue and vice. We shall not be wrong to say that virtue and vice are the problems which have confronted most of the philosophers as they do with the Muslim theologians. Shah Rabindiah being a Muslim theologian does so in his own way. How far it is meaningful depends on the comprehension of the individual and upon him.

Defining the virtues, the Shah asserts that there are two kinds of attributes (Kamalat). The first ones are natural or innate and the second ones are acquired.

In the natural attributes there are some common to all

belongs whether animals or inanimate. He explains it by saying that some of the attributes of man are shared by the inanimate objects like hills etc. For example the attributes of the height of the body is present in the hill as well. He does not consider its virtue because if it is taken as virtue the hill possesses it too. It is obvious that there is no question of virtue in case of hill. Thus such attributes which he calls 'sahaja gunas' (the attributes of the inanimate) may be admirable but cannot be considered as virtue. The man possessing them must not hold any virtue. Some of these natural attributes of man are shared by vegetation. For example visible growth, stripes and formlessness are present in the vegetation. He does not regard them as virtue because they are not the attributes of man alone and if they are regarded as virtue, it would mean that the flowers, as they have these attributes, also have the virtue. Some of these natural attributes of man are shared by animals as well. For instance loudness of voice, strength, sex, power to eat such and such etc. To them he also does not think as virtue because if they are taken to be as virtue, even a donkey possesses them. There are some attributes which are the qualities of man alone.

They, for example, are high wings, in, courage, good spirits etc. The reason demands that these attributes alone should be considered as virtues but to think foolishly they are the partial virtues as many of these attributes are common in all the animals. Courage, for example is the essence of anger and revenge. It is the essence in demands of intense danger, an ability to defend himself in dangerous situation, and this attribute is common in all the strong animals. In the same way docility is common in the industry is one of the attributes found even in the birds and they sometimes show a better one. It is then clear that all these attributes cannot be the virtues as such. They can only be regarded as partial virtues. Virtues to man foolishly means an attribute which is under the control of the human soul as a desire under the control of reason.⁴

Having spoken of virtues he speaks of the kinds of action. The actual virtue includes in it a power to do kinds of action. The first ones are those in which the human soul is involved in the worldly affairs. Man has got potentially a tendency to do them but he does not express it unless the time wills forth on the occasion demands. He expresses it with examples. The courage, let

instincts, is expressed in the state of danger; eloquence when desired by someone is achieved by the study of good poets of Achaia. It is thus explained that the virtues related to the worldly sphere are called forth when they are needed, and until one fails too necessarily is remained as a potential force. All these affairs are the worldly affairs and when a man dies he leaves them behind. At the time of his death if he repents for having engaged himself in these affairs, he will be deprived of the actual virtues (kamil) and if their attainment has developed his soul he will suffer from a loss instead of gaining a profit. The second kind of the affairs are those related to the spiritual interests. It should be pointed out that the Shah speaks of two tendencies in man. The first ones are again as rational tendencies and the second ones are the actual inclinations. In the spiritual tendencies he calls 'jaanghi-ir-shakhtiye' and the actual tendencies are called by him as 'qasbi shakhtiye'. We should have in mind that the eastern psychologists also speak of these two tendencies in man and are of the view that the rational tendencies should dominate the actual ones. Shah muslimish also holds the same position. Stepping forward he also suggests the way by which the animality can be suppressed. The spiritual or

national tendencies should always continue to speak their
 desire to the actual tendencies and the latter should be
 made to follow them. The continuous obedience to the
 impulse or national tendency will make the actual tendency
 habitual of the conscience and thus the animality will be
 suppressed. Shah 'Alaullah also points out that the
 animality does not like to follow the rationality and in
 the same way contrary is the case with the rationality. The
 desires of the rationality (ma'akhiyat) are in conformity
 with the world of angels (alam-e arshi) on one hand and
 related with the world of spirits (alam-e jahad) on the
 other. These desires as the second kind of affairs are the
 prayers. These prayers are necessary for a higher world.
 It means that the attributes required by the angels and
 the virtues in the real world. It is therefore, that the
 divine spirituality, through the form in the world of angels,
 comes to direct the soul. The prayers are of training
 the soul. The training of the soul means that it should
 remain as divine (ilahi). The soul in no case should let
 animality dominate it. Contrary to this the animality
 should stay in. It means that the actual desire is the
 dominance of national tendency (ghana-e ma'akhiyat) over the
 actual tendency (ghana-e ma'akhiyat), and so to the attributes

is he acquired by man with the help of the sensible and prayer.⁵

In order to acquire the virtues the man should be attracted towards his form, i.e. angelic form and as long as he is not attracted towards it, he cannot acquire it, and when he is attracted towards his form, he stays it and as a result (as soon as he acquires the capacity of being attracted towards his form he acquires the virtues, i.e. it, then becomes like angel. The flesh partakes it with the example of the iron which is attracted towards the magnet. If it is in the sphere of the iron it is attracted towards the magnet and as it man is attracted towards his form. All the men of reason and insight are aware of this fact and are able to acquire these attributes (abundance of animal tendency; to angelic to rational tendency - malaki Gennadi). All those who have acquired this attribute, be they the rich or the poor, have included themselves amongst the angels. Although we are aware that all the men belong to the same form of man, yet it is evident that the acquisition of the attributes of the dominance of the angelic tendency is not difficult, i.e. the angelic tendency (malakiyet) is in the nature of man. The form demands the dominion of the angelic tendency (malaki) and if the man

be attracted towards it, he will acquire that virtue, and this attribute alone is the virtue to reach virtue.⁶

Having described the virtues in the real sense (Isadat), the book comes to speak of the difference amongst the people regarding the acquisition of the virtues. It is very much worthy of such foolishish advocates, that by nature every individual is different and as there is bound to be a difference in the acquisition of the virtues simply by the reason that the individuals are born with different capabilities, abilities and potentialities. The difference of abilities, and potentialities results into the difference of interests and aptitudes. To be explained by some examples, The attribute of courage, for example, is not potentially common to all men. Some of the men this function is not present in, for it is not there in their nature. Others it present in but it is very little and hence is not brought forward when the time calls forth in the greatest demands. But since the attribute of courage is potentially present in them they can be said to bring it forward. The way to be adopted would be looking at the deeds of the brave men, listening to the stories of bravery. These things would help them to realise the potential courage present in them since birth. Those who do not possess it at all can also

acquire it by the steps described earlier. In this way the Shah contends that the attributes (greatest attributes) can be cultivated and acquired by the man himself.⁷

The other example that the Shah offers is that of virtues or good qualities (Khudā). Some of the men do not possess it at all. In others it is present but not as very strong. But there are some who have a very strong tendency towards it and this tendency is potentially present in them since birth. These men need not acquire it and cannot be refrained from developing it, and if they are refrained from its expression they become restless. Realizing the position the Shah gives the example of oil. If someone takes it is brought near the fire it starts burning. Similar is the condition of the one who possesses the virtue of morals (khudā) who is refrained from its expression. Such people need no guide (Imam) to lead them for its acquisition but for others who do not possess it at all or in whom it is weak a guide is necessary. Thus these people become their guides and they enjoy the status of leaders (Imams). But these people cannot eradicate the shortcomings. For this a prophet is needed. He, with the help of God, removes the shortcomings of the virtues (khudā) and possesses it practically. It is therefore that he comes to acquire

it. Here it is clear that in the life of a prophet. Thus

the Jñān has the view that a virtue can be cultivated even after keeping in view the individual differences in man. The virtue, in the final sense (śuddhi), can also be acquired in the same way despite the individual differences of the capacity of the acquisition.⁶

Having spoken of the individual differences the Jñān comes to discuss the ways by which the virtue in the final sense is acquired. To him there are two ways to acquire it. The first consists in the fact that the identity in man should completely be suppressed, rather be destroyed. It means that individuality should no longer be the part of man. There are people who adopt this way. The struggle and the self surrendered by nature, as Jñān points out, have adopted this way, for the achievement of 'śuddhi'. The second line is the fact that the identity should continue to exist and it should be made obedient to the spiritual faculty (śuddhi). Most of the people have adopted the latter one for the attainment of the virtue. Being aware of the capacity of man, the Jñān has also some prophets to preach the other way of the acquisition. Explaining it the Jñān gives some examples. The first one of them is of an artist who with the help of his imagination can colour scheme presents the picture of some one, and not only that, but he

also depicts the state in which that same one is. The other one is of a wedding neither where child dies. She cries in the way that others are affected and share her grief as their own. and still another one is of a dumb man who only interprets the actions and by gestures conveys his objective. Similar in the way, as Shah points out, is *maad* the animality (*hahmiyat*) *marwa* is the animal quality (*malakiyat*). It means that to should be made to subdue the dominance of the animal quality. In order to achieve it were is, no doubt, a great deal of effort required. But it is necessary. Comparing the two the Shah asserts that the first one has its own qualities. By this way the human soul attaches itself completely with the world of spirits and a man adopting it for the acquisition of virtue is completely segregated from the worldly desires. He, if necessary, even detaches himself from the world but the religion prefers the other way because together with religion the world is also *loohiqaroh* and it cannot be left behind. It is better that we should remain in the world and then get rid of the animal tendencies. Apart from it if all the persons adopt the former way there will be no one to live in the world. Thus the religion favours the latter way of the acquisition of virtue (*hagmat*), but

does not reject the former one as well. There is another reason for it, the preference of the latter way over the former one and that there can be only two persons to adopt it, for it requires great patience, persistence and prayer which the majority is not capable of. The Shah thus explains these two ways for the attainment of the vision and the people adopt one or the other in accordance with their capacity.⁹

In explaining the other way in which the animality is not to be destroyed but to be sublimated, the Shah offers a very psychological example. This categorically shows his insight in the psychology of man.¹⁰

In the above language it has been described that there are two ways for the attainment of 'ma'adit' (blissfulness in the real sense). It has also been pointed out that the latter one is preferred for many reasons. In the following passage we shall discuss, as Shah 'Abdullah has done it, as to what helps in adopting the second course. As the Shah puts it, there are many ways to pursue the course but he favours the one which creates its own four important qualities or attributes. These qualities are the result of the control and enlightenment of the animality by the rationality of a man (nafas maktab). These four qualities

are (1) Purity (taharat) (2) Humility to God (ijra)
 (3) detached from worldly desires (nasshat) and (4) Justice
 (adalat). The man who creates these qualities in him, is
 in alliance with angels because the qualities themselves are
 of the angelic nature, as shall describe them one by one.¹²

(1) Purity (Taharat) : It is one of the four important
 qualities or attributes. It means that the man desiring
 to obtain 'sawab' (blissfulness) must at the first hand
 make himself pure by purifying the heart and cleansing the
 whole of the body. When a man acquires this attribute the
 deepest in opposite 'haseen' (profanity) because in that
 stage he feels himself dissatisfied and restless and as
 long as he continues to be in the state of profanity the
 restlessness and dissatisfaction bind him and as soon as he
 becomes pure he feels satisfied and contented. It is
 because of this fact that purity touches his nature and he
 can fight things against his nature. When Jihadist is at
 his view that only those people can attain this quality
 whose soul is able to obey the commands of the Lord from the
 world of forces (dunya & mauli) and man have the capacity to
 be pure. When their potentiality of purity is realized they
 do not like the opposite way, always desire to keep them-
 selves pure and it never is to pure take both, perfect

abstention, wear clean dress and use different perfume.

Having acquired this quality, the man becomes capable of seeing the angels. Apart from it, he sees good dress in which he has the vision of graceful and radiant things.

Those who are in the state opposite to purity - 'badar'

(profanity) & have in them the satanic elements. They see bad dress, their souls are opaque and admit no clarity.¹¹

(2) Humility (Ihsa) : The second quality is the humility to God. It is also important in course of the attainment of virtue. It means that man should feel himself humble before God. Such humility is of the view that it can be acquired by a man in the days of prosperity. In those days he should remember the location and the position of God. Their remembrance will create in him the humility as he and he will feel himself as insects before God as he does before a King. The humility in him would make him realize the greatness of God. Like other spiritual states the state of humility brings him in proximity with the angels. Having realized the greatness of God he desires His goods.

(3) Detachment from desires (Rahbat) : The third quality is the detachment from desires. It means that a man having acquired it does not engage himself in the world. It is created in man at the time when he is too much engaged in

the worldly desires, he makes all efforts to fulfill all his wishes. He enjoys to have sensual pleasures and luxurious life. Having reached this state he realises his potentiality of the detachment and immediately after detaches himself from the worldly desires. He gets rid of his previous luxurious life, sensual enjoyments, anger and greed. Detachment means that the soul should not admit the influence of the animality (behimiyati). Or may be that it should control it completely. This quality can be acquired only by those who have the capacity for its acquisition. Those who do not possess it cannot detach themselves. Those soul become controlled by the animality are they conscious to dwell in this state. Speaking of the difference between the two persons namely the one capable of detachment and the other not capable of it Chah Malikish gives an example. If something costly is stolen from a house, its owner, if generous, would not bother much, and if miser, would regret over the loss for a long time. The former one is a man having the capacity of detachment and the latter is one who does not possess it. Detachment brings the soul near the divine and its opposite, greed, (hira) takes it away from God. The detachment and the greed are both in different circumstances and to each one of them a different cure has been given.

Here follows the description, in respect of wealth detachment in generosity (sahamata) and greed (māra), in respect of ease and other biological desires detachment (samahata) in chastity (dharma) and the opposite in unchastity (asamhata), in respect of luxury and labour the former is painless (sahaja) and the latter painfulness (atishaya) and in respect of size and limitation things the one is plenty (bhoga) and the other is size (bhujat). When the quality of detachment is acquired by man, his mind, when, freed and devoid any influence of the world and he consequently detaches himself from the worldly desires, he only wishes for the things held high by the sages and requested by the system which are organic and divine in nature.¹²

(4) Justice (sadait) : The fourth and the last quality of attributes is he acquired by man is Justice (sadait). It is the quality which helps man carry out the actions leading to the administration of the country and the nation. That which is of the view when the objectives of the administration are present in the form of progress. The human mind has the capacity to understand and realize them but only those human beings can be aware of the will of God regarding the administration of the country and the nation who have acquired the attribute of Justice (sadait). When

a country or a nation lacks the principles of administration, God sends the prophets to show to the people the right and correct path of administration. When Voltaire rightly remarks that the religion brings the people out of the darkness, it says a time those who keep the prophet in spreading the enlightment ^{as} deserve the reward of God and those who hamper its progress deserve punishment. The helping ones are those who possess the quality of justice (adab), those who acquire it, are included among the angels and are in proximity with God. Their souls, when separated from the body, feel satisfied and comforted. The other ones who are void of it are deprived of all these blessings.¹³

All these four attributes or qualities are essential. They lead to the second way prescribed for the attainment of blessedness (saudat). These qualities help in the attainment of the perfection in the field of knowledge and action. They raise a man to the status of angelic. The one who understands their importance has a key to the secrets of the religion. To put it in brief, they are essential for building up the character.

We have discussed these qualities. Now there comes a question as to how they should be acquired. When Wahidiah profess the answer to this question. He holds that the doors

mentioned four attributes or qualities can be attained either with the help of knowledge or also the help of action. It means that there are two ways for their acquisition.¹⁴

The book first discussed the part of knowledge. It begins it, with hypothetical assumption that if the human heart develops the fear and awe, it refrains itself from being involved in the pleasures of flesh and bones. This fear, of course, is the fear of God. A man on the very first hand should have the knowledge of God. He should believe Him to be the agent of all actions and should be convinced of His presence. Such a belief would arouse in him the awe of God and he would abstain from doing the evil deeds. God sent many prophets to give the human beings the knowledge of prophet Ibrahim. It is the knowledge which helped him realize of the ^{on}existence of God. It reminded the mankind of the attributes of God and revived the knowledge of His omnipotence and maintenance. The knowledge of the prophet Ibrahim helped acknowledge the existence of God. The other one was the knowledge of prophet Ismail, which brought the mankind to understand God's plan of reward and punishment. The people were told of the blessings and punishments of God so as to keep them away from the evil.

Further reference need be to the knowledge of the events in the past and of the life hereafter, with the help of which the virtues and vices were explained.

What is essential is of the sign that all these three types of knowledge are important and, besides, the knowledge of the characteristics of God and the knowledge of the solemnity of the future (hereafter) are also essential. All these are the esoteric types of knowledge listed in the Holy Qur'an.¹²

Knowledge describes the path of knowledge (the that which) is distant the path of action, like the former, is also helps man in the attainment of hisnessness (essence). For his attainment a man must perform only those actions which are desirable in the soul and he should continue to perform them until he becomes habitual of them. And when he becomes habitual, they become his qualities of hisnessness. Some of these actions are performed as there is a resemblance in the habit and the stirrings, and others are performed as the performer is inclined to them under the compulsion of his nature. Which of them are the materialistic actions is not a question at all for a man who has been freed from the life of the materialism of the creature. A man should perform only those actions which are held as signs. What is essential holds these such actions, he is not to give, has some concern. In

exhibits none of them with example. The causes of sinful actions [bagya] are not apart being full of animal desires, the worst making the ill will towards divine persons, the heart being surrounded by the cords of the egoism and so on. In the same way the causes of piety are contrary to the causes of sin. Thus it is clear that a man should save himself from the causes of sinful deeds. Everyone nurtures in him five qualities which are in conformity with his nature. we explain to first for example (a) of a man who is angry with any of his fellow beings. Before expressing his anger he thinks of his enemy and of his shame and then contemplates over his detachment and (b) of a woman who when weeps, often remembers the quality of the dead. But in the acquisition of two attributes or qualities he should follow the people of good fruits and acquire only those qualities which are to hold as fruits.

We have thus described the two ways by which two attributes are to be achieved. Now we shall take up the qualities held as virtues and vices.

Shukra-siddhanta first takes up the virtuous action and defining it he says that virtuous action is one which is performed in the absence of angalia quality. If it performed by a man of divine inclination or by using amrita-

igned in the knowledge of God or it is action yielding
 reward in this life and the life hereafter or it is an
 action redounding the earning efforts (tadabhir-kaafia)
 which are the foundations of the human affairs, or it is
 an action unresponsive of the obedience and the source of
 receiving the calls. Thus are good or virtuous actions be dis-
 tinguished. Having defined it he, then, takes up the bad or
 vicious actions. That action will be held as one which is
 either performed in the stubbornness of the devil or which
 yields punishment in this life and the life hereafter, or
 the action which obstructs the earning efforts (tadabhir kaafia)
 or is hostile to even to the action which redounds the
 calls between God and man. And shows the good or virtuous
 actions definitively. Explaining it he begins that as the
 people collectively agree on the profitability of the earning
 efforts, in the same way the benefits of a good action are
 also contained and established by the heart. The heart is
 capable of understanding truth as it is, illumined with the
 divine light which is in its nature. Explaining it he
 gives the example of the bee which is aware of the profitable
 efforts (tadabhirkaafia) and acts accordingly. The people
 in general are also aware of these efforts and are also
 conscious of the good and bad actions. In spite of the

difference of opinion. There is an agreement among the people as the virtuousness of an action and most of the people do desire in pariter II. But still there are some who take up the otherwise and that foolishness here points out that they should be neglected. The virtuousness of an action is often confirmed by those who are sent by God with revelation. It does not have that the reason is not remained of them. It does depend the performance of such an action and it is therefore that the philosophers and scholars of different religions and countries have established the criteria of an action being virtuous, being good or bad and the people in general accept pariter only that action established as good. The ways responsible for the performance of the good action are the sources of the sublimation of the animality (bahirdyat) by its angelic quality (malakiyat). It will be discussed afterwards. The goodness of action can also be realized by reason and those who perform it do have the experience of its benefits. In our preceding I have that foolishness describes the importance he has experienced by the performance of good or virtuous actions.¹⁶

In discussion of virtuous actions he gives a list of the actions held as virtuous and of those held as vice. The first one of them is the will of God. We should, however,

not confuse the discussion of the unity of God with the statement made in his metaphysics. There he explains the concept with a different approach and here he describes^d it as a virtue. He is of the view that the belief in the unity is the most important virtue. As a matter of fact it should be understood as the cardinal one. Emphasizing on it, he gives the greatest command saying that he asserts that the unity of God is the basis of all virtues. It is the one which keeps others. It means that without the belief in the unity of God no other virtue can be obtained. It is this virtue which enables the soul to penetrate into the secrets of the divinity. Having explained its importance he speaks of its stages.

To him, there are four stages of the unity of God. The first is the stage of the belief in the fact that God is the only existence. It means that it is the stage of the unity of existence. The second one is the stage of the belief in the fact that God is the only creator of all the skies and the material world. The third stage is the belief in the fact that God is the only designer of all the bodies existing in the space between the heaven and earth and, finally, the fourth is the stage of the belief that God alone is worthy of our worship. Regarding the first two

though there exists no controversy but the others do believe so.²⁷

Discussing the issue he speaks of three groups which do not possess the belief in the unity of God. The first one of them is the group of the astrologers. It holds that the stars play a great role in making or carrying out destiny. They are concerned with the day to day events and so they deserve our worship. Thus the astrologers do not believe in God being the designer of the stars and consequently they do not believe in the unity of God. The second group is of the polytheists. These people are of the view that God, of course, is the really Real but some of his servants, having worshipped him with a great devotion, have acquired His proximity. They, therefore, also deserve our worship. They also hold that God Himself has incarnated in them and as they are divine are being divine they should be worshipped. From the polytheists consider some of his servants as worthy as he worshipped by giving the reason that command him by his worship cannot reach God, for he is too great for him. He is said, therefore, approach Him with some saints, as mediators and these divine persons are the mediators when Him. Consequently their belief in the unity of God is not upto the mark and complete. The third group is of the

Christians. They are of the view that the prophet Jesus Christ is the son of man. In the beginning, as Paul Milliard holds, they call him so to show his proximity with God and later as they considered him to be the son of God as they advocated the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ and argued that the incarnation of God must be divine and the divine coming from God is His son. They, however, included him in Godhood. The only group rejects the contention by declaring that God has no wife and son and that if God wants to create anything He pronounces "Eam" (be) and it becomes (Japheth). Maintaining this process the group rejects the theory of incarnation.

Paul Milliard, in dealing with the concept of unity in Christianity does not point out their belief in the Trinity. They do not believe in God and God's son only but also include the Holy Ghost Gabriel, as God. Thus the Christian believes in the unity in Trinity, that is, one is three and three is one. We need not give its details.¹⁹

The second important virtue is the belief in the goodness of God. In dealing with the attributes of God in monotheism we have referred to the controversy and different schools of the Muslim philosophy. We need not mention them here. It will suffice to say that Paul Milliard

in his discussion on witness actions clearly points out that a Muslim should have a firm belief in the attributes of God. He, in the very beginning of the discussion, asserts that God is ever and above our comprehension. Although he has not referred to this verse of Quran yet he does read it, or else there is no meaning in saying that He is beyond our comprehension and it is therefore that we understand Him with the help of the attributes. Many of them, at the end points out, are the attributes that are unfolding a simile; we should be careful in its interpretation. For example God's generosity is stated the generosity of man, although to explain the generosity He has metaphorically been called as generous. To put it clearly, God's generosity should not be interpreted as the one of man.

What mistake is of the view that the believers in the attributes should not wonder over them, for any ponderance or speculation into them might mislead the believers as it happened with a group of Muslims called as anthropomorphists (mushabbihism) who very naively conceived God to be a body having hands, eyes, ears, legs etc. They were misled as they could not understand the metaphor. It is therefore that the Muslims are advised by the Prophet himself and later on by the tradition not to think over the nature of attributes

of God, and the Quran declares that the believers should not think over the nature of God, and as the attributes belong to His Way should also not be thought over.¹⁸

Shah classifies categorical attributes into three types namely (1) the attributes permitted to be contemplated over by the 'shariah', (2) the attributes not permitted to be contemplated over by Shariah, (3) the attributes to be understood and contemplated in accordance with the necessity. The 'shariah' gives certain principles in accordance with which the attributes of God should be thought over. In the first category he takes those attributes which are thinkable to God. For example laughing (takah), happiness (farah) and joy (bakhshah) - these attributes can be applied to God. But contrary to them are the attributes which do not suit to the dignity of God such as weeping, lamenting, grieve etc. The third category includes those attributes which are thought over and dismissed in accordance with the necessity. It means that the necessity demands their presence in Him. Let us understand them with some examples. God is called 'Alim (knows) because He knows everything. God being the creator of the world must be aware of all that happens in the world and as He is the knower of all things (alim). God is known as All-hearer and All

near (Imal and Tahir) because he listens to the prayers of his creatures and notices their conditions. The attribute of will is comprehended to be present in Him because he creates the things when and where they are required. Shah Waliullah here asserts that in the beginning they were all in Him and thereafter he created them and created them in the world. Here he supports Imal's view. He also, in explaining the 'ayatul hakim' expresses the same view. God is All-Potent because He has the power of choice of doing or not doing something and also of the way with which it is to be done. The same is the case with other attributes. Most of them are those present in the living things. But it should, however, be borne in mind that they are metaphorical in nature and the one is to be very careful in understanding them. 22

Having discussed the virtue of martyrdom Shah Waliullah ⁶⁷ ~~correctly~~/describes the destiny. Belief in the destiny or fate is a virtue and so Shah Waliullah puts up, supporting it on the words of the traditions, as the greatest virtue. Speaking of the necessity of the faith in destiny he asserts that the faith is to make the man aware of the balance (Tahir) running through the whole world. Explaining it in the beginning of the book 'Iman' (Mujawidat-ul-Hal) he

He holds that God first created the forms of the things
 and thereafter, in accordance with the forms, their
 specification and designation. He created the things themselves.
 It means that the things are the copies of the forms present
 in the world of heaven. All the qualities of the things,
 be they the sciences or instincts, be they vegetation, animals
 or man, are present in their forms respectively. Some of
 these qualities are common to all, others are common to
 species and still others are those which make something
 individual. Some of the individual qualities are realized
 and others are added with God with them to be realized.
 In accordance with the capacity and necessity of the form
 God provides facilities to the creatures belonging to the
 different species. It means that He applies different ways
 (tadaatir) to keep different creatures alive and to make
 them realize their common and individual qualities. In
 designing these ways there is no one referred above as
 before moving through the whole world. The explanation
 leads us to know that God plans and designs every thing to
 be done by the creature and it certainly is that conclusion
 which Shah Waliullah also at. God, in accordance with the
 capacity of the forms, assigns to the creatures the tasks
 to be done by them in the world. The animals know the will of

God by their nature but man has his knowledge with the help of revelation. Thus it is certain that destiny or fate cannot be denied, one must have a faith in it, for, as the prophet asserts, those who do not have faith in destiny (Qadr) are excluded from him. At another time the prophet asserted that the faith is not complete unless it includes the destiny in its purview. The traditions thus make the destiny a part of faith and it is therefore that the prophet has held it as the highest virtue. It is on this point that there arises a controversy that if God is the designer of all things and if nothing can be done against destiny, what the reward and punishment could mean? We shall take up this question in the discussion of the reward and punishment.²¹

Explaining the destiny that includes aspects of its five stages. In the first stage God willed to create the world. In order to create it he designed its form. Out of many He chose a few of them and created them in the world of beyond. Thereafter, He designed all the deeds to be done by the creatures in the world. Then the form of the objects of the world, their characteristics and nature came into existence. In the second stage God designed the number, quantity and quality of things. It is believed that

God had created the forms of the world fifty thousand years before the creation of the gates. The number of years here signifying a great period of time. Referring to that Rabbenu points out that the form of prophet Israhel was created at that time and it was also decided as to what he will be sent on earth to spread and preach the divine commands. Together with this, it was also decided that there will be a person named as Abu Lahab who would not accept him as prophet and that Abu Lahab will be mislead and condemned. Thus about all the creatures every-thing was decided in the second stage of destiny. In the third stage God created him and also created the forms of his posterity. He also created in them the power to choose the right and to avoid the wrong. In addition to this, He created in them the power to recognize him and also designed the destiny or the deeds to be done by them in the world, although now, as Rabbenu points out, do not recollect the exact yet all that they do are the deeds for which they were destined to do at the time of the creation of Adam.

In the fourth stage of the destiny, the soul was fused into the fetus. Right at that time the contemplative again asks self whether the person would do good actions or bad actions in the life and thus his being virtuous or vicious

is decided soon that very moment. Explained is that Malinlak gives an example of a man who plants a palm tree, taking in view the quality of seeds, soil and atmosphere, guesses some of the qualities of the fruit yet to come after a long time. In the same way the apostle, at the time of the fusion of the soul into the features of a man, understood whether he will be dominated by animality or divinity.

In the fifth stage of the destiny describing what happens in the world of nature is succeeded in the world of heaven. Every event presages certain causes which are the formation of the ideal form of the event in the world of heaven. In chapter II, he gives two examples. In the first one he states that some people were quarrelling and the fish prayed to God for this time to resolve. Just after his prayers he noticed something revealing in the north from the sister (headwaters). II, in the beginning, was in the form of a point and thereafter it spread all around as it spread, the people got rid of their long-standing quarrel and once again started only to work other. In the second example he describes the death of one of his sons illness and affirms that during the afternoon (evening) prayers he saw the death of the dying son and he died the following night. Thus it is clear that every event that happens in

this world has its causes in the world of heaven and they are created before the event takes place. But at the time of the happening they are revealed on the earth. Some of them are punished. He explains it by saying that sometimes certain miseries, for example, are created to trouble a person but his prayers stop them from hovering upon him. He sometimes says death is postponed by some virtue. In order to support it, he makes the mention of some traditions but does not refer to any of them here. It would have been desirable had he quoted any of the traditions to justify that the death can be postponed by some virtue because it is the belief of the Muslims that the death comes at its own time. Thus in our opinion this argument is not in conformity with the general belief and saying something against it should have been supported either by the verses of the Quran or by the traditions and then too with proper references. Summing up the stage that follows is of the view that the events are the effects of the causes created prior to their occurrence and the forms created a priori are given a meaning when their copy is to be created in the world. He again explains it with some examples such as miseries, the forms of the rivers Nile and Euphrates were first created in the sky and thereafter on the earth. In the same way the

(Adam was first revealed as the first city and thereafter,
 through the prophet, as the earth. The prophet saw heaven
 and hell, between himself and the veil of the mosque and
 fell then as sleep that he could reach the gates of heaven
 and feel the heat of the hell. Similar is the case of other
 things. All of them have their forms in the world of heaven
 and all that happens is in accordance with the destiny of
 the form and it is actually the cause of the events and not
 those events which are generally understood to be the causes
 of the events. Explaining it further, Shah Raisulahi writes
 Qasr Fawaid mentioning that the grazing of the camel is a
 picture in Allah looking. In connection with the same the
 prophet was once asked that the eagle and the sparrow are
 sure some day. He replied that they were also destiny,
 meaning namely that they are destined to come or the sun is
 destined to be covered by them. The companion that states
 that God is force in his action but he is not ^{free} to use
 his freedom because freedom implies that his willful desire
 and intention should be created in the face of his and if
 they are not all created, he cannot have their knowledge.
 Thus he is not free. It means that whatever was done is
 done in accordance with the destiny of his form in the world
 of heaven which has been shaped in five stages.²²

Having gone through the virtue of fasting it seems that that Muslimish advocate both determination and inclination. But it will be clear in the discussion of reward and punishment. That Muslimish does not take up the position of abstinence in regard to fasting.

Having described the virtue of the belief in fasting, that Muslimish, then, takes up another virtue consisting in the faith in the worship of God. He regards it as one of the highest virtues and considers its pursuit to be essential for the followers of the Religion. He is of the view that the worship of God by man is his privilege and not by manshipping should give him the due. Supporting his argument he quotes a tradition in which the prophet Muhammad asks one of his companions named that if he knows the privilege of God is man. He replies that the prophet knows it better. The prophet replying him tells that the privilege of God to man is to be worshipped and the privilege of man to God is to bless him, if he is not polytheistic, of sin (sins). Thus the virtue consists in the fact that man should worship God, he should be a believer by faith and together with this should also be convinced of the anomaly of the prayer. It means that he should not worship him just as a matter of habit or convention but willingly and heartily.

Explaining the necessity of will (lines) to the action he asserts that in the celestial world (also a soulmate) there is one stage at which rests the will. The actions in he does are decided at this stage but at this stage of will doing or not doing of an action does not mean anything. That is to say that it comes when the matter of the performance confronts us. At this stage the action is certainly not performed. It is created by God. The philosophers who understood by will the doing or not doing of an action are, as that scholar thinks, wrong, because they interpret will in the context of man and this world, and because they are not in a position to comprehend the state of will in the celestial world (also a soulmate). To establish his criticism against them, he argues that before the performance of an action its doing or not doing is one and the same, meaning thereby that the action involves both and it is a matter of choice that man can choose any one of them. He gives an example to support his conviction that a man intends to take a gun. He knows that he will take it by his hand but unless he takes it up the action of lifting the gun is not performed and unless it is performed its doing or not doing is one and the same. Similar is the case with other actions. They are created in the mind

of form taking, is also the capacity of the doors and every one, in accordance with his own capacity, performs them. As the capacity of the door increases, new forms of actions are revealed. Explaining it he gives an example of the yeager. When a man prays, the form of his acceptance is revealed. It means that in the creation of the forms of acceptance man's prayers play an important part. It is evident that actions are created in accordance with the capacity and the capacity depends on will. The will is indispensable. Supporting his contention, Shah Waliullah holds that the 'Shafiah' people do by advocating the faith in power of choice (Qadr). Explaining it he gives the example of a couple of animals indulging in the pleasure of the flesh. Enquiring into the reason of their indulgence we can either say that it is due to their helplessness or God's will or their own will. Any of these interpretations will independently be wrong. The right one will consist in the fact that both men will as doing it/the creation of their action by God to be done by them own side by side. It means that both of them are equally important. God has designed this action for them and they have chosen it by their will. Similar is the case with other actions to be done by man. We have been given the power of choice but

this choice should bring him to choose the right action. That is to say, ^{that} the action is designed for him by God. Worship of God is one of them and should be chosen by man at his own will. He has given this argument in order to explain that the worship should be done willingly and not by habit or convention.²²

Worship is the privilege of God. Mainly it is given three reasons. The first one of them is that God is the bestower of reward. That who rewards must be thanked and worship is performed as a token of thankfulness to God for the pleasure He has given to man. The second one of them is the fact that God punishes those who deny His unity and avoid His worship in the world and finally, God rewards those following the path of righteousness and punishes those following the path of disobedience. These reasons lead us to the knowledge of (1) rewards of God (2) punishment of God and (3) status of the life hereafter. The only direct explanation of the knowledge of these three becomes worship of God to be the desire of man and man should choose what is shown in his return. Besides it is correct religion. Moreover, the worship is the privilege of God as it is in the nature of man.²³

In the proceeding three he explains the fact that the

worship is natural. He asserts that together with the five senses (*Javarak*) man possesses another sense (*latifa*) known as the sense of divinity (*latifa-e-Ilahani*). This sense being divine, is attracted towards God and is satisfied when divine deeds are done. In order to know the sense of divinity, man first needs realize his five senses (*Javarak*) and thereafter he will know this sense present in him a priori. The realization of the sense of divinity is not possible without the help of intellect and the soul alone can realize it for they are roots of the intellect in him. Like other Fallacious, it also stands as self-evident. Explaining it Ghosia ^{Latifa} asserts that its realization is like the hunger or thirst. It evidently means that hunger and thirst can only be felt and not explained. Similar is the case with this sense. Man remains unconscious^{ness} of this sense as long as he is involved in leading a life of senses. It with a time he does not feel the existence of this sense to him. But after his death, when all the senses are quiet he becomes aware of the sense of divinity and then realizes the sanctity of his actions. Thus he clearly explains that the worship is the privilege of God because it is in the nature of man conceived as a humanity in the sense of divinity (*latifa-e-Ilahani*). Although the actions

to be done by every individual are created by God in the world of Azee, yet being induced to the extent of divinity present in him can can choose other actions.²⁴

Having discussed the virtues of the halted in the worship of God, he comes to another virtue embodied in the respect or the pains of God (Chazra [shah]). Before describing these pains he explains abstract actions (Umara majarriha) and the concrete signs (Shahar). The abstract actions are those which are abstracted by 'Shahar'. The concrete signs are the signs of God. These signs are to be respected because by respecting them one shows respect to God. They are four in number, namely (i) the Chazra; it should be respected because it is the command of God, (ii) the prophet; he should be respected because he has been sent by God and by respecting him the tender is respected, (iii) Lake; it should be respected because it is taken as the house of God. In the days of the prophet Ibrahim it was built; for the people had constructed houses for the idols and for him it was necessary that the House of God should also be constructed so that they could respect him and be benefitted after visiting the idola. As it has been established, it should be respected by the followers.

Further, that walking, standing, bowing prayer (sajda),

fasting (*sawm*), holy tax (*zakat*) and the pilgrimage to Mecca (*Hajj*) as duties and also insistence on them as obligations (*fard*) nothing (*ghayb*). But we as the students of philosophy need not go into these details. It will be suffice to say that for religious Islam considers them as virtuous actions and that Wahidieh being a Muslim thinker also advocates their inclusion in the followers of Islam.

One of the virtues in a person of true secrets and it is because of that the path of virtue should be followed. In his explanation Shah Wahidieh talks up some of the virtues and points out the secrets concealed in them. The first of them is the remembrance of God (*dhikr*). The prophet himself has emphasized it and has held as the highest of all virtues. Related to it is the ideal prayer which purifies the heart of man and also involves in him the feeling of humility before God. It is essential because it helps her make out the difference between God (*ma'ad*) and the man (*qad*). Besides, one of the greatest virtues is the recitation of the Holy Quran. It awakes the feeling of fear in man and also helps him get rid of selfishness. Another virtue that Shah Wahidieh mentions in this discussion is the Holywar (*jihad*). It is a virtuous action for the reason that it wipes out the stains of religion,

eradicates the evils like *Phagava* (hoar), *Shra* (leishy) and *Urad* from the society and brings back the blessing of God in the world. Thus all of these virtues should be inculcated for the better of their society.²⁵

Having discussed the secrets of virtues that *Calidasa* takes up an interesting problem. He rationalizes it for it is a matter of general interest. It has often been observed that a man following the path of virtues leads a hard pressed life. It seems to be rather paradoxical that a man pursuing the path of virtues should not be prosperous. Explaining all that *Calidasa* gives interesting arguments.

He is of the view that a virtuous man is in difficulties for many reasons. Firstly, he leads a hard pressed life because he needs purity. In his difficulties he remembers God and his heart and soul are justified. Secondly, he gets punished at his side in the world though he had he kept he believed in the torture (punish) in the life hereafter. Thirdly, the nature of difficulties is in his case the period of illness and when the illness is removed, he like other patients forgets the position as a of virtue and starts leading a new life with new courage and perseverance.²⁶ Thus *Calidasa* in a very scholarly manner rationalizes the problem of general interest and answers the question

which often hinders the young mind.²⁶

Having disposed the intricate notions, Shah 'Abdullah, then comes to describe the aim. We have already defined it in the preceding passage. We shall, at present, discuss the nature of some of the aims. Shah 'Abdullah is particularly deals with polytheism. At the outset of the discussion, he described its nature asserting that the aim of worship is to make the aim is distinguishing between human and the great. In each of the deeds there are two aspects and the deed may be done by taking any of their into account. As, for example stated and her done in the prayer. Both the notions being conveyed but it may either imply the reality of man to the vast sea of God. Or is humble and a. others is or all. The correct teaching is not to distance between the two. Explaining it further, Shah 'Abdullah's opinion that the humble should be attributed with humble things and the great with honour, respect and great location. Such an understanding will give a man a distinction of the world and the great and he will not associate any with the great.²⁷

It regards to his attitude like power, great or etc. can understand them on two levels. On the first one he takes it as in relation to himself, individuals like himself and being other than his self (me). On the second level he

takes that in relation to the persons in whom he seems
 some devilish power. Thus taking them as three two levels,
 he understands the implications of the affairs and discerns
 the humble from the great. In the same way the secrets are
 also understood at two levels. On the first one he gains
 their knowledge from the stories like names, reasons, death,
 divinity and other such reasons having to do with the
 self. On the second level he gets their knowledge from other
 persons without labouring for its attainment. In the first
 case he works hard and undergoes difficulties to achieve
 their knowledge but in the other he takes an effort. Here
 that foolish thought does not indicate but does follow in the
 self and ordinary persons. In the same way all other
 affairs like effort, effort and others are also interpreted
 on two levels. Firstly, so, by effort, for example when
 stands to create something in a state by doing certain effort.
 Secondly he understands by it as creating something without
 any state or effort i.e. by the will of God. He especially
 suggests that the that supports the second type because
 as the first state wills are taken into consideration which
 in fact, do not play any part in the creation of anything.
 When he argues he asserts that the stages of the
 comprehension of the affairs must end in the where nothing

can be categorized in any part. But here again, he holds that the attribution of God must be distinguished from the attribution of man, for any such conflation begins polytheism. Explaining its nature he notes the people of those who, by contact in some of their fellow beings some of the attributions which they did not possess, believed them to be divine and named them as angel God or relatives of God. The other way leading to polytheism is also caused by the erroneous association of the attributions of God with those of man and other creatures. Some of the people observe some of the attributions in the plants and the stars and start worshipping them. But of them, some are of the opinion that God is the king of all the living beings not some of the men, but it shall worship, and other creatures such as stars and plants have been given some powers by God. In all the times referred above, believers practice polytheism when in no way it allowed by the Lord-ship and to this they are led due to the incapability of discerning the reality from the gr-ty. Summing up the discussion we should point out that both scholars deal with the limitations of the affairs to explain the distinction between the two, because the issue is polytheism and the other is mixture of unitarianism. He explains it by one of his experiences that he was given

an account of a man entering bee and was asked if it was polytheism. He says that it was not so, because the man did not consider bee a god. The man told that he has reached the earth. It seems that he observed the location of the bee and found in it no revelation of seeing the bee a god. ²⁸

The nature of polytheism has been discussed in the preceding passage. In the present we wish illustrate again with the types of polytheism. We determine its types on the basis of its attitude regarded by the Jewish as polytheistic. Out of them, we shall take up the important ones. Holding the hand before people either that God is one type of polytheism. The Jews and the traditionists repeatedly warn the people against it. The other type of polytheism is to consider such as any other creature a sharing with God. The Jews and the traditionists instruct the people to refrain from it as well. The last instance of which we see is the *idolatry* of talking with and other creatures as one of God or equivalent of God (here the references are made to the Christians and the Muslims in the pre-Islamic Arabia). Besides, there are many types of polytheism such as talking as with an answering, like about them. For, say, say, some comes as about women, about men, etc. The prophet repeatedly

forbid any such type of polytheism to be practiced by Muslims. In sum, it is clear, polytheism is against religion and is, therefore, a sin.

Having dismissed polytheism and its types, Shah 'Abdullah comes to discuss in the positive of this. That he talks of the good is it is not without that he has not forgotten all else is equally good and great. There is no doubt that any of them benefited others in a way or the other and there are major and minor things. It should also be noted that the decision of the holy men to whom will be in accordance to one another and all is not of the same. In the matter of discussion, he divides the sin as a bad deed under the heading of polytheism or lesser evil (Khar'ah). Thus all men decide of this sin as it will be held as sin but cannot be treated as equal things, and so he speaks of the grades of sin. Finally, he lists up those sins which committed against all but God's program. He divides them into two categories. The first category includes the sin of the ignorance of God. Shah 'Abdullah is of the view that a man can be ignorant of God through two greatest sins. Not only he is the ignorant but he also knows the God but does not believe in Him in a manner of equal status. Every one would, therefore, believe in Him. The second category

above the sin of the disabled in the life hereafter. He
 considers it as a major sin because to him it is against
 reason and a man believing in this life alone is controlled
 by his senses and not by his reason. The soul of such
 a man after his death unite as illusion and desire in
 complete darkness. Keeping it in the first place means that
 it is the greatest sin and should therefore be avoided. One
 must have the knowledge of God, he should not contest and
 blend his opinions with the attributes of God. His
 opinions should not be moderated with the help of a scholar
 for it requires great care in its enforcement. One should
 also be careful of polytheism. It means that he should not
 see God's attributes in any of its creations. To affirm
 it is to, he should have a firm belief in the life hereafter.
 In the second grade are the sins belonging to the denial of
 the greatness (small) of the God's chosen persons. God
 invites those qualifying to them to achieve a great dignity.
 The class of this type does neither believe in the dignity
 of such persons nor in the gifts given to them by God.
 Such a person, as Shah Waliullah thinks, is deprived of his
 desired dignity. The third grade of sins includes those deeds
 which deprive man of God's deliverance (salat). They are
 either the forbidden deeds or those against the nature of

and some of them such as working in very grave, others are serious and still others like gambling etc. are harmful. These activities are done by those controlled by consciousness. The qualification of this type of sin depends on the involvement of the soul of the person in the sin. Some of them are in the grip of consciousness or animality. In their case the soul can be saved by following the commands of the Shariah. Some of these sins are very heinous and require rigorous efforts to eradicate this sin from their souls. The disobedience to the command (Shariah) and ways of God is a sin of the fourth grade. The people must believe in the commands of God revealed to their prophets to eradicate evil from the society. It is the duty of the followers to act in accordance with the principles and commands of God revealed to the prophets of different times, ages and places. Regarding some of the issues God clearly reveals His will to His prophet and those left untouched must be done in accordance with the will of the prophet. Shah Waliullah seems to advocate that every man should follow the prophet of his age. The fifth grade of sin involves the denial of the will of God regarding some divine laws by a man or a man in agreement with men. Speculating in what Waliullah suggests that there

are sure deeds about which nothing is said by God nor by the prophet but were persons obtaining God's proximity gets the knowledge of either their affliction or of negation and other people would follow him, for God has told him via will about those actions. It should however be borne in mind that every one should not strive for the knowledge of the will of God, for God gives to everyone in accordance with his capacity and as one should, therefore, hasten himself to see that his capacity. The prophet (Isaiah) has categorically affirmed not to be severe to oneself as it is beyond ones capacity, and if one persists in being severe to oneself God will punish him. The people in general are, therefore, advised to follow the path of truth.²⁹

The discussion of the grades of almsgiving is another discussion regarding the perceptions brought about by alms. In the beginning of the discussion he defines the two grades of alms as the major alms (al-kabira) and minor alms (al-saghira) as given by the charity of Islam. The major and the minor alms are to be understood in two respects namely (1) in respect of the nature of virtue of alms and (2) in respect of the commands (ahkam) and principle belonging to different ages. The major alms (al-kabira), from the point of view of the nature of virtue and alms, is the alms necessarily

results in the torture on his door in his grave and on the Day of Judgment or it is a sin resulting into the perversion in the hereditary efforts (shakhs-e nafsi), or it is a sin inducing a man to do something against his nature. And minor sin (saghat) is one which may lead to the results of the major sin or may probably lead to an action following the results of the major sin or it is a sin which in the way leads to some perversion and for otherwise helps to avoid it. Relating it he gives an example of a man sacrificing all his money for the sake of God but as a consequence ^{that} his children starve to death. By sacrificing his wealth he certainly has given up the habit of miserly but he commits another sin i.e. the sin of not looking after his family. In respect to the 'shari'ah', major sin (kathibat) is an action forbidden by God or it is a sin when committed by a man, he is declared as sinned from Islam. The shari'ah declares only 4 such actions as major sins which are against the will of God but their performance becomes traditional. The people insist on doing them. The shari'ah, keeping in view the perversions born out about by them in the society, forbids them by command and thus the people are made to abstain from their doing. It means that the evil deeds are declared as the major sins. Some of the others are the

what she was motivated in respect of the nature of virtue and vice has she now become major sin (al-kabira) when taken in respect of Shari'ah as explained above.³⁰

Having discussed the major and minor sin he equalises the pervasiveness brought about by the major sin. From the point of view of the nature of virtue and vice the major sin results into a corruption on its own. There is a controversy regarding the fact that the sinners will be forgiven or not. Millenium parts of hadith explaining their point of view present their arguments regarding the issue based on the Quran and the tradition. Such hadiths that give rise are not convincing. As to the view that the controversy may be resolved by taking into account the fact that there are the types of actions namely (1) the minor & very few involuntary actions (2) and the problems (ma'asil) which are also of two types, namely the necessary and probable. The two different problems (ma'asil) should be related to one and the same direction (jahat). To explain let us take an example. If a man says that poison causes death and the other asserts that it does not necessarily cause death, it implies that one can survive even after taking poison. In the first case it is a necessary judgment. That is to say that death must occur when the poison is

taken, and in the second case it is probable. Similar is the case with the actions of man. It is natural on his part that he should torture a man committing major sins but he can do otherwise as well. Besides, the man committing the major sin is, however, different from a non-believer and should not, therefore, be tortured for ever. Thus the greatest harm of the sin is lost.

Another harm brought about by the sin is the perversion of soul. It is on the basis of sin that man is either held as atheist, pagan, non-believer or a sinner. The condition of the souls of these persons is also different as they are at different stages as regards their belief. Such condition says that the divinity (believed) is developed by the creature (believer). Judgment towards God is in the nature of man but the man himself since his soul when he is completely controlled by it, the divinity in him becomes helpless. In the state of his helplessness he commits great sins. He denies the existence of God, does not believe in the prophet, and, putting it in brief, he denies religion. Now man is an atheist. His soul grows in darkness, he loses visibility in understanding the concrete of divinity but his action is against the nature of the divinity in him and it remains useless. Such a man,

as that which is in the greatest sin, for he
 does not believe in God, His commands and His prophet.
 Thereafter he describes the pagans. They do not believe
 in the unity of God and do not follow His command. They
 insist on their previous beliefs. Any such belief, however,
 is a sin. The sickness of (malakibat) in them is also
 controlled by the consciousness (hishiyat). Their souls
 are also restless, for they do against nature. Next is
 those who are of those who do understand the unity of
 God (Tawhid) and are also convinced of the validity of His
 commands but do not follow them. The last of all are those
 who believe the commands of God and together with this also
 identify themselves in their sins. The condition of the
 soul is explained by the analogy of a bird in a cage. In
 the first case the soul is like a bird in a cage having no
 holes. In the second case it is like the bird in a cage
 in which there are holes but covered with a veil. In the
 third case it is like a bird in a cage having holes but
 outside is covered and all these holes. In the fourth case the
 soul is like a bird in a cage having holes. It is covered
 or the other can free itself by tearing its feathers and
 skin but thereafter will not be able to live with its fellow
 beings due to the wounds. Thus the soul has been explained

in this tradition that some will ^{be} burnt in the fire, others will fall in it and thereafter may be redeemed and still others will only face the flames and thereafter he will be forgiven. 33

The class described above are the ones following the soul. We shall in the preceding lines deal with those also related to the outward behaviour of man. To begin with the discussion, Bush ³⁴ tells us that there are many kinds of animal species in the world. Each of them has certain characteristics and it is in accordance with them that it lives its life. The most ordinary of them are the insects. God only tells them how to find out their food, and other than this they know nothing and need nothing. The birds are the next in the hierarchy of the animal species. They are told how to find out their food, how to build their nests and how to give birth to their off springs. Next is that of the mammals. They are also informed of the ways of getting the food, seeking the shelter and producing their offsprings. At the top of the hierarchy there stands man who has been given reason and guidance to probe into the matters related to his life. God informs him of only few things which he uses in childhood and grows up to face the environment in which he leads social, economic and

political life. He has to get the knowledge as to how to live his life. For some of the affairs guidance is given to him by revelation through the prophet and he becomes aware of the will of God. In some of the affairs he follows his protagonists and other respected persons and they give their knowledge. From after that there are many affairs about which he has to decide himself and he does decide by preferring over them and choosing one of their positions.

Knowledge about them comes from his friends. God does not guide him regarding all affairs, for then he would not be able to use his reason. It is here that the choice of choice comes before him and he either chooses the right or the wrong action. By choosing wrong one he commits a sin.

Describing the life of man that intelligently classifies the actions into three categories namely (1) the actions related to the sex, (2) hegemonic actions (takawful) and (3) actions related to social dealing. We shall describe the same one by one. Before describing the actions related to sex it should be pointed out that man is the master of desires and every one of them wants to fulfill his own and does not ignore the interference of others in their fulfillment but if the course of intolerance is pursued it will certainly be hazardous and there will be no one to live in the world. In

apart to avoid it God has prescribed a path for the completion of things, it is done for God's sake and it is in the nature of man and he must pursue it.³²

The sexual desire is natural because it helps increase life population and thus it is a natural desire in the species of life animals. 'In the animals and the birds God has given no source but in case of man it is necessary. Such inhibition presents a very psychological condition saying that no one tolerates interference in the sexual pleasure. The animals, when disturbed, quarrel with each other and the strong gets over the weak. The weak consequently runs away and the strong enjoys with the female. Man also does not tolerate any interference in his sexual affairs but he cannot be left to quarrel with each other if disturbed. It is, therefore, better in the case of man to have a source for himself. It is the right course of the fulfillment of the sexual desire. Many of them sin against other ways and they commit sin because their doing are very much against their nature.

Keeping in view the fact, man's life is amid the necessary actions are also forbidden. Drinking, for example is forbidden because it disturbs the economic life of man. In the state of intoxication man loses his reason and he

steps making allies. Consequently, he affects his economic life. Now it is the nature of man and together with this he has the potentiality of revenge. He is angry when something is done against his will, and like many other animals he decides to take revenge. Being controlled by this tendency he often murders or gets murdered or gives poison. In any of the cases it is a danger to himself, and consequently, all such hazardous actions are treated as forbidden.

There are many actions related to the social dealings which disturb the social life. Stealing, for example, harms the equality. It disturbs man's economic life. It has, therefore, been forbidden. And if not kept as man would have been reduced to naught. Murder is the case with killing a life. It is also regarded as social evil and has, therefore, been forbidden. All these actions as they disturb the life of man are forbidden by God. Man is aware that a good life must refrain himself from doing them and must consider them as sin. Alongwith this, he should be aware of getting punishment in case he performs them.

We have discussed the virtuous and vicious and having understood it, it is rather apt to deal with reward and punishment in the preceding passage.

The problem of reward and punishment has been a matter of controversy in the history of Muslim philosophy. To date it indispensable to give a brief description of the approach adopted by different philosophers to explain reward and punishment. In connection with this, we shall aptly refer to the schools of determinism (Ja'fari) and indeterminism (Ash'ari). The former believed in the fallibility of reward and punishment, for it contended that man is a free in the hands of God and whatever he does is actually done by Him. The contention is supported by the verses of Quran and also by the traditions. To some of them we have referred elsewhere. At present it will suffice to say that in the face of complete determinism, reward and punishment have no meaning.

But as we know and as a common man believes that reward and punishment have been promised in the holy Quran and in the traditions as well, it must, therefore, have some meaning. Keeping this in view, the latter (Ash'ari) believes in reward and punishment. In support of the contention, many verses from the Quran, and traditions as well may be quoted.²² And on the basis of these verses and traditions it can rightly be inferred that the reward and punishment are the matters of reality and shall have to be enjoyed or faced. Stepping forward in the realm of the history

of philosophy we come to other schools of thought. Landing a thought provoking contribution to the problem of reward and punishment. These schools usually materialism and atheism are of no less importance in the history of philosophy. Both of them agree on the basic proposition of the reward and punishment and also hold as a matter of conviction that it is necessary in this life and the life hereafter. The materialists being the offspring of Utilitarians are of the view that God must reward the virtuous and punish the vicious. In support of their conviction they quote the verses of Quran. The atheists neither believe in any legislation on God regarding the reward and punishment nor, like the Utilitarians, do they, believe in the humanity but take up a position in midway and hold that reward and punishment are essential but ^{it} entirely depends on the will of God whom we reward and whom to punish. God can reward for a virtuous action and punish a vicious one we can, however, do otherwise as well. It is also worth mentioning that unlike Utilitarians who believe in the priority of a man, the atheists give priority to evolution and pronounce that it is evolution which informs man about an action of the being virtuous or vicious. Arguing the same, they put forward a very convincing example of the just which by all

death and from every aspect is a virtue, but the very same action is forbidden on certain days in the year and thus becomes a punishable action.

That utilitarian gives his disapproval on the reward and punishment by holding a belief in the basic proposition that it is a merit in this life and the life hereafter, and it is therefore that he begins from the cause of reward and punishment and not from the controversy whether merit will be rewarded or punished for his deeds or not. His not indulging into the controversy is suggestion of the fact that he takes it a priori. To me disapproval on destiny we have pointed out that he neither believes in determinism nor in indeterminism but in some determinism which on one hand denies the free will to man and on the other affirms it. We shall deal with it in the conclusion of this discussion. In the preceding passage we shall discuss the nature of reward and punishment as described by that utilitarian.

There are, as he says, many causes but two of them are important and leaving the minor ones he describes only the major ones. The first cause of reward and punishment lies in the fact of sanitation by the divinity of its having done some action. That utilitarian is of the view that like the sanitation of knowledge the divinity in man also has a

capable to review its actions and in the process of review it detects any wrong action and consequently is disappointed and on doing the right actions it is delighted. The contentment and relief are, the blessings. The soul, due to the divinity in it is position to know as to what is right and what is against it. Having realized it the soul feels pain in case some wrong action has been done. It is relieved of it by the angels. It often witnesses pain in the dream. It sees the angels in horrible form in the case of wrong action, and in a righteous and majestic form in the case of a good action. It, in short, knows that not it made cause of his actions and he can avoid the undesirable and choose the good one. The following verses of the Quran reflect to a large extent the self-revelation regarding the action :

عَلِمَ مَنْ كَسَبَ (النحل)

(Those who perform bad actions will be burnt in the furnace of Hell and will be there for ever).

According to that tradition, the reward given of reward and punishment in the situation of shirkah (the world of angels). Explaining it he asserts that in the world of higher angels (malakut) all the desirable and undesirable actions are present. Thus the men who perform the desirable actions are blessed by the higher angels

[Bala-4-a'10] and those choosing the undesirable way are cursed by them. The prayers of higher angels are granted by God and thereafter the higher angels assist the good and to bless them and victims, never to inflict pain, agony, vengeance and wrath. Such belief is of the view that the prayer of the angels has been mentioned to explain the destruction, extinction, as a matter of fact, God from the very moment of the creation of the sky and earth stands to them, awards the virtues and punishes the vice. As reference to it he quotes the following verses from the Holy Quran :

(وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ عَنْ آلِهَتِهِمْ كُفِّرُوا - ١٠)

[Those who will die in the state of Paganism shall always be cursed by me, the angels, and men. They shall always live in the state of torture and agony of which they shall never get rid off].

It is not necessary that there should be any one of the causes to bring reward or punishment to man but both of them could occur at the same time. In the case of the first cause the divinity is not to be compelled by the universality and to become so much strong that the divinity takes all the hold, we are aware of the state of such belief that one important in the previous position. It is clear that we mean that the divinity would control the universality and not otherwise, and even otherwise because the state of affairs is nothing but the state of man in which man is

his actions is guided by his reasonableness (*rahimiyat*) instead
 of the divinity (*ilawata mahabbat*). The divinity, however,
 does not remain suppressed for good. It sometimes illumines
 the soul to realize its own state. It is possible in the
 case of individuals and worldly actions for only those who
 have a radiant soul. Thus the first cause is removed. The
 second one is to be removed by certain other contrary
 causes meaning thereby that the causes resulting into the
 bliss and reward can do away the effect of a cause resulting
 into the cause and punishment. And by this away and grace
 almost is a man in action and eradicates the will. The
 following verse is quoted in this reference :

۱۲۳ - ~~بسیار است~~ *بسیار است* *فی* *الک*

(Every action has its own time and when the time comes, it
 is done by itself and with).

Thus the causes of reward and punishment, like the causes of
 other things, yield any of the fruits namely either the
 fruit of reward or that of punishment. It depends on and
 is determined by one of the two caused by the facts described
 above.²²

Having registered the causes that result in the reward and
 punishment after death, at the subject of the
 discussion he quotes the following verses from Holy Quran.

1.

ما دما يكلم - (الح)

[All the lifelines are by your own actions]

2.

روى الله - (الح)

[Verily had they not apostatized the old and New Testaments and the commands of God they would had had a plenty of [love].

3.

ان تروى - (الح)

[Whatever is there in your hearts whether you reveal it or keep secret, God will, he that, demand you is account for it].

4.

من يعبد سوري - (الح)

[Whoever does a bad action shall be punished for it].

All these verses are indicative of the fact that reward and punishment are earned by our himself. In the case of wrong actions he invites trouble for himself. Contrary to this the virtuous actions result into God's blessings. Having committed a sin if a man repents and sorrows for it God may pardon him. The sense of sin and repentance makes him honest and virtuous. In the state of sin the selfishness rules over the divinity. This domination ends either in the physical death when divinity goes apart and illuminates the soul, or in the self imposed death (that is in the state of actuality) when a man continuously abhors himself in mortification (mujahadah) to subjugate the animality and incessantly attends to the world of heaven (al-haqq). Consequently, the divinity (malikiyat)

divinizes his soul and sensuality is sublimated (sublimated).
This sublimation of sensuality is his death.²⁴

It should be borne in mind that every thing is
delighted to do the action in accordance with his nature
and if it happens to perform the contrary action, it is
grieved. In the same way all the actions embodying delight
and the actions bearing lament are also revealed in the form
giving delight or inflicting pain. To explain his proposition
he gives the example of a nail and other examples which in
other are seen in the form of trouble. Thus it is also
that the domination of divinity brings delight, and the
domination of sensuality inflicts pain. In accordance with
his nature one should be inclined towards his divinity to
get delight, otherwise he will be grieved and sad. That
delight is his reward and lament is his punishment.²⁵

Reward and punishment are not only the matters of the
life hereafter but are quite very of them in accordance with his
deeds in this world as well. God has categorically affirmed
that every one shall reap as he sows in this world and in
the otherworld. Every action is the effect of a cause and the
reward and punishment in accordance with the deeds also
proceed from the cause of actions. In order to understand
the phenomena of reward and punishment the causes should

necessarily be undergone for with out understanding the effect, reward and punishment cannot be justified. Sometimes it so happens that a virtuous man finds himself in a state of persistence and he is unable to understand its cause. In such a case his own virtuous actions are the causes and he is put in such a state for the purification of his heart and soul and for the emancipation of his sins. A Muslim, as Shah Waliullah holds, remains in the state of persistence for the reasons prescribed above. A non-believer, on the other hand, is in the state of worldly prosperity and pleasure. It is because he wants him to enjoy the world even in this last breath and thereby increase his sins by indulging himself in luxury and dissoluteness. For this, the life hereafter will be eternal hell. In support of his contention, Shah Waliullah quotes the tradition

يقين الموت . (34)

(The believer is like a tender tree which is swayed to and fro by the wind and if it falls down. The non-believer is like a strong tree not allowing the wind to shake it but at last very suddenly falls down.

The simile is expressive of the fact that a believer lives a life of persistence and a non-believer a life of peace and prosperity. Further were the prophet aware that every pleasant anticipation a believer (must) from his sin.²⁶

Many people in the world indulge themselves in Turkish

deeds. In the history of mankind evil has crept in the society several times through the ages but each time God has helped man to eradicate the evil from the society and each time man has disobeyed the commands of God. The verses of Holy Quran, for example the following one refer to the sending of the prophets by God in the world.

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا - رَأْسًا

{In each village God has sent a prophet, He has punished the people for their disobedience. They often blamed God as have ill treated their forefathers. God in return punished them for their misconception.}

Reward and punishment are earned by man in the world itself. All the man will have to account for their actions on the day of judgement, and not only the man, the other creature like Jin, will also be rewarded and punished for their deeds. The following verses refer to this fact

وَنُفِثَ فِي السَّحَابِ

{God will be at leisure to look into the stories of the creatures on this day}.

The system of reward and punishment are realized by man in this world. In the case of reward, he feels ecstatic and rapturous and in the case of punishment heavy and gloomy. It is necessary for a believer to understand the phenomena of reward and punishment. It will help him earn the reward and avoid the punishment on one hand and remember the earthly traditions on the other. By the

contrary traditions, the Shah means the following :

- a) The illustrations are purged of sin.
- b) Those who indulge in luxury are actually the ones to be purged for their deeds.

There is no contradiction in the two traditions, for a believer leads a life of simplicity and a non believer a life of luxury.

Looking up the discussion we should see that it is evident from the words of Shah Naimish that he believes in the reward and punishment, from the above discussion it is also clear that Shah Naimish does not only advocate the notion of reward and punishment to be realised in the life hereafter but also pleads for them in this life, and by taking the support of the traditions and the verses of Quran he holds his contention and puts it in a convincing way.

Regarding the free will, much has been discussed while dealing with the destiny. It should, however be pointed out here that he rather believes in determinism and in fatalism and he takes up a midway position to point out that man has been given the freedom of choice. He could choose either the good or virtuous action or wrong or vicious actions. He also rationalises as to why the good

actions should be chosen saying that they are in accordance
 with the nature of man and in order to satisfy his own
 nature, that choice is undeniably his own. Let us
 recollect that even in the matter of strictly hypothetical
 indispensability on the same basis. Thus to him the choice
 of virtuous action is a right choice, for it corresponds to
 the nature of man himself. Regarding the right of the
 artist, he states Chastell and is of the view that the laws
 of the artists are created in the world of forms. It is
 certainly suggestive of the fact that the artists originate
 in God. The notion of choice, then, is as we seen in
 their completion and that depends on age. That Tolstoy
 may be criticised for saying that every man is destined
 to do what he does in the world and in such a case to
 question to do of reward and punishment unless. Yet in our
 opinion it will not be a proper assessment of his position
 because he says it being on the fact that God knows
 everything, He knows the future of man as well. and as
 there is nothing beyond His knowledge, man's destiny can ^{not} also
 be so on par. God knows the foundation of the soul of
 man. It is here that the destiny is shaped according to what
 that every soul must be divine. If it looks, it means that
 it has the soul the wrong and for this it should be punished.

There is our opinion that individual does not deny free will to man, yet man is not free in all spheres, destiny plays its own part. We are either in by necessity. The Sikh emphasis on it at several places, freedom of choice of man gives him free will and destiny determines it. But as we have said it in the beginning, it is neither complete determinism nor complete indeterminism, on the contrary it is the determined freedom.³⁷

C O N C L U S I O N

The philosophy of Shah Waliullah, as we conclude, is a *naifi* philosophy. We have admitted it elsewhere and as we do here that the Shah was a practicing *Naifi* and it is therefore, that his epistemology, metaphysics and ethics are dominated by *naifism* but it does not mean that he has nothing to do with philosophy as such. Shah Waliullah even in the explanation of *naifi* problems presents rational arguments. Moreover, he takes to criticize the *naifi* at many places.

The thesis at hand tries to present a comprehensive philosophy of Shah Waliullah. We have begun it with epistemology. As we are aware, the philosophers in general, including the *Naifis* and the *Naifi* themselves as the two sources of knowledge. Regarding their veracity and truth, there is a controversy among the philosophers. We have taken to discuss it in the beginning of his epistemology. Shah Waliullah neither challenges the authority of the *Naifis* nor does he deny the validity of reason as the source of knowledge but he does emphasize as a hierarchy. To him the lowest kind of knowledge is imparted by the *Naifis*. The reason gives a higher kind

of knowledge. Apart from these sources he also considers the heart, the soul and the hidden power (sirr) as the sources of knowledge, and one yields higher knowledge than the other. Shah Waliullah being a sufi gives much emphasis to the soul (nafs) and considers it to be the highest source of knowledge. Besides, he lays much emphasis on the forms of intuitive knowledge. Meditation (Kashf), Inspiration (Ilham), contemplation (Istisqa), revelation (Wahi) and hidden power (sirr), all of them are the forms of intuitive knowledge. Were he to see many other sufis like Ghazali, Rumi etc. like him they also believe in these forms of intuitive knowledge.

In the light of his views on epistemology we come to conclude that Shah Waliullah emphasises on the knowledge of the dispositions for the attainment of the knowledge of the world and that of the divine being (God). According to him the dispositions bring out a discipline in the life of a sufi meaning thereby that it stands as indispensable for the pursuit of sufi course. Shah Waliullah is of the view that the ignorance of the dispositions prevents his progress and whatever he knows on practicing lacks experience. Shah Waliullah, therefore, speaks of the advantages of their knowledge and also

before of the value of their ignorance. The advantages
 of the knowledge of dispositions that he speaks of are
 (1) The mfi knows the right way to conquer God,
 (2) he becomes aware of the fact that the knowledge of
 the things falling out of the area of sensory can be attained
 by the dispositions. Describing the losses of their
 ignorance that mitalah holds that (1) is one of the
 ignorance from dispositions the work cannot cannot be made
 strong. As a matter of fact he is unable to know as to
 which of these dispositions is weak and how it can be made
 strong. It is indeed essential for him as any such
 ignorance would hamper his progress. However, he should
 be aware, which of the dispositions should dominate the
 others so that he might control the strange powers in him,
 (2) the other harm consists in the fact that the mfi
 passing through the alternate stages of purification and
 unadulterated finds himself in a complete astonishment and
 wonder, for he is at a loss to understand as to what he
 is going to with him and where he is at a particular stage.
 Still another harm of the ignorance of these dispositions
 lies in the fact that the mfi is unable to understand
 the stage of his predicament and considers it as the
 highest or the final one. Hence it may be pointed out

that Shih Wai-chieh seems to criticize the followers of utilitarian (shih-shih wai-jai). It can be established on the basis of his ideas regarding the stage of shih-shih wai-jai which he considers as lower than 'shih-shih', we have discussed it in his metaphysics. However, we shall bring it to light in the preceding passage. But we may repeat that Shih Wai-chieh, though does not reject utilitarian, yet considers it as the lower stage. Thus the knowledge of the disposition is indispensable for a self because of his advantages on one hand and on the other that he can save himself of the harm in the case of ignorance from that. As a matter of fact saving himself of those harm is also an advantage.⁴

Shih Wai-chieh proceeds on the disposition and gives us an analytical approach by describing the meanings of different terms used by the sages. He is of the view that the meanings should necessarily be determined so that the context may be clear and there should be no difficulty in understanding and comprehending the underlying thought. Dismissing the problem, he takes up the term 'sage' which is sometimes used as the nature of man and sometimes as the inner soul and at others as the heart. In each case it will have different implications, defects and qualities.

In the same way the heart is also used to mean different things. Sometimes it is used to mean a bit of flesh in the body, and at others the power that controls the emotions. In the latter case it is a dignification. Shah Waliullah also notes that in different meanings but the context helps us to determine them. We shall not be wrong if we assert that as philosopher in the west taken up this analytical approach and even in the west this is one of the modern approaches which has recently been emphasized. Thus having gone through his discussion on the terminology we must acknowledge his initiative in adopting this approach. It is not only here that he emphasizes on the clarity of terms but at many places he informs the reader to avoid the confusion arising out of the difference of meaning implied by the terms.²

Shah Waliullah also discusses in his epistemology the limitations of the sources of knowledge. It stands as a fact that each one of them imparts the knowledge but in its limited span. He takes them to discuss so that people may not rely on any one of them as every one of them has its own area of conception and cannot be understood as sufficient for the knowledge of everything. He begins it with the external senses (Jawahir). They give us the

knowledge of the worldly objects as they are seen and perceived but the reality there is, cannot be known. The heart gives us the knowledge of emotions. The reason in the same way has also its own domain. It perceives the opposites. By thus he unites the actual and the abstract, explaining it explicitly we should assert that Shuk Mishkiah reportedly calms it and that every object in the world has its form in the world of forms. Thus the object present in the world is the actualization of the forms present in the world of forms. The reason perceives their differences and the relations as well. It also comprehends the differences of the attributes and the substances and along with this also goes through these qualities. Higher than the reason is the system of Shuk Mishkiah there is yet another source of knowledge lower to the hidden part or the 'sirr'. It, as we have pointed out in the beginning, is a form of intuitive knowledge. Shuk Mishkiah like any other wife relies on the validity of the intuitive knowledge, meditation, contemplation, inspiration and revelation. All of them have now given due place as the sources of knowledge. As it has been said that many of the sages rely on intuition, adding to it we should assert that philosophers also believe in its priority. Supporting our contention we can

refer to Iqbal and Bergson. For Iqbal intuition probes into the matters where the reason is struck with wonder and unable to see which is which. It will be apt to quote him :

مے حاضر گوید پر ادا کتنی ضرورتِ محسوس
 فعل ہے حرکتِ شاعری کے لیے بزمِ افسوس

Many other verses can be cited but we need not go into the details for we have just captured him. The quotations are enough to prove that Iqbal like Shah Waliullah, believed in the validity of the intuition knowledge and ranked it as high as any other source of knowledge. Ghazali and Rumi also espoused an intuition. For them the revelation is one of the forms of intuitive knowledge, has priority over all of the sources of knowledge. So it is in the case of Shah Waliullah. He also does not challenge, as mentioned before, the authority of other sources, yet the knowledge imparted by the intuition is the most sure and the most correct. After using the hidden power he man wakes him realise the secret of truth which is the highest type of knowledge. But it should be kept in view that even this hidden power (al-ir) is not prior to revelation. He again and again emphasises at the head of the prophet and considers the institution of prophethood as the source of human welfare. Thus Shah Waliullah, like other Sufis and

philosophers, accepting the validity of other sources of knowledge, emphasize on intuition as the source of knowledge.⁸

Having spoken of the limitations of the senses and the importance of the hidden power (al-irr), Shah Waliullah brings to light the distinction between reason and 'reason', here again he emphasizes on the clarity of the term and by doing so removes the confusion that arises otherwise. Both reason and Zaq impart to us the knowledge of the objects. Yet they are not one and the same and are distinguished on the basis of their source. The reason comprehends the qualitative of objects and Zaq is the power through which the existing object with its contradictory qualities is comprehended. Reason fails to understand the contradiction of the qualities existing in the objects. As a matter of fact it is the sense of the senses which apparently perceives the contradiction of qualities, otherwise, in actuality, as Shah Waliullah thinks, there exists no such contradiction. Supporting his assertion he argues that no two individuals are alike and yet they are not different from each other. It is obvious that they are not alike due to the individual qualitative and yet different from each other due to formal and essential qualities. Besides, it also stands as a fact

that witness of these qualities make the individual what he is. Explaining it he gives the example of some of the qualities existing in man, yet only these qualities do not go to make him a man, for man without them he would have been the same what he is due to their presence in him. Looking through the differences in the individuals he comes to conclude that the world contains objects existing thereby that every object is present in abstracts and it is its form. It is evident that they are neither alike nor different from each other. Even after being separate they are related with one another and this relation is established in the fact of manifestation by the universal soul which is source of all qualities. Criticising the followers of material world he asserts that they are at a loss to understand the relation between the external world and the human beings and the universal soul. In the light of this discussion we may conclude that the Jang perceives this relation and gains its knowledge.⁸

Shah Waliullah holds a practical and emphatic view on the soul. He is of the view that the essence of man and other beings is the soul though it differs in category. Keeping it in view he describes different categories of soul namely the animal soul (nab-haywan) the rational

soul (nafsa natiqa), universal soul (nafsa kulliyah),
 divine soul (nafs alavi), angelic soul (nafsa malakiyah),
 world soul (nafs samavi), heavenly soul (nafsa falakiyah)
 and perfect soul (nafsa kamiliyah). Apart from them there
 are some other categories like the mineral soul (nafsa
 tabaiyah), vegetative soul (nafsa nabatiyah). Each of them
 resides in the matter related to its capacity and in the
 being of the object. We have discussed these categories
 in his epistemology, for it stands as the source of knowledge.
 At present we should point out that Ibram Shah Mulla'ish
 whom Aristotle who, in his book "On the soul" speaks of
 different souls and then discusses the hierarchy of souls.
 Ibram Shah Mulla'ish takes it as partly, for like Aristotle
 holds that the entire existence comes from one form and
 it is the universal soul (nafsa kulliyah). Not, unlike
 Aristotle, Shah Mulla'ish does not regard it as the absolute
 form. He believes in God as the creator of all things.
 He even can consider God as the form of forms or the
 absolute form but understands him transcending all. Thus
 we may conclude that Shah Mulla'ish seems to be influenced
 by Aristotle but he is not a mere follower. He has something
 to add as his own.³

Discussing the categories of soul Shah Mulla'ish also

describes the nature of every one of them and in accordance with their nature they have their own functions in periods. To begin with every one of them is divine but the element of divinity is in accordance with their grades. The animal soul is created out of the temperature and controls the animality. The optimal soul is confined to man and controls him as a man. But proceeding from the animal and optimal institutions what has been the soul also, the animal and the optimal and each of them controls the tendencies related to them. As a matter of fact the lowest is the element of the latter. The universal soul is more divine in nature and manifests itself in different parts of existence. For instance, the vegetation, the animal and the rational souls are its manifestation and it manifests itself in accordance with the universal expediency (*ma'alihat kull*).⁶

In his epistemology we have discussed in detail that Ghaz Nalqish believes in three types of dispositions namely the external (*jawarih*), the internal (heart, reason and soul), the secret dispositions - the divine soul and the world soul. We have mentioned it here it points out that Ghaz Nalqish includes the soul in two dispositions, the internal and the secret ones. By doing it he on one hand discusses the hierarchy of soul and on the other points out

that the knowledge of more subtle things cannot be gained by the soul of lower capacity. The divine soul and the world soul though are present in man, yet are not realized until the internal dispositions are not purified and with the help of these dispositions the soul enables himself to know the secrets of the world and heaven.

Discussing the divine soul Shah Waliullah speaks of a saint known as 'hajre bahar' and it is the essence of the divine soul and is realized by a soul who reaches the stage of pure consciousness (*qahar bahar*). Having realized this point he sees through every other secrets which so far remained unknown to him. On the basis of the discussion regarding 'hajre bahar' we may conclude that it is the source of the highest type of intuitive knowledge.⁷

It is obvious that the point mentioned above can be the source of knowledge for the few only. Here again it depends on the stage reached by the soul. As we know the divine soul is a compendia of (1) optimal soul, (2) the world soul and (3) the hajre bahar. One of the three dominates the others and the stage of the soul is determined on the basis of the domination which has been discussed in his epistemology. At present it will suffice to say that the soul in any of these stages understands the fact

that it is the universal soul which manifests itself in different parts. Criticising the followers of Maheshwajid Shah, Shihabuddin points out that they cannot comprehend this fact and considered the existence to be the manifestation of the One beyond one such. Besides, he also criticises the followers for not having perceived the relation between the attributes and the substance. Although, as he thinks, there is a unity underlying the diversity, yet it is not of the kind which merges into One. To him the unity is hidden in the opposites. The reason must be understood by seeing the contradictory qualities of the objects which are inherent in their being. The qualities of one are shared by others. It is because that all of them are manifestations of universal soul and being its manifestation there is a resemblance with each other, and on the basis of these similarities they are bound up in a unity. And on the basis of this unity they are related with each other. Thus it is neither the relationship, as understood by the followers of Maheshwajid Shah nor is it the one proposed by the people of universal shahid. Here Shihabuddin partly supports the notion by understanding the objects to be the manifestation brought out of God but of the universal soul (nafas kulliyah) and he differs from

the whole by asserting that the complete knowledge of God is a notion of impossibility. We only know a part of the truth.⁴

It is not natural that if these sources of knowledge are perverted, the life as a whole should be affected. During the perversion a person will be unable to know the right thing and thus the wrong would guide his life. It is inevitable that when selfishness overpowers us the purification of these dispositions. In case they are properly purified and trained man would lead a virtuous and moral life and the otherwise would reverse the evil deeds. Such Utilitarians are of the view that any of these dispositions can be perverted and the perversion of each of them would influence the other. Besides, the perversion of one would result into the creation of a pessimistic evil. Explaining it he holds that if the soul is perverted, man would lead a sensual life; if his heart is perverted, he will be guided by his emotions and the perverted reason would not let him discern the right and wrong. He rightly asserts that the perversion of any of them would affect the other, for all of them work in coordination and any of them goes astray, the whole will also follow it. The purified and trained dispositions would help man

include all the Muslim virtues namely piety (ihsan), attention to God (ikhsan), detachment (fakr) and Justice (adl). On the basis of this discussion we may conclude that the correct knowledge depends on the right sources and if they are obtained and assimilated they cannot lead us to true knowledge. In the case of not being able to get the true knowledge it will be difficult for us to lead a good and virtuous life.

There has been a controversy regarding the Shar'iah and 'taqiyya'. Some of the ulema are of the view that 'taqiyya' is more important than the Shar'iah'. It will be worthwhile to mention here, as Shah Waliullah has himself discussed, that the Raghbunadi in particular laid emphasis on it and did not give due importance to Shar'iah. But as Shah Waliullah thinks that Khwaja Raghbunad indeed did not mean it, his followers either misunderstood him and misinterpreted his thought. It was, therefore, that Shah Waliullah took up to explain the importance of Shar'iah but it should be borne in mind that he still persists to follow his method of synthesis and consequently affirming the importance of Shar'iah along with, however, with the relevance of 'taqiyya'. But to quote as a fact that the Shar'iah being the spirit of Islam is more important.⁹

We must go to the very pertinent remark that Shih
 Huailish had a great insight into human nature. He was
 completely aware of the fact that in spite of the nature
 of human beings, which is good in itself, that may be
 perverted due to the weakness inherited by man from his
 ancestors. It is for this reason that he vehemently
 emphasises on the purification and training of the
 dispositions possessed by man. To him, Shari'ah is only
 the way to purify and train these dispositions. Discussing
 it he holds that there are two aspects of Shari'ah namely
 the internal and the external one. The external aspect
 purifies the five senses (Jawarih). It keeps man refrain
 from the sins and establishes a system of values. The
 internal aspect of Shari'ah purifies man's soul and makes
 him understand the meaning of vice and virtue. On this
 basis we may conclude that by following the external
 aspect man travels on the path of righteousness without
 any conception and penetration into the validity of his
 action and following the internal aspect he possesses the
 right choice by being convinced of its righteousness. It
 seems to me that Shih Huailish suggests that righteousness
 is based on Shari'ah and it is rather advisable for man to
 be convinced of leading a life of virtue and goodness, which

it we may conclude, is a matter of impossibility if the dispositions are not purified and trained. Thus the external and the internal aspects purify different dispositions and in accordance with the purification of the dispositions the stage of the soul is determined. For example one whose heart is purified and trained is truthful (sadiq), one whose minority is trained is a son of obedience (saki), one whose reason is purified is a learned man (fakihi al ilm), and one whose dispositions and passions are not trained but he avoids a life of excess, is righteous (sakihi yasi).

The chief importance of the Shariah ilm is the fact that there are two tendencies in man, namely the animal or sensual tendency and the rational or spiritual tendency. The former incline man to the life of sin and profanity and the latter to the life of piety and virtue. Shariah being a discipline takes within the former inclination and due to their inclination man becomes pure and clean. Thus it may be concluded that Shariah enjoys a primacy in the domination of virtue in the life of man. Moreover, it takes man impart the knowledge. Being the complete discipline it informs man about the right and the wrong. Thus it is established that the Shariah has

ethical and epistemological importance and essentially be acted upon.¹⁰

Shah Muhiyiddin also emphasizes on the habitual readiness to God. One must obey God not because that He has commanded for it and because we feel an urge of obedience. It can be subverted in him by worship and prayer. It is necessary, then that the worship and prayer should categorically be performed by man. We have discussed it in detail in its epistemology. It will suffice to say that speaking on the importance of worship Shah Muhiyiddin is of the view that it purifies the disposition and helps one reach a stage. He is right as understood in this way, for many sufis like Ghazali and others have emphasized on the performance of worship and prayer. Jalal Rumi lays a great emphasis on its performance and considers it to be the duty of man.¹¹

Love has a great importance in the will discipline. It is rather indispensable for the reason as it helps the master of desire to the care of the heart of the will. It will not be wrong to say that without love the performance of the will serves for the will is a matter of impossibility. Like Ghazali and other sufis, Shah Muhiyiddin is also convinced of this fact and that is why he mentions

It is one of the stages of evil (error) (ashuk).

Having explained the sources of knowledge that willful takes as the dangers of getting false knowledge, the first one of them is the misunderstanding. That willful is of the view that many of the gulls are not capable of understanding the stages of annihilation and resurrection and it is therefore that the scholars of shari'ah have not explained them. But that willful considering it an inadvisable thing to explain them because the gulls of his time were rather confused about these stages and he saw in it a possibility of misunderstanding and error.

Discussing the dangers the Imam points out that they are rooted in the sources of knowledge namely the heart, reason and soul. We have described them in his epistemology and need not repeat them here. That willful is convinced of the fact that every event has its cause. It should however not be mistaken that he believes in the contemporary theory of causation. Every danger rooted in the sources of knowledge can be eradicated by analyzing its cause and, as a matter of fact, as inferred on the basis of his views, the best possible way of its eradication lies in the purification of the dispositions.¹²

Speaking of the *daqqa* *gha*, *Wailalish* also asserts that the *gull* should be able to know the divine motive. *Qismam* in he asserts that the *arpe* is created in the world of forms by the universal expediency (*maaliha* *hail*) and is brought to the individuals by the higher angels in the world of forms. The *salik* must have the capacity of admitting it. He *taawwaj* is informed of the divine motive in different ways. *Gha* *Wailalish* speaks of different possibilities which have already been described in his epistemology. Concluding it we may assert that *Gha* *Wailalish* presents a complete epistemology. He does not only speak of the sources of knowledge but also asserts as to how the correct and true knowledge can be gained. Alongwith this, he informs of the confusion regarding the use of terminology and also warns of the dangers in the attainment of true knowledge.¹³

At the outset of metaphysics of *Gha* *Wailalish* we have taken the realm of *synthesis* which may rightly be considered as his main contribution in the realm of metaphysics and *tafi*. By bringing out the *synthesis* he not only founded the *metaphysics* but also refuted *tafi*. And this brings us to conclude that he should be given the status enjoyed by *Qasali* and others in the

history of Muslim thought. We are of the view that Shah Waliullah was an epoch making person. He did not only influence the people of his age but also left a great deal of it to the generations coming after him. He dominated the political and the social scene of the time and also produced some philosophical problems regarded as crises in the history of Muslim philosophy. One of them was the controversy between the two schools of ahl-e sunn, namely Ash'arite Mujaz and Mu'tazilite Akhbar. He took up to resolve the controversy either by rejecting any of them or by propounding any other school but by seeking a reconciliation between the two. And, as history witnesses, he was unsuccessful in his efforts. His philosophical writings could earn for him a good deal of fame and reputation. Besides, he was honoured as a foremost intellectual and an erudite scholar of jurisprudence.¹⁴

Shah Waliullah did not attempt only at finding out similarities between the above mentioned schools of ahl-e sunn but he also tried to resolve the controversy in different fashions, namely shar'iat and ijtihad and various schools of jurisprudence (fiqh). We have mentioned it to prove that for Shah Waliullah synthetically was a method and he applied it in his various writings on different

subjects. This work only discusses the synthesis of the described sciences. Shah Waliullah puts forward convincing arguments to point out that *unaidiyat* and *shahidiyat* are the two stages and as the *shahidiyat* has been propounded in a later period of history, it is a higher stage. It should be borne in mind that Mujaddid Alf Thani also holds the same opinion but his followers reject me and propound the other. But Shah Waliullah does not take himself to any such thing. Contrary to this, he explains that they, being the stages should not be rejected. Shah Waliullah is of the view that the place of a thought in the history should be determined and having determined it we should try to understand the development of knowledge. He tells that every age has its own age of knowledge and whatever is missing in it is undoubtedly in accordance with the comprehension made possible on the basis of its development. Putting it more explicitly he expects that the people belonging to different ages have their own domain of perception which categorically depends on the standard of the knowledge developed in that age. In brief, one comes to conclude that Shah Waliullah does not reject the thought of any of his elders. Instead of it he reconciles all of them and resolves the controversy by saying that

They should be understood by placing in history, their time is the most suitable determinant of their value. It is suggestive of the fact that Shah Waliullah believes in the development of knowledge in a positive direction and is also convinced of the increasing complication of the ages and knowledge itself.²⁵

Illustrating the similarities between the two schools Shah Waliullah proceeds to saying that Truth is one and so vast that it cannot be claimed to have achieved it fully. As a matter of fact the truth even after being one is an ocean in itself and the seeker, despite of his all efforts, gets only a drop and is contented with it. Explaining it he presents the traditional analogy of the birds taking water from the spring drop by drop with their beaks and a traditional example of blind men having felt the parts of the lion. Both of them considered the part as whole. By presenting these examples Shah Waliullah aims at asserting that in the first case the truth stands beyond our reach and in the second phase it has been mistakenly understood. The analogy shows the vastness of the truth and the example gives us a clue of the incomprehensiveness of its grasp. In the first case it undoubtedly stands as convincing and in the second, as

Shah Waliullah himself asserts, a man of sound vision may correct the mistake. This assertion is suggestive of the fact that the followers of 'majaz' and 'ghalib' have not grasped, as they cannot, the whole truth and have mistaken by considering it as a whole when in fact, it is only a part. In the man of sound vision we see the projection of Shah Waliullah's personality. In our opinion he does not only claim to have understood the issue but he in fact did probe in it and approached its reality. He realized the vagueness of the truth on one hand and its misinterpretation based on, if we can say in modern language, substantialist fallacy on the other. He was the first man in print and then the controversy carried so weight and could easily be accepted if the philosophy of the two schools was placed in the historical perspective. Thus Shah Waliullah helped the scholars a great deal by ending them with the futility of the controversy.¹⁶

Explaining the similarities between majaz and ghalib Shah Waliullah brings to light a very important discussion. He begins it by asserting that the existence and concept are separable and are different on the basis of the qualitative. The existence in concept is an abstract existence and the existence perceived is characterized by

what qualities and the most important of them are the subjectivity and the existence itself. Shah Waliullah has made a contribution by pointing out the qualities in the objects. It should also be borne in mind that he does not speak of the common and essential qualities but is also aware of the qualities which make an object an individual. Thus it is suggestive of the fact that the objects possess two types of qualities namely :

(1) the common and essential qualities and (2) the individual qualities and each passing through the objects takes its what it is perceived. The existence is a common and essential quality of the objects. It runs through all the bodies and thus it exists, then all. It is on this basis that the doctrine of mujasidiyat is accepted by Shah Waliullah. Writing about the Shuhadiyat, Shah Waliullah agrees with the Mujasidi in the point of the existence of the attributes but he does not agree with him when he asserts that the world is not the manifestation but the reflection of the attributes. To Shah Waliullah the difference between the two statements is the difference of interpretation. Shah Waliullah again points out that the mujasidi is right to assert that the appeared and the appearing, i.e. reflected and the reflecting are different. It is on the will of

the reflecting to reflect as long as it desires. That is to say that the image formed after reflection rests in the body reflecting and it remains in the subject as long as body is present before it. He writes of its being the image of the same body it cannot however be asserted that the two are identical. Thus Araki, as Shih Shibubish thinks, perceived this identity in the state of ecstasy in which the distinction between the two simply *was* and the world is not clear due to the over powering of the rapturous cognition of the self. Thus Shih Shibubish points out that the followers should understand the state of Isha Araki and come on to others by considering it is the one of the many states of the self *taurus* (being) and it can be possible only by the right placement of the thought in its historical perspective.¹⁷

Writing about *mafi* Shih Shibubish points out the importance of self practices. He philosophically explains the two aspects of Islam namely the natural and the intended, the Shariah and *ghana* (sanctification). Each one of them is learned by different types of people i.e. (1) the rulers, nobles etc. and (2) by *poets*. It will not be out of place to mention here that the *sofia* have really rendered a great service for the *atoms* of

Islam. It is not mere a proposition but a fact based on the historical evidences. It should be taken as a contribution that Shah Waliullah discusses the development of sufism. Not only this, he also points out the nature of the phases and also informs us about their importance. Having described it he comes to the important problem of travelling (sawaj). According to him, since he did not come, he defines what is the will of God and also points out the different stages. On the basis of his discussion we may conclude that travelling (sawaj) is the course desired by God on which a traveller should go for the union with Him. Shah Waliullah also points out the importance of seclusion (khalwat) and poverty (faqr) in the safi course. Apart from it, he discusses absorption (jash). It is evident that absorption (jash) is more significant to the safi practices.²²

Having described it Shah Waliullah comes to discuss different attributes which are required by a safi with the help of his repetitive effects. To present a brief of them we shall give only their names :

- 1) attainment of purity : It is indeed necessary for a safi in particular and for the people in general. Cleanliness has been ordered by almost all the religions.

2) Attributa of Relief (Mishkat gahies) : The secret of this attribute lies in the contentment and relief of the heart. It can be acquired in three phases, (1) by sympathy of God, (2) by inclination of mercy (shamsa khamal) and (3) by the admittance of the light of the divine names.

3) Thereafter he discards the Omnia attributa which is acquired by seeking the proximity with the angels or the wali souls.¹⁸

Discussing the attribute of memory Shah Waliullah points out a very important thing. He holds that the knowledge of the object is gained with the help of the images. It is important because the western psychologists of our times also share the same view and then one comes across Shah Waliullah's thought he feels himself bound to admit his opinion. Shah Waliullah also described the importance of love. It, as we know, has a great importance in sufism and almost all the sufis have emphasised on its importance. It is the only way which leads to *ghayb*.

In the philosophy of Shah Waliullah we often find the refinement of the world of *form*. He is of the view that every object is the copy or manifestation of its *fact*. It even is argued that Shah Waliullah is influenced by

Plato who names these forms as Ideas. Like his ideas the forms of Greek ethicalism are also not present in this world but to another to which he, however, does not call the supernatural one. Not its being supernatural may be concluded with no difficulty.²⁰

Besides, that ethicalism often speaks of the attributes of God. He neither thinks them to be other than His essence nor he considers them excluded from His essence. In one opinion he makes Gods actual and considers essence over and above the attributes. Putting it in brief, that ethicalism points out that his attributes should be understood as simple but one should be careful to unfold it.²¹

Like many Greek and Muslim philosophers Greek ethicalism also bases his ethics on metaphysics. In the Introduction of the Chapter on his ethics we have strongly supported our contention by giving the example of Greek and Muslim philosophers. We need not repeat them here. His ethical philosophy is rooted in metaphysics. We shall also not be wrong to conclude that the code of conduct he recommends, is mystical in nature. It is rather indispensable for he himself was a practicing saint and thereby must have pronounced the best way of life.

Justice by definition is the science of right and

many causing thereby the vice and virtue. Shih Hsiieh-shih understanding the nature begins it with the definition of virtue. He is of the opinion that every object whether animate or inanimate possesses some attributes (Kung-shih). Recognizing then he holds that there are two types of attributes (Kung-shih) namely the natural or the innate ones and the acquired ones. In the case of inanimate object it may evidently be inferred that there arises no question of any acquired attributes. They must possess only the innate or the natural ones. It is in the case of man and some other higher animals that some attributes are acquired. The presence of innate attributes is essential in all the species though it is evident that there would be a difference in accordance with the nature of the things. Shih Hsiieh-shih then takes up some qualities (Kung-shih) which are common in the species. Shih Hsiieh-shih gives many examples of these common and essential qualities in different species, and in them he speaks of the common and essential qualities intended by different species. Some of them are shared by man and inanimate objects, some of them are common to man and plants, and others are shared by man and animals. These common and essential qualities shared by different species cannot be counted as their virtues for they are in

their very being or in other words insects. Their constitution cannot be considered as something specific which can separate them on their heads as virtuous or vicious. These qualities can be regarded as virtues in the case of species without which their existence is a matter of impossibility. In our opinion a hill without height cannot be imagined. That height can be taken as the virtue of a hill. But, as Shah Nizaiyah rightly remarks that it cannot be taken as virtue, for it is present in the very nature or being of it, and if at all it is counted as virtue the hill possesses it the most. On this basis we may infer that man also shares the attribute of height. But in the very same grade it is not a virtue at all. Similarly the qualities common between plants, animals and man can also not be counted as virtues, for they also are innate and their presence is essential. We have described these attributes in his ethics and it will be more explicated if we discuss them here again.

Having spoken of the common and essential qualities that Nizaiyah discusses the attributes particularly possessed by man alone. Some of them are, for example the high morals, courage and good efforts. To Shah Nizaiyah they are partial virtues, for many of them are possessed

by higher animals. Courage is one of the examples. There comes that the question as to what the virtue is. The answer to this question as Shih Hsiang-shan thinks, is that virtue is one controlled by soul and desired by reason. We may conclude that the acquired gongxiang are the virtues. They are present in the nature of man but are not realized unless attempted at and hence are called as the acquired virtue. Moreover, they are virtues because they control the animal and sensual tendencies harmful for the conduct of man.²²

It is not indispensable that the virtue is embodied in the action, and every action virtuous, however, be regarded as virtuous. It is virtuous and requires no clarity. Shih Hsiang-shan, admitting the fact, speaks of two types of actions namely one related to the world and the other related to clarity. Both the types of action are potential in man and be realized in purpose when the time demands. Courage, for example is shown at the time of danger, otherwise it lies hidden as potentiality and does not come forth unless demanded. Similar is the case with other actions related to the world. Shih Hsiang-shan is of the opinion that these actions are virtues but not in the full sense. And he is also wrong that all

of them cannot be regarded as virtues (aretes) for many of them belong to the animal tendencies which in no way do any good to man. The second type of actions, as Shah Malikian holds, are also potential in man, and since they are concerned with divinity and are the qualities of our souls are held as virtues in the real sense.²²

Like the modern psychologists, Shah Malikian speaks of the two types of tendencies in man, namely, the rational or spiritual tendencies and the animal tendencies. Not only the psychologists, the philosophers of different ages have admitted this fact. Aristotle, for example, recognised these tendencies present in man, but he distinguished them on the basis of reason or in other words the rational tendencies, and that is why he calls man as the rational animal. It is explicit that he calls him without fear to the presence of animality in him. Shah Malikian also acknowledges, as we have earlier pointed out, these two tendencies in man but for him as well the reason remains as the distinguishing force between man and the animal. Supporting our contention we may point out that it is, therefore that he lays much emphasis on the dominance of rational or spiritual tendencies and it is for this reason that he considers the second kind of actions as the virtues

in the real world as they existed in prayer and aspiration and are related to the angels or rational intellects. It is thus clear that Shih Hsiieh-shih, like many other philosophers and psychologists, considers reason to be the core of man alone.²⁴

It also stands as a fact that man being a man animality must be cultivated. And it is therefore that the philosophers have suggested different ways for his suppression. The Ishuquo, for example, as Shih Hsiieh-shih himself sometimes, preferred to destroy it completely. But it is rather difficult for a man to do it and as Shih Hsiieh-shih professes another way which in our opinion, is more psychological and suitable to the human nature. He holds that the complete destruction of animality is a matter of impossibility but it is true that it can be cultivated to a great extent and when it will be suppressed it is evident that the angels or rational intellects which we may call the divinity would dominate and his domination would result into the cultivation of the virtues in the real world (mundus) belonging to the second category of actions. Here Shih Hsiieh-shih shares many other philosophers which he does not mention. However, the way which he suggests is more practicable than the first one.

use to make his virtuous, and it is, indeed helpful in the evaluation of Qasbi, the virtue in the real sense. As we know, Qasbi has also used the word 'qasbiyat' but he uses it for the end which also includes in its pursuit the means by which the end is achieved. For Qasbi *qasbiyat* 'qasbiyat' is the virtue which consists in the cultivation of the habit of performing the second type of actions earning thereby the proper end the perfection.²⁵

The second type of actions lead to the creation of following virtues which must necessarily be possessed by a virtuous man. Qasbi believes that there are (1) purity (Taharat), (2) humility (Ihs), (3) detachment (Tawakkul), and (4) justice (Adalat). All of these virtues are cultivated voluntarily and when man becomes habitual of them, he finds themselves in their essence. It should not however²⁶ mean that Islam advocates for a complete detachment or segregation from desires but it does place that man should not engage himself in the pursuit of worldly pleasures to the extent that he should forget the life hereafter. Islam, thus being a practical religion, prescribes a way of life which is free neither of the extremes.²⁶

In spite of the fact the rule is general have

practised the life of detachment or at least they have not indulged themselves in the worldly desires at the cost of the blessings of God wanting thereby that they have led a life of piety and penitence. As to the earlier born disciples that many of the mafia believed in 'Varigat'. In connection with this the 'bhagavadgita' have already been referred. Those following the path of Varigat always led a life of complete detachment for the reason that attachment to the world creates disturbance in the presence, penitence and forgiveness of God. Detachment was become the most important virtue which is a must in the case of a monk. It will be worthwhile if we mention Ghazali in this connection. Having taught in the University of Baghdad for a long time his doubts regarding the knowledge he had gained forced him to leave that life and he went to seclusion to lead a life of complete detachment and sequestration. Having lived for a long in this state he came back to the institution with more glowing and better radiation of truth. Thus detachment has been the source of knowledge not only for Ghazali but also for many other mafia and saints. Buddha may also be referred in the same connection.²⁷

Shah Waliullah being a practicing mafia advocate

For the cultivation of this virtue. As we are aware of his life, he never lived in a complete detachment and sequestration but it also stands as a fact that he was never inclined towards the life of luxury and sensual pleasures. It may thus be concluded from his biography that the detachment he pleads for is the one advocated by Shariah.²⁰

Shah Waliullah is of the view that man should detach himself in all walks of life. He also speaks of the different forms used for it in different fields we have already discussed that is the others.

The last of these four cardinal virtues is justice (adl). It is the virtue which enables man for administration. Regarding it Shah Waliullah holds that the objectives of administration are in the world of angels or the world of soul (alame-e-ghaybi). The human soul has the capacity to acquire the attributes of administration, since man does not possess, the ability to know the will of God regarding the administration, God, therefore, sends prophets to teach man His signs which are in accordance with His will. It may be concluded that the selected ones, as we know all of them do not, are able to acquire this quality and they alone should have the privilege to look after the administration as soon the nation may

to live and be benefitted by his capacities and abilities.²⁸

Regarding this virtue, if properly analyzed we can safely assert that Shah Waliullah goes to some Plato and Aristotle. Plato in his "Republic" holds justice to be the highest virtue and on the basis²⁹ of his opinion that the philosopher should be the king of his ideal state. Shah Waliullah does not advocate the legacy of the Philosopher-king. In the matter of citizenship we do not consider that justice (distributive) is the highest kind of virtue. To him, however, it is, as it has been said, one of the cardinal virtues and like Plato he also holds that the selected heavy souls are able to acquire the equidistant of justice which helps them look after the administration. Imam Ghazali discusses in detail these cardinal virtues and Shah Waliullah especially mentions the term of Ghazali, "Dhya-ul-akhir". This shows the impact of Ghazalian thought on Shah Waliullah. Shah Waliullah considers the above described virtues as the cardinal ones, but along with it he also mentions over other notions which are either to be taken as virtues or as vices. In his ethics he first takes up the notions held as virtues.

The first one of them is the belief in the unity of God. He considers it as one of the essential virtues to be possessed by one or he would not be taken it be a Muslim.

describing is he speaks of the stages, namely the belief in the unity of God (1) as the only existence, (2) as the only creator, (3) as the only designer of the universe and (4) as the only one to be worshipped.³⁰

In the light of his discussion on the unity of God we shall not be wrong to infer that Shah Waliullah advocates for a perfect belief in His unity. By describing the stages he seems to point out that God is the only one in all respects and there is none to share him at any stage. Like him, Ghazali also speaks of the same stages.

The essence of these various notions is the belief in the attributes of God. All the Muslims and the followers of different religious believe in His attributes and have interpreted them in a very controversial way. In dealing with Shah Waliullah's metaphysics we have already referred to the controversy regarding the attributes and the debate in the schools of Muslim philosophy. Such controversies, however, are found in other religions as well. There is no doubt that they are different in nature. Shankara, for example, advocates the belief in the God without attributes (Nirgun Brahma) and considers him to be really real. Shah Waliullah also takes up the problem and presents his own solution. He considers the attributes to

be the studies which should carefully be pursued, but in the difficulties he agrees with the Islamic view that the sciences must be contemplated over them. Besides, he also describes their categories namely (1) the studies which is to be thought over by Shar'iah, (2) the studies disallowed to be thought over by Shar'iah, and (3) the studies to be thought over as per necessity. For instance, laughing (qawaf), happiness (farhat) etc. belong to the first category; eating and learning are included in the second category; and the studies like that of knowledge such as seeing, hearing etc. come under the category of the third category. By giving these categories Shah Waliullah wants to point out that belief in the obligation is necessary but the prominence or non may misled the people. Putting it up, we may even conclude that Shah Waliullah was aware of the controversies and also had an insight in the difficulties to be faced by the people in general if they contemplate over them. And it is, therefore, that he considers them as studies, and thus he points out the difference between the actual and the actual. One should not, however, be mistaken as the other.³¹

Shah Waliullah is of the opinion that the destiny

is greatest of all virtues. In order to support his contention he cites certain traditions which we have mentioned in his ethics. Besides, he also speaks of the five stages namely (1) the stage of Iman, (2) the stage of Niyah, (3) stage of Adam's creation of man and his peculiarly, (4) stage of the fusion of the soul into the loahut and (5) it is the stage when the events happening in the world of matter are recorded in the world of heaven. From the discussion of these stages it is clear that when Mulla Ali has a staunch belief in destiny and predestines it with the same love and pleasure. The stages categorically suggest that Mulla Ali does not believe in complete freedom of will but it should also be taken into account that he neither denies the freedom of man. He is of the view that in spite of the determinism man has been given the power of choice and this implies that he is responsible for his right and wrong deeds. It can, however, be affirmed that in all stage of destiny described here every thing regarding man has been destined. The affirmation would be that still it would lead us to conclude that the power of choice is also included and being the destiny of man he should be held responsible for the right and wrong. Putting it in brief, it may be

concluded that Shah Waliullah, like Aquinas, advocates *qasr* determinism on the rationalist grounds.³³

In the discussion of virtues, Shah Waliullah also takes up worship. He regards it as one of the greatest virtues and should cultivate in him for it benefits him and satisfies his nature. Shah Waliullah repeatedly emphasises on the importance of worship. He regards it as essential for the training of *qasr* and it not has also brought to light his *iqra*. He regards the *qasr* as polytheistic. He thinks there is no case who worship the planets, and what actually causes our situation is that is also considering Christians as polytheistic. Christianity, as we know, is one of the monotheistic religions and has preached *tauhid* but there is no doubt that the notion in Christianity is much like the *tanbihat*, for it advocates the belief in the unity in Trinity. Shah Waliullah and other Muslim thinkers, however, could not agree with this unity for the Holy Quran categorically asserts that there is none but Allah. He has neither been hostile nor has been hostile by anyone. The followers of Christianity believe that the Christ is the son of God. The belief is against the concept of the Holy Quran and *tauhid*, therefore, is held by Muslims. Moreover being the son means sharing

instead and any such proposition would certainly lead to polytheism. It is therefore that Shah Waliullah considers Christians as polytheists.

As Islam categorises, Shah Waliullah also classifies the sins as the major and the minor ones.³³

Apart from it, he speaks of other virtuous actions like prayer (salat), fasting (sawm), holy war (jihad) pilgrimages (hujra) (hajj), holy war (jihad), abolition (zakaat), bathing (ghusl). In addition to this he also describes the secrets lying behind these virtues.³⁴

Shah Waliullah has given a complete system of ethics. He has not discussed the aliptous sins but has also described the vices. At the outset of the discussion of the sins he takes up polytheism. It means that to him it is the greatest evil and next, therefore, he eradicates from the society. We shall not be wrong to assert that any of the religions, particularly the muslim ones have attempted to its eradication and turning successful to a great extent. As a consequence to this, a great number of people profess a belief in monism or atheismism, but even after that polytheism is prevalent and has lived at the attention of the philosophers like Shah Waliullah. He has not only discussed dispositions, and also considers it

necessary for building up a higher moral conduct. He is
 of the view that the worship should be performed by will
 and not by habit. Next he explains the meaning of will. The
 power of will lies in the power of choice. He explains it
 by criticising the philosophy that the will implies doing
 and not doing of an action, and before it is done or not
 done it does not mean anything, meaning thereby that the
 action is prior to will, its performance depends on it.
 Then he explains that the action is prior to will. It is
 created by God, first in world of forms and then in the
 world of disform and man chooses its doing or not doing,
 and worship being one of the virtuous actions should be
 chosen by man by his own will. Rationalising it further
 he asserts that (1) God should be worshipped as He has
 created man, (2) He should be worshipped as He creates the
 virtuous and destroys the vicious. In addition to this,
 he also takes up the problem whether the sinner will be
 redeemed. Explaining it he is of the view that there
 should be a difference between an atheist, a sage, and a
 believer, and as they are different in stages, they should
 be dealt with differently in the life hereafter. In this
 connection he presents an analogy of a bird in a cage. He
 does not repeat so far, however, on the basis of this

disbeliever (that willful sinners) he concludes that the
 believer and the non-believer cannot be treated as equal
 fortinques. His view is supported by the traditioner that
 some will be burnt in the fire of hell, others will face
 (the blazes and still others will be tortured for sometime
 and thereafter released. Thus it is evident that the sinner
 is distinguished from the non-believer and will be released
 after a sufficient torture for his misdeeds. The next
 controversy he resolves by pointing out that there are two
 types of actions namely (a) voluntary, (b) involuntary and
 (2) laws. They are also of two types, (i) necessary and
 (ii) probable. Explaining (i) he gives the example of a
 statement of a person declaring that the poison necessarily
 causes death. The other denies the statement and challenges
 its necessity. To him a person taking poison may survive.
 Thus in one case it is necessary, and in the other it is
 probable. The example suggests that the necessary and
 probably is relative. What is necessary in the case
 of man may be probable in the case of God. To note (ii)
 explicit we should take up the proposition that God
 rewards the virtuous and punishes the vice but He can do
 otherwise. Let us refer here to Mutakallim who considered
 it as necessary, and, again, to Asharites who thought it

it is probable meaning thereby what is necessary may either be possible in the case of God as He is all powerful and cannot be disappointed. On this basis we may conclude that Shih Weichieh suggests that a sin may be forgiven. The position that he takes up is the one taken by the Advaitism, but the difference lies in its explanation.³⁵

In addition to the other pervasions brought about by the sin, it affects the outward behaviour of man. As he lives in the society he must behave in a way which does not affect the institution, and if he does not do so, not only the society but he too will be affected and the development of both, man and society will be hampered. Thus the reformations in the outward behaviour is a must. In our opinion, most of the religious attempt at wiping out the social evils, so that man and society may progress.³⁶

The second aspect consists in the blessing and curse of the higher angels in "theological order". Their blessing is reward and their curse is punishment. Shih Weichieh clarifies it saying that finally God blessed the virtuous and punished the vicious. Man having the power of choice cannot any one of them for himself. Realising this, he holds that every man must be contented and relieved if he does in accordance with his nature and if he acts

otherwise it feels suffocation and torture. The same is true in the case of man. He possesses the divine disposition (Latifah nasabah) which is the case of his nature, consequently, he must perform the actions satisfying this disposition. If his actions correspond to his nature, he feels satisfaction, and if the case is otherwise, he feels torture and pain. On the topic of this discussion we may conclude that that Wahidist is of the view that man is guided by his nature, and he may remain as if the *ghaybiyyah* does not disturb his divinity. But the Muslims presented after him is *ishlah* is the case of necessity and so he feels disappointed and discontented. That Wahidist also points out that the reward brings delight and the punishment leads to abhorrence and torture.³⁷

In the light of the previous discussion we may conclude that that Wahidist presents a complete system of ethics. Regarding ethics he is of the view that it will be determined in accordance with the species. The virtue in the case of other species of animals will be the innate attributes (*Khassiyah nasab*) and in case of man it will be determined on the basis of acquiring those qualities helping the dominance of divinity present in the essence of man. Regarding destiny it has been

maintained that he advocates semi-determinism. Shih Hsiueih has not rejected the principle of reward and punishment, instead of it he holds that God being the knower of all things also knows the destiny of man which he will choose for himself in his future. Shih Hsiueih is also of the view that blessing and curse of God depends on his will. Like Asharites he never likes to limit the power of God in any sphere. In our opinion Shih Hsiueih, by considering man to be good by nature, presents an ideal of man who is perfect in all respects and that man is *tsungshih tshungshih* (Jungshi-Kungshi).

To conclude the account, we may assert that Shih Hsiueih presents a complete philosophy which is tinged by religion. He has not only influenced his contemporaries but also the later generations. And for a long time the justice within scholars have been interpreting his philosophy. Their interpretations require a perceptive study which I wish to take up thereafter.

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